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This thesis will examine the administration of executive compensation in listed 
companies in South Africa in order to understand the background to the topical 
emotion expressed by the public about the quantum of executive earnings. The 
Thesis attempts to explain how approaches are made to these vast payments. It 
commences with the history of the management of executive compensation. Before 
the 1990s, disclosure of directors' emoluments was limited to one amount. 
Companies suffered losses due to the Agency Theory where executives dominated 
boards. With the introduction of remuneration committees and corporate 
governance, control was moved to a committee of the board of -non-executive 
directors (a remuneration committee). The purpose of this research was to ascertain 
whether such a committee is effective. Interviews were held with leading executives 
and an analyst. An electronic survey was dispatched to the chief executive officers 
and chief financial officers of a large selection of listed companies. 
The results of the research are summarised and conclusions expressed on all such 
views with the addition of limited input of the author's views. The question requires 
an examination of the effectiveness of remuneration committees. Some suggestions 
are also made as to future research and actions which may be conducted. 
This thesis shows that remuneration committees are not as effective as they should 











DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS 
The research will be based on certain fundamental assumptions noted in the 
following definitions: 
Appropriate Dates - Companies Act and King Reports 
At the date of submission of this Research, the Companies Act Number 61 of 1973 
has been referred to throughout. The Companies Act Number 71 of 2008 has been 
passed but is only effective from 2010. The King Report 2 was finalised in 2002 and 
the King Report 3 of 2009 has only recently been issued and has thus not been 
taken into account, unless a specific recommendation has been considered. 
Camouflage 
That which compensation designers do to attempt to hide, obscure and to justify the 
amount and form of excessive pay. (See Rents and Outrage, below) 
CEO 
Chief Executive Officer - the head of the Executive Branch of the organisation. 
CFO 
Chief Financial Officer. The head of all the financial operations of the organisation. 
Chaebol 
A South Korean form of business conglomerate. The Korean word means "business 
group" or "trust" and is often used the way "Big Business" is used in English. 
Compensation 
Includes all emoluments including the customary (e.g. monthly) salary, bonus, 
penSion and medical aid contributions, use of vehicles and other assets, and all 












"Concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals. The aim is to align as nearly as possible 
the interests of individuals, corporations and society. Corporate governance is the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled." (Cad bury, 1992). 
Executive 
Includes only those persons at the head of an organisation. Without being too 
prescriptive this will include the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Managing 
Director (MD) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). The Chairman is specifically 
excluded because corporate governance recommends only an independent non-
executive chairman whose remuneration is not that of a full time employee and he 
does not have a specific function in the day-to-day operations of the firm. Thus, non-
executive directors who are also in a similar position to the chairman are similarly 
excluded. 
He/She - Gender 
Throughout references are made to the male firstly, as a matter of convenience; then 
the point has been made that a substantial majority of the executives of listed 
companies are male. No chauvinistic intention exists. 
JSE 
The South African Stock Exchange formally known as the JSE Securities Exchange. 
NASDAQ 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotations. 
An automatic information network that provides brokers and dealers with price 
quotations on securities traded over-the-counter. (USA) 
Non-executive Director (NED) or Outside Director 
A member of the board of directors of a company who does not form part of the 
executive management team. They are not employees of the company or affiliated 











members of the board also serving as executive managers of the company (most 
often as corporate officers). To be an independent Non - executive director there 
should be no business connection, for example an attorney whose firm conducts 
substantial legal matters, a supplier; there should be no meaningful connection 
through a shareholding of the director including his family, clients, family trusts. The 
difference between an independent non-executive director and a non- executive 
director is not stressed herein in order not to confuse the major issues about non-
executive directors with the issues about executive directors. 
NYSE 
The New York Stock Exchange. 
Organisations 
Do not only refer to profit earning companies but governmental agencies such as 
heads of government, the judiciary and parastatals. 
Outrage Costs 
The constraints that place some limits on deviations from arms-length contracting 
which would be between two independent objective parties. (Similarly see 
Camouflage and Rents). 
Perks or Perquisites. 
Non - pecuniary benefits. 
Rents 
That which managers use their power in order to secure extra value beyond what 
they would obtain under arms-length bargaining, due to their positional advantage. 
(Also see Camouflage and Outrage Costs) 
S.E.C 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, whose mission is to protect 













The Stock Exchange News Service of the South African JSE Stock Exchange. 
Unitary Board 
A single board of directors rather than separate management and supervisory 
boards, Ideally, the unitary board would be composed mainly of independent non-
executive directors. Such independent non - executive directors would mainly having 
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A lack of controls existed over the CEO and his remuneration before the 1990s. This 
can be described as compensation failure. With no disclosure, shareholders were 
not aware of the compensation of executives. The strong CEO operated with a board 
that he either effectively controlled or there was no controlling or shareholder or one 
holding a sizeable voting shareholding. When a board did not have the support of 
shareholders, major issues were pushed by the CEO through board meetings. The 
board had very little knowledge of the detailed operations of the company and was 
intimidated into accepting what they were told. As far as remuneration and the terms 
of employment of the CEO go, what was said in his contract, and what actually took 
place had different interpretations with the CEO being assertive on his own position. 
This problem relates to Agency Theory. It is dealt with in full in a chapter in this 
study. 
According to Section 297 of the South African Companies Act, number 61 of 1973 
there is an obligation to disclose in financial statements "particulars showing the 
amount (in total) of emoluments received by all Directors." Disclosure of individual 
directors' emoluments was previously non-existent. Thus, the compensation of the 
CEO was, accordingly, unknown. There were other decisions that could otherwise 
have been taken in the interests of the company. Examples would be in the 
acquisition of businesses where a short-term decision might be better for the CEO's 
personal share options (which have time limits), rather than making a long-term 
acquisition that would be more beneficial to the company. 
In South Africa, the UK and the USA full disclosure about Executive Compensation is 
now required. In the USA the SEC, in South Africa it is called for by the King Report 
through the JSE and in the UK by the Cadbury and Greenbury commissions which 











of corporate governance specifically related to financial reporting and accountability" 
and were introduced by the London Stock Exchange, which requires complete 
disclosure (Cadbury, 1992.10). 
1.2 The Public Perception 
The complaints about the "grossly excessive" compensation paid to "these greedy" 
executives are mainly read in the print media. Such perceptions raise emotions that 
can fairly be described as jealousy. A balanced society is important thus, the press 
have a duty to guide society. Why should the person at the till of Woolworths earn, 
say, R 35 000 per annum whereas the chairman's compensation package may be 
some R 6 million? Are two human beings so very different? That is not a subject for 
this treatise but it is important when the remuneration committee considers the vast 
differences that cause this emotion. This was expressed in a 2006 study, 
Remuneration of Chief Executive Officers: An overview of JSE listed companies, 
(National Union of Metal Workers of SA, 2006) Solidarity, a trade union movement 
which found that 
As at the end of 2005, the average Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a 
company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) earned between 
R 3 and R 4 million per year or between 35 and 53 times the total 
remuneration of the average worker; 
The average basic salary of a CEO ranges between R 1, 5 m and R 1, 7 m 
per month (sic); 
Basic salaries of CEOs increased by an average of 18, 5% between 2004 and 
2005; and, 
No direct relationship could be established between the company profits and 
the salaries, bonuses and total emoluments of CEOs. 
Even at executive level, at interviews conducted for purposes of this research, it was 
related to this author, that executives would have a great interest in the annual 











results, but also in order to compare (emotionally) the emoluments paid to 
executives with their own earnings. 
Trade unions carefully watch results and rates of increases in executive 
compensation can thus be a factor in negotiations. Kantor (2006:2) verified this to 
the author. These problems do not simplify the task of the remuneration committee in 
making compensation decisions. 
1.3 Research Writings and Methodology 
This thesis will take the reader through an examination of research writings on 
remuneration committees reporting on interviews held with a variety of persons .. An 
electronic survey was conducted in which executives of listed companies expressed 
their views, which views will be analysed and presented to the reader. 
The intention is to present the reader with a balanced view on the perceived 
effectiveness of remuneration committees of listed companies in South Africa and to 
ascertain whether the research can add knowledge and contribute to the betterment 
of economic and employment conditions in South Africa. 
Whilst the main question asks whether remuneration committees are effective, the 
'supplementary questions' asked are: 
• Whether the perception of remuneration committees and the reality are the 
same thing? (Symbolism versus substance) 
• How remuneration committees are constituted? 
• How well and what are the qualifications of the members? 
• What is their structure and what are their functions? 
• What research says about how effective they are? 












The "conversion" from the agency problems (lack of controls) shown in the Agency 
Theory over to the systems applied to overcome these problems calls for an 
examination of whether there has been success. 
1.4 Current Events 
Compensation and the position of NEDs is currently a major global item of 
contention. As the global economy worsens, scapegoats are not difficult to find in the 
huge downturns in financial institutions. The first point of call is the "vast, huge, 
excessive, etc." payments made to the CEOs duly followed up by the question about 
who approved such payments. The financial press reported on one of the most 
prominent and substantial crashes concerning the Royal Bank of Scotland now 
nearly 70 per cent owned by UK taxpayers after a £20 billion rescue last year.(See 
Business Report International ,1 11 February 2009:22). Almost every financial 
journal and newspaper has featured the events prominently. Last year the CEO Fred 
Goodwin received a £4,19 million salary including a £2,86 million bonus. Formerly 
regarded as one of the world's top bankers blamed for the ill-timed take over of ABN 
Amro, Chairman, Tom McKillop, is now regarded as having failed to keep the CEO in 
check. He received a £750 000 payment in November 2007 (Is he a NED if he earns 
such a high salary?). He is quoted as being "profoundly sorry" for the bank's 
problems. In HBOS Bank a similar position appears - taken over by L10yds Bank, 44 
per cent owned by taxpayers after bank received a £17 billion bailout, the CEO was 
paid £ 1,93 including bonus and incentives of £694,000. The chairman waived his 
rights to a pay-off when he left. These events cause a complete loss of confidence 
in the system that controls the compensation of those entrusted with the largest and 
most trusted institutions. In the press report the four bankers are reported as having 
called on the banking sector to "tweak its maligned pay system". The problems with 











1.5 The King Commission and the Introduction of South African 
Remuneration Committees 
The complaints resulted in setting up the commission under an esteemed Judge 
Mervyn EKing, SC, known as the King Commission on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa. The first report in 1994 was followed up by the second report of 2002. 
(The King Committee, 2002:8) described the problem saying 
"Investors were worried about excessive concentration of power in the hands 
of managers with the era of the professional manager. This protection against 
greed could encourage the sins of sloth and fear with an erosion of enterprise 
and an encouragement of subservience. A balance is needed." 
(Then) President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn, quoted in The King Report 
(King, 2002:7) said that 
'The proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world 
economy as the proper governing of countries". 
The King Committee, (2002:28) recommended the formation of board committees of 
which the minimum were to be audit and remuneration committees, with a charter 
that would include delegated powers and reporting procedures, free to take 
independent outside professional advice as and when necessary. 
The King Committee, (2002:28)wanted non-executive directors to play important 
roles in board committees including the requirements that one of them be chairman 
having the obligation to submit an annual report to shareholders. The JSE supported 
the report and required member companies to comply with these recommendations. 
Because the JSE approved and is monitoring the regulations no government controls 
and interference with private businesses have been introduced. 
Since the King Report was adopted, every South African listed company is required 











the introduction of the 2002 King 2 report. Having described the background to and 
importance of this public problem the purpose of this review becomes clear - to 
perform research on whether such committees are effective. 
1.6 Structure of the Remuneration Committee 
Chapter 3 is devoted to showing the structure, membership, duties and functions of 
the Remuneration Committee. The specialised and important nature of the 
remuneration of executives is not a matter that can be fully attended to in a usually 
busy main board agenda. 
This Research will examine whether the committee is a pro- active committee or 
merely one whose function is to advice and consent. If the members of the 
remuneration committee are not the right persons then the results can be disastrous 
as they have a great responsibility in their hands. 
1.7 Incentives 
Chapter 3, where remuneration committees are explained, links incentives to the 
remuneration functions of the remuneration committee. Employment of an executive 
today is usually based on basic compensation, to which is added profit sharing. 
Large sums are often paid as bonuses. These are usually substantially in excess of 
the earnings of the vast majority of workers and as such the company bears a 
responsibility to all personnel, to shareholders and society in general. Therefore, 
they should be calculated and examined most carefully. The responsibility for the 
supervision of these bonuses rests on the remuneration committee where the 
capacity for error exists in many ways as the committee members are not directly 
involved in the basic figures contained therein. The perfect fit is to appoint the right 
CEO and the right top team. One quote from an interview in this study bears 
repeating -"The difference between a good company and an excellent company is 











It will be of importance to know whether the executive has been motivated by 
remuneration committees to do the utmost for the shareholder/company - either by 
the incentive method or by the stewardship system. 
How accurate is, the incentive system and what are its failings? Is more shareholder 
involvement beneficial, workable, or desirable in place of or in addition to 
remuneration committee governance? Are present regulations adequate and should 
they be supplemented? These will be viewed herein not only in South African 
companies but also in other countries like USA and UK. 
1.8 Nepotism and Cronyism 
In Chapter 6 the results and analysis of the electronic survey expresses the views of 
respondents. This aspect is viewed with many deep arguments for and against, and 
the effect on the company, of cronyism and nepotism. Evidence is hardly ever placed 
before shareholders to show what steps boards take in making new appointments of 
directors who may thereafter be appointed to the remuneration committee. It is fair to 
say that the remuneration committee is as good as its members but then the one of 
the important factors of the success of the company is as good as that remuneration 
committee. 
1.9 Remuneration Consultants 
Under the section "Taking Independent Advice" in Chapter 3, the expert knowledge 
on remuneration from consultants who operate in the wider market is explained. The 
view has been expressed simplistically that such consultants could carry out the 
work of a remuneration committee on their own quite easily. However, the charter of 
a remuneration committee is much wider than the quantum of compensation that is 
the bent of such remuneration consultants. The remuneration committee also knows 











1.10 Shareholder Power 
Chapter 4 (The Literature Review) and Chapter 6 (Results and Analysis of Research 
Undertaken) deal extensively with the question whether shareholders should have 
the say over executive compensation or whether remuneration committees are better 
equipped. Bebchuk and Fried (2004: 16) claim there is much abuse by executives 
stemming from their position, the solution being increased monitoring roles by 
directors and larger (institutional) shareholders. They use stronger terms such as 
"defective board monitoring" recommending "shareholder power". Remuneration 
committees are not completely accepted and this review will report on the views 
expressed both in favour of and against the remuneration committee system as well 
as support for and opposition to shareholders involvement in work undertake by a 
remuneration committee. 
A "fat cat" furore erupted in the UK over a 75 per cent pay rise awarded to the CEO 
of British Gas, which then encapsulated itself to the Greenbury Committee and 
thereafter to recommendations for the formation of the remuneration committee. This 
was then followed by Hampel (1998: 1.17) who said that they were equally concerned 
with the positive contribution which good corporate governance can make. The 
important Combined Code on Corporate Governance was then introduced launching 
details of requirements that had not previously been formalised. 
1.11 Substance and Symbolism 
Westphal and Zajac (1994) in their article Substance and Symbolism in CEO Long 
Term Incentive Plans find that a large number of companies adopt, but only to a 
limited extent actually use, long-term incentive plans. This suggests that there is a 
separation between substance and symbolism in CEO employment contracts in 
which symbols are more prevalent in companies with a strong CEO and a poor 
performance record. They attribute the cause to be the problem by a board who wish 
to exhibit legitimacy in aligning agency costs to the company. It is this avoidance of 
substance and the application of symbolism merely to impress that has brought 











regulation such as that which was introduced by the JSE and the King Report. The 
actual consequence is that the long term incentive plans (L TIP) are "seen but not 
heard" or noted but not applied. 
1.12 Solving Conflicts 
Chapter 2 explains handling of conflicts. Under the Agency Theory method 
Henderson (2007) doubts whether the current practices are a solution to the agency 
problem created by the separation of control in large public companies and refers to 
the acts of a powerful manager in extracting what he terms "rents". This is the classic 
conflict of interest situation. Agency Theory is based on self-interest with no altruistic 
desires especially in a situation where the agent's own pockets are the beneficiaries. 
The manager will have no real incentive to promote the welfare of the firm. A strong 
term "abuse" features in some writings. The structure outside the firm is also related 
to the remuneration control problem. Thus, Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong, (2007) 
argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO 
pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. This leads to the conflict 
between Agency Theory, remuneration committees and shareholder power, - issues 
that will be dealt with herein. 
1.13 Controls 
How good are all the systems and how well are all the controls applied? Do the 
NEDs really make a contribution to the remuneration decisions taken by their 
committee or do they merely advice and consent with a few pertinent questions 
added. The remuneration committee reports tabled annually before shareholders 
show many activities of the committee but how effective are these? 
Does the remuneration committee merely state what should have been done, not 
that which should actually have been done especially in order to cover any pointed 












Chapter 3 presents criticism of the NED as well as discussion of their independence. 
Chapter 6 gives the views of those surveyed on their independence. 
1.14 Symmetry of Information 
The main board and remuneration committee receive and rely upon information 
placed before them regarding the operation of the company by the executives. 
Research, which will be dealt with in Chapter 4 was quoted earlier on Agency 
Theory, referred to writers who dealt with the difficulties of shareholders and boards 
verifying the symmetry of such information. The difficulty of verifying information 
submitted by the executive due to internal control problems, audit problems, 
performance evaluations, costs and the functions of the non-executive board not 
embracing active participation will be outlined. Thus, remuneration committees are 
set up by boards who establish a charter embracing duties that assist in resolving 
this problem. 
These functions are not extensive being almost a monitoring function This research 
must consider the extent and consider what Westphal and Zajac (1994) called the 
substance and symbolism of the functions set out. What is vital to the company is 
whether the NEDs adhere strictly to the rules and procedures and present a "plan" 
(also called a long term incentive plan) to shareholders which all looks very good or 
whether these plans are implemented in such a way that the company can go 
forward in a positive manner to promote itself for the present and the long term 
future. Chapter 4 (Literature Review) deals with such Long Term Incentive Plans 
(L TIP) and Total Shareholder Returns (TSR). 
1.15 South African Research 
Strong South African criticism of the remuneration committee system is more 
important than reviews of those in the UK and USA. Mongalo (2003) attacks the 
structure and application of the systems from numerous angles and Crotty and 










1.16 Government Controls 
History showed that should there be weaknesses in the remuneration committee 
systems the unfortunate alternative could be for the government to institute controls. 
Reference to Chapter 2 on Agency Theory under Conflicts expounds on this. 
1.17 The Research Questions and Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the perceived effectiveness of remuneration 
committees in deciding on executive remuneration in South African listed companies. 
The research is to ascertain how such committees operate, the public perception of 
remuneration committees and why there are problems and how those problems can 
be solved. 
There is unhappiness about executive compensation not only in the views of 
investors but of the public. Reassurance is needed that all is not wrong, that there 
are systems in place to prevent executives from unfairly extracting Rents from 
companies and that our economy is not suffering because companies are improperly 
administered and prices become too high as one of the consequences. When a 
company pays its executives unexplained sums, either too high or too low, with 
investors being left in the dark a loss of confidence results. This occurs despite there 
possibly being a more than adequate explanation. The corporate governance of the 
company is called in to question and the share price will suffer. Overseas and 
particularly in the UK, remuneration committees report extensively on their activities. 
The "devil is in the detail" which can virtually never be enough. Viewing the reports of 
such companies (Appendix 4 furnishes a sample report) will illustrate this and show 
some of the knowledge that can be added to our South African structure. In essence 
- Knowledge Begets Confidence - which will flow from this research. 
The public wants to know and they need to know and are entitled to know what 
remuneration committees are about, how they operate, and whether they properly 
consider executive compensation. A search for information on remuneration 











be successful. The subject is topical and conversational with investors having 
decided views. They are thus entitled to know and this research is striving to 
contribute to that knowledge. In the research, it will be necessary to see whether 
remuneration committees are effective enough to give effect the purposes for which 
they were established and whether in South Africa, they can be improved and make 
a more substantial contribution to the economy and to corporate governance. 
Remuneration committees have been introduced to companies and research has 
been carried out to see whether a committee is or has been effective in the limited 
number of years since birth. The UK has been advanced in its requirements for the 
Remuneration Committee although institutions felt that they had not gone far enough 
(supra the literature review). This major problem must also be viewed referring to 
committees of less than a decade. The research commences with information on the 
problematic Agency Theory (Chapter 2) and is followed by information on the 
structure of remuneration committees (Chapter 3). The Literature Review follows in 
Chapter 4, after which in Chapters 5 and 6 research conducted by the writer is dealt 
with and finally in Chapter 7 the conclusions with areas for further research are set 












HISTORY OF REMUNERATION FROM AGENCY THEORY 
2.1 Introduction: What Is Agency Theory? 
The agency relationship is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of 
social interaction which Ross,(1973:134) defines as "a relationship that arises 
between two (or more) parties when one designated as the agent acts for, on behalf 
of, or as representative for the other being the designated principal in a particular 
domain of decision problems." Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) define an agency 
relationship as "A contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.) "There is a separation of 
ownership and control that has lead to the notorious 'agency problem'" (Solomon, 
2007:17). 
Agency Theory is the principle where the agent performs his function using 
excessive power to undertake the business of the organisation mainly to his own 
benefit whereas it should be applied for the benefit of those to whom he is 
accountable. In Agency Theory when reference is made to agent and principal this 
means that, the agent is the executive or manager, and usually the CEO and the 
principal is the shareholder or owner of the organisation. The losses to the 
organisation caused by the actions of the agent are known as agency costs. The 
principals incur these losses when their interests and those of the agents diverge. 
2.2 Agency Theory and Remuneration Committees 
Agency Theory deals with the systems that were in operation prior to the introduction 
of the remuneration committee to which it is the antithesis. Various methods to 
undertake control of agency costs have been researched. The one most often 
referred to is the agent's contract. The administration of these systems takes place 











review. The problems that are part of Agency Theory led to the formation of 
remuneration committees details of which are more fully described in the ensuing 
chapter. 
2.3 Conflicts 
The Principal-to-Agent relationship opens the door to conflict. These conflicts affect 
how the executive administers the company. The departures from shareholder-
regarding strategies may involve inefficient behaviour according to Bebchuk and 
Fried (2004: 16) which reduces the size of the pie and causes agency costs. Agents 
tend to maximise rationally their own utility at the expense of their principals 
(Sanchez, 2007:5). Jensen and Smith (1984) and Cohen and Uliana(1990:7) found 
in their research that mainly in the USA the issues are addressed on conflicts of 
interest between self-interested individuals in organisations. This problem is not, 
however, restricted to the USA but is worldwide. Executive compensation will be 
shown herein to be an important factor often considered as a measure of dealing 
with the problem. A further measure to achieve maximum value for shareholders is 
for the executive to have the real incentives and enthusiasm to promote the firm. 
Research into Agency Theory will show in Chapter 4 (Literary Research) that many 
authors provide suggested solutions to the problems in the relationship between the 
agent and the firm. Such solutions were applied in detail by implementing mutually 
beneficial employment contracts. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004:72-74) recognise the agency problem in the managerial 
power analysis. They explain that when managers/agents use their power to secure 
extra value beyond what they personally would obtain under arms-length bargaining 
then economists uses the term "Rents". Such arms-length bargaining takes place 
with a board that has both the inclination to maximize shareholder value and the 
necessary time and information to perform that task properly. The manager who 
makes decisions, administers, and implements those decisions is not the ultimate 
beneficiary of those decisions. This can then result in the manager taking different 
actions that may not be as beneficial to the ultimate beneficiaries 











outsiders whose opinions affect the attitudes adopted by boards. Bebchuk and Fried, 
(2004:61-68) continue that the extent that boards are deterred depends on whether 
the board sees the rents as unjustified, abusive or egregious. They refer to the 
negative term used by outsiders as outrage costs. These limits are placed on 
managers and directors. That which compensation designers do to attempt to hide, 
obscure and to justify the amount and form of excessive pay is called camouflage. 
The objective behind camouflaging (as the word itself suggests) is to bring about a 
perception of the costs of compensation that can limit criticism. The notion of 
camouflage is consistent with the possibility that an outsider might identify the hidden 
rents of a compensation arrangement that might otherwise be less visible. 
A fuller description of agency costs defines them as the sum of the out-of-pocket 
costs of structuring, administering and enforcing contracts, both formal and informal, 
plus the residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976:137). Agency costs include all costs 
frequently referred to as contracting costs, transaction costs, moral-hazard costs 
and information costs. 
2.4 Systems to Resolve Conflicts 
The board or shareholders have the choice whether to use the "carrot or the stick" -
the "incentive/persuade or punish" approach - that is a balance between what 
persuasion should be applied, alternatively that incentives should be offered. The 
punishment might be the threat of what could happen if the agent did not produce 
the results expected. Of benefit to both parties in the process of incentivising a 
manager is that whatever method is to be applied to incentivise the CEO the most 
successful one will be that in which a board causes him to voluntarily and 
enthusiastically of his own volition administer the firm. Barnard, (1968) believes it is 
best that the individual must be induced to co-operate. Incentives are fundamental in 
formal organisations and in consensus efforts to organise. Conversely, inadequate 
incentives mean dissolution, failure, or change of purpose. One must then consider 











Barnard, (1968) refers to the net satisfaction which results from the positive 
advantages as opposed to the disadvantages and cites an example of making 
employment positively attractive or less onerous. Some of the objectives listed as 
incentives are money or material items such as goods. Negative items are listed as 
working hours or conditions of work. Depending on the state of mind, the agent can 
be induced to contribute by a combination of negative and positive incentives. 
With the huge problem of information asymmetry, controls need to be imposed by 
remuneration committees to reduce the agent's self-serving behaviour and in the 
process reduce agency costs. These controls include, firstly, performance 
evaluations, then internal controls and lastly audits. "Shareholders cannot control nor 
watch what the agent is doing" (Jensen & Murphy, 1998:229) Viewing the position of 
shareholders and a board, shareholders are inactive except when attending a few 
meetings per annum. They appoint a non - executive board so that monitoring does 
not start from a positive position. The principals have to put in place situations of 
trust that incentivise the manager. Thus, the manager's contract is a start of one of 
the systems that are used to apply as part of the control mechanism. Substantial 
research deals with the provisions of a vast number of systems of compensating the 
manager and of aligning his needs with those of shareholders (Lambert and Larcker, 
1989:294-5). Of particular importance are the differing views on risk and time 
horizons between the parties, which would include schemes to tailor investments to 
be made by the company that will give the CEO reassurance about longer or short-
term investments due to his own risk aversion. 
2.5 Moral Hazard and Information Asymmetry 
Many of the problems of moral hazard are concerned with those raised by agency. In 
risk sharing a moral hazard may arise under conditions (like delegation of 
responsibility) where the privately taken actions of agents affect the probability 
distribution of the outcomes. The source of this moral hazard or incentive problem 
points to an asymmetry of information among individuals. These come about due to 
individual actions that cannot be observed and hence contracted upon (Holmstrom, 











effect with far reaching consequences. The duties of running the firm are delegated 
by principals (shareholders) to directors who then delegate these duties to agents 
(managers). Considerable discretion is then available to such executives when they 
exert day-to-day control as part of their duties. "As agent for the principal the 
executive is morally responsible to maximise shareholder utility; however, executives 
accept agent status because they perceive the opportunity to maximise their own 
utility". (Sanchez 2007:5) Shareholders do not see immediately what is transpiring in 
a company or see such information differently to what they should see resulting in 
information asymmetry. Thus, shareholders do not know, nor can they ensure, that 
the manager acts in their, best interests. 
Information asymmetry is an extensive problem relating to the provision of imperfect 
information. At the outset, the manager holds perfect information. In this position, he 
has a moral obligation to place the shareholder (and the board) in the same position. 
The agent then chooses to disclose only the amount of such information as he 
wishes or in the form that he may wish. The information the parties hold will not be 
the same and thus not be in symmetry. 
To comply with his moral obligation it would be optimal were he to disclose all 
information and leave it to the principal to decide what portion thereof should be 
eliminated there from. If he does place full and correct information, and the utility 
functions of the agent and the principal coincide, then there should not be an agency 
problem as both parities are in an optimal situation to benefit from such information. 
The principal can then instruct the agent on the action to be taken. The problems 
then arise as to how to monitor the action that the agent chooses and to ascertain 
whether it is correct and if not how to deal with that problem. Full disclosure is the 
commencement of trust and is the basis towards something of importance in the 
principal agent relationship, but it is a steep hill to be climbed. 
By furnishing information in the format that the agent so chooses, major decisions 
can be taken by the principal in relying upon such information that decisions are to 
the detriment of the firm. The agent can benefit personally by whatever flows from 











accordance with their objectives. "It can be expensive to monitor the activities of the 
agent and to verify his actions" Eisenhardt (1989:69), who found that "information 
systems (manipulated by whether or not the principal could monitor the agent's 
behaviour) were negatively related to performance-contingent (outcome-based) pay". 
Ross (1973:138) also argues that monitoring would involve bringing in outside 
experts at a senior level that may not be economically feasible. An examination of 
the actions of a CEO could not be undertaken by managers at a lower (less costly) 
level than the CEO himself and quality consultants are known to be expensive. 
Calling in third parties to verify the information provided by the agent immediately 
commences with the concept that the agent is not believed, thus creating in him an 
undesirable atmosphere of mistrust and a souring of his relationship with his 
principals. 
2.6 Directors and Boards 
The structure of companies gives the final powers to shareholders who appoint a 
board who then appoint executives to administer the company in accordance with 
their instructions (see also Chapter 3 on Remuneration committees). The 
remuneration committee directors are non-executive. Bebchuk and Fried (2004:19) 
refer to boards that have neither the time nor the information necessary to monitor all 
managerial actions to ensure that they do actually benefit shareholders; nor are they 
engaged to conduct managerial actions. Being in such a position, a board will 
delegate to the CEO the duty to generate shareholder value and in so doing to watch 
over the principal's money carefully and to maximise shareholder wealth and returns. 
According to Gstraunthaler Lukacs and Stellar, (2008:47) a member of the board will 
invest sufficient time to satisfy the investors and thereby ensure his re-election. This 
imposes a natural limit to the engagements the director can accept. His activities in 
the firm itself will accordingly be subject to limited time. 
A fundamental approach accepts that there should not be a "we/they" relationship 
but rather a "we/us" working concept in between the board and the agent. The 











disastrous - a strong term but this should be viewed in terms of the capacity for huge 
problems. Thus, the next matter to review is how to resolve this problem. 
2.7 Government Intervention 
Because the agency costs can grow to uncountable proportions, which can lead to 
the failure of a company, there is the alternative of governmental regulation. Writings 
on the application of such controls have not been found. "The state in its political 
ideologies cannot close the gap" (Gstraunthaler et ai, 2008:39-40). To legislate 
would almost certainly bring about interference in the internal examination of 
company records. History shows that this became necessary in Europe after the 
1873 and 1929 turbulences. It can be considered whether substantive controls 
flowing from additional legislative powers granted to a remuneration committee can 
have extensive effects on markets and share prices. Market crashes are a most 
undesirable situation. There is still the alternative of more shareholder power. 
2.8 Co-operation 
Besides the said performance evaluations and audits, flowing from this the essential 
element of organisation is the willingness and the power of persons to co-operate 
and contribute their individual effort to the co-operative system. Barnard (1968) says 
that these constitute the energies of the organisation because of incentives where 
dominating forces are egotistical motives of self-preservation and self-satisfaction. 
The approach is turning towards reviewing the individual and his position in the 
organisation that is always a basic strategic factor to the structure of the 
organisation. It is thus intended that these incentives would limit the agent's actions 
in information symmetry and moral hazard, thus contributing to the overall welfare of 
the firm and its principals. 
2.9 Incentives? I Persuasion? 
It is considered to be improbable to the whole existence of a firm should it not 











combination. In commercial organisations, the professed emphasis is almost wholly 
on the side of incentives whereas in the case of other organisations the method is 
persuasion. Both methods can be used in organisations if account is taken of the 
different kinds of contributions required. Organisations experience difficulty in 
supplying incentives or in exercising persuasion. 
2.10 Motivation 
It is common to all debates that the best company performance results from the 
intentions of all parties with motivation of the executive being the path to walk. The 
two sides of the debate hinge upon whether this is done by appealing to his "hip 
pocket" (McConvill, 2004:18) or to foster those factors that make him genuinely 
motivated to do best by the corporation. Recognition of the existence of the Agency 
Theory problem is vital to the existence and continuation of organisations that are 
always made up of people. It is people who have to be motivated and controlled to 
ensure the future of organisations. Failing these, unpleasant consequences could 
ensue. Maslow (1970) suggests that we first need to satisfy our physiological needs 
and thereafter non-financial requirements. He is quoted by Bender (2004) who states 
that a main function of the reward is to meet the needs for self-esteem. 
2.11 From Agency Theory to Remuneration Committee 
Reviewing the problems outlined above in the principal agent relationship and some 
of the controls, which are attempted by principals to avoid information asymmetry 
and to overcome moral hazards it, must be realised that none of these are perfect. 
This is so, especially given the intentions and benefits, which can accrue to the 
agent. The major factor to note is that Agency Theory has mainly become historical. 
It did "serve the purpose" of being the forerunner of greater concentration on 
corporate governance and that is what spawned the Remuneration Committee, 












WHAT ARE REMUNERATION COMMITTEES? 
3.1 Introduction on Workings of the Committee 
In order to have a fuller understanding of remuneration committees this chapter 
exptains the workings of, the regulations applicable to, the compositiorl of and the 
powers arid functions of a remuneration committee, its relationships with 
shareholders as well as the membership, qualifications arid irldependence of such 
remuneratiorl committee members. Research and commentary will be restricted to 
substarltially informative matters as regards the structures and regulations of the 
remuneratiorl committee 
3.2 Company Structure 
The overall structure afwhat a typical listed company might resemble follows-
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This organogram illustrates the delegation of authority from shareholders who 
appoint the board of directors who appoint committees and the chief executive who 
is chairman of the operational board which contains various divisional heads. 
3.2 The Committee of the Board of Directors 
The main purpose of a remuneration committee is to consider executive 
remuneration that was administered by the board itself until the early 1990s. In so 
doing, they must apply the philosophy of compensation and strategy of the company. 
The Institute of Directors initiated and established the King Committee, who reported 
that: 
"A suitable mechanism for improving corporate governance, by delegating 
specific tasks from the main board to a smaller group and harnessing the 
contribution of non-executive directors brought about the remuneration 
committee. At a minimum, each board should have an audit and a 
remuneration committee. Industry and company specific issues will dictate the 
requirement for other committees" (King Committee, 2002:28). 
Over the last decade, most large public companies have set up such committees. In 
the UK, Cad bury (1992, 4.42: 30) reported 
"We also recommend that boards should appoint remuneration committees, 
consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors and chaired by a non-
executive director, to recommend to the board the remuneration of the 
executive directors in all its forms, drawing on outside advice as necessary." 
In South Africa, investors (principals) were becoming unduly concerned with the 
excessive concentration of power in the hands of the agent/manager. The era of the 
professional manager, as discussed in the previous chapter, calls for a balance. 
Controls that are arising indicate the intention to improve the situation by establishing 











Agency Theory. Should the remuneration committee not be in place agency losses 
would occur. 
Of all the fundamentals of a company's establishment, the sine qua non is staff and 
importantly, executives. Their terms of employment are important to the application 
of the philosophy and the strategy of the employer. A remuneration committee is 
fundamental to such workings. At the heart of its structure, it makes decisions that 
affect the heads central to the operations of the organization. A remuneration 
committee should, hopefully, in looking at the issue of executive remuneration, do so 
in a more detached way says (Mongalo, 2003) and will then make recommendations 
to the board of directors who would implement them. 
The employment of the CEO is a significant matter that carries tremendous 
responsibility for the board and its remuneration committee. The CEO is the central 
pivot around whom the day-to-day operations of the company revolve so that the 
choice of the wrong CEO can lead to disaster. 
3.3 Charter- Regulations 
When the King Committee, (2002:22) recommended the formation of board 
committees, they stated that each company should have a charter of its own that 
would include inter alia their duties and delegated powers and reporting procedures. 
It should be free to take independent outside professional advice as and when 
necessary. This charter is the board approved mandate upon which a remuneration 
committee carries out its duties - it is its constitution, its terms of reference. 
Committees customarily meet three times per annum and on extra occasions should 
urgent matters arise. Non-executive directors make up the membership playing 
important roles in all board committees including the requirement that one of them is 
chairman of the committee. The JSE requires in section 3.84(d) of their current 
listings requirements that all issuers (institutions listed on the JSE) must, in 
compliance with the King Code, appoint a remuneration committee. In the absence 
of any enforcing legislation, government controls and interference with private 











3.4 Non - Executive Directors (NEDs) 
The success of a remuneration committee and of a company depends on whether 
the right or wrong NEDs hold office. Although they do have to report to the main 
board of directors, they are not mere puppets. The first NEDs were appointed in the 
nineteenth century with the intention of attracting investors and to enhance company 
status by virtue of their status, Spira and Bender (2004) say that NEDs commanded 
disrespect for being thought of as nominees of the system. NEDs are a 
counterweight to managerial power which view stresses the monitoring and control 
aspect of the functions of the NED Tricker (1978, 1.1). The significance of the 
opinion of Spira and Bender (2004) is highlighted when considering views oft 
expressed that NEDs are part of cronyism and nepotism that, if ever correct, 
impinges on their independent judgement. 
"Non-executive directors should be individuals of calibre and credibility, and 
have the necessary skill and experience to bring judgment to bear 
independent of management, on issues of strategy, performance, resources, 
transformation, diversity and employment equity, standards of conduct and 
evaluation of performance". (King Committee, 2002:24) 
Hampel (1998), in considering the importance of the skills and experience needed 
for NEDs and how they should be appointed, queried whether the pool of available 
people was sufficient and how their independence should be defined. Importance 
was also stressed about the ability to fulfil the increased control function expected of 
them. Cadbury (1992:30) stressed their importance as equal board members and the 
positive contribution expected from them. The Higgs Report described the qualities, 
personal attributes skills and behaviours required of the NED as "engaged but non 
executive; challenging but supportive; independent but involved". It is important for 
them to ensure consistency with sound risk management. The duties of the NED 
include availability of time, assuming of risk and knowledge of regulatory oversight 











3.5 The Functions of the NED 
These include focusing on ensuring alignment of the remuneration policy with 
stakeholders' interests. Performance objectives are set and they must consider 
performance of the company and the executive when determining remuneration 
structures. Asymmetry has already been dealt with but the NED must also manage 
asymmetry interests inherent in variable compensation effectively. A NED should 
have the additional ability to overview other benefits and financial arrangements in 
order to ensure that they are justified, market related and disclosed in a transparent 
manner. 
3.6 Input to a remuneration committee 
Although the CEO and CFO are not members of a remuneration committee their 
attendance and input at meetings and other deliberations is vital. Together with the 
Human Resources Director, they are responsible for fundamental information on 
which a remuneration committee makes decisions. Their interfacing with that 
committee is more detailed than their relationship with the board itself as systems 
and controls are viewed in detail and import. The committee name implies that its 
main function is to oversee remuneration. 
Agency Theory shows the problem that a strong CEO was able to dominate a board 
that did not have the support of a large (percentage) shareholder. A remuneration 
committee with a clearly defined charter should thus have the necessary tools with 
which to control a strong CEO. Proper governance embraces both conformance and 
performance. Conforming to corporate governance standards results in constraints 
on management. Boards have to balance this with performance for financial success 
and the sustainability of the company's business. 
3.7 The CEO and CFO 
Matters for consideration at meetings would be fully researched by the CEO and 











would be decided upon would all be known to the CEO and CFO. These executives 
account directly to the CEO and CFO, who should accordingly be in a position to 
satisfy the committee on all aspects of their recommendations. 
The CEO heads the operations of a company. The overall administration and 
controls of all staff are - as with most matters - his final responsibility. At the 
remuneration committee he accounts and dedicates his attention to staff with the 
main concentration being on executives. Staff of lesser seniority would be reviewed 
by the executive operational board - as contrasted to the main board of directors -
but it is at the remuneration committee meeting that the CEO would obtain more 
general guidance and approvals on matters relating to such executives. 
3.8 Duties of the Remuneration Committee 
The duties of the remuneration committee include tying remuneration closely to 
performance. In so doing, they set out aspects that need important consideration, 
asking numerous questions, starting with whether the policy on directors' 
remuneration is in line with guidance in the Code and with guidelines of relevant 
institutional investors' organisations. They stress the support by institutional 
shareholders of the company's remuneration policy. The Code calls on non-
executive directors to constructively challenge and help develop proposals on 
strategy, monitor the reporting of performance, scrutinise the performance of 
management in meeting agreed goals and objectives, satisfy themselves on the 
integrity of financial information and also ensure that financial controls and risk 
management systems are robust and defensible. They must also determine the 
appropriate level of remuneration of directors and senior executives based on their 
individual contributions to group performance. They have a prime role in appointing 
and, where necessary, removing, executive directors and in succession planning. 
The committee also recommends and monitors the level and structure of 
remuneration for senior management - at least for the first layer below board level. 
The board itself should normally determine the non-executive directors' 
remuneration. A remuneration committee would assist the board in reviewing the 











Matters on which independent external advisers would be engaged include tracking 
market trends and salary benchmarking information, both local and international in 
respect of salary and benefits. Market related remuneration is vital to determining 
compensation. Thus, maximum knowledge should be made available by them. 
The King 2 Report (King Committee, 2002) proceeds to spells out fully the 
requirements that a remuneration committee or such other appropriate board 
committee, consisting entirely or mainly of independent non-executive directors, 
should make recommendations to the board within agreed terms of reference on the 
company's framework of executive remuneration and should determine specific 
remuneration packages for each of the executive directors. Their decisions are taken 
with clearly agreed upon reporting procedures and written scope of authority. This is, 
ultimately, the responsibility of the board who furnish the final approval of the 
decisions of a remuneration committee upon reporting procedures and written scope 
of authority (King Committee 2002:28). 
It is therefore up to the NEDs to decide whether they wish to merely implement a 
policy, to advise and consent or whether they intend to be pro-active. In so doing 
they will give a lead to the company as to its success, at the same time following the 
poliCies which are laid down by the board. 
"It is particularly important that remuneration committees should bring 
independent thought and scrutiny to the development and review process 
together with an understanding of the drivers of the business which contribute 
to shareholder value." (Association of British Insurers, 2003) 
Thus, the problem has been described and the need for action to be taken was being 











3.9 Attendance at Remuneration Committee Meetings 
The remuneration committee should consist exclusively of non-executive directors 
(supra), although in interviews conducted for this study an instance was found of an 
outside life and pensions adviser being appointed to a committee. The usual number 
of NED directors is approximately three or four. In the UK FTSE 350, which is a list 
of the top 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange companies listed 
therein are expected to have a minimum of three members on their committee 
whereas smaller listed companies are allowed to have just two. 
Attendance at the meeting itself consists of far more persons. The main 
presentations would emanate from and be led by the CEO and the CFO. Other 
persons in attendance would be the secretariat, legal, human relations and tax 
advisors. Independent external advisors such as remuneration consultants would 
also be present. Only the committee members (NEDS) partake in any voting. All 
other attendees are there to advise the committee members. 
The recommendations that have been endorsed by the JSE included the 
requirement that an independent non-executive director must chair this committee. 
The JSE requires this "in order to obtain his or her input on the remuneration of the 
other executives". Reference is made by the JSE to the chief executive officer's 
attendance at the meetings saying this would be by invitation but taking no part in 
decisions regarding his own remuneration. A substantial part of the information 
tabled before a remuneration committee would initially be approved by the CEO and 
CFO. In the light of information asymmetry, the information placed before a 
remuneration committee also emanates from outside consultants. Thus, whilst 
agents may have control of the information outside experts should act as a form of 
control over the accuracy. (See Information Asymmetry, infra). NEDs are in a 
position at a remuneration committee meeting to interface directly with remuneration 
and human resources and tax consultants. Greater detail eluCidating on what should 
be placed before a committee is seen in the comprehensive remuneration committee 











3.10 Taking Independent Advice 
The King Committee, (2002:28) recommended that a remuneration committee 
should be free to take independent outside professional advice as and when 
necessary. This is a fundamental aspect of the committee's deliberation, as its 
members cannot be expected to have expertise in all aspects of remuneration. Such 
experts would customarily attend meetings of the committee. They provide 
specialised services having available voluminous schedules of compensation rates 
in the market spread across various industries and a wide range of occupations and 
positions. 
3.11 Powers, Functions and Activities of a Remuneration 
Committee 
Being, a sub committee of the board of directors, its charter does not grant it 
executive powers except possibly in isolated cases of emergency. The committee 
thus reports to the board of directors. Such reports contain recommendations on 
policy, strategy and employment of executives. Mainly it would concern itself with the 
employment of the operational board of directors, including the CEO and CFO. 
Some proposals of a remuneration committee also need to be approved by 
shareholders should the Articles of Association require this. In the USA, UK and RSA 
varying legal and regulatory obligations have been placed on a board to establish 
and regulate remuneration committees. 
"Compensation decisions do not rest with shareholders but rather with 
compensation committees composed of members of boards of directors who 
are elected by, but are not perfect agents for, shareholders". (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990:260) 
This view is in contradiction to that of (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004:195-200) which calls 
for more shareholder power. Controls over the misuse of power are supposed to 











"There is now greater openness about the way in which executive pay is 
being determined with the widespread adoption of remuneration committees". 
3.12 Remuneration and Incentives 
Establishing the quantum of remuneration and terms of employment are the main 
functions of a remuneration committee. The principle involved is to establish the level 
of pay for delivering on-target performance. A major function of the committee is the 
incentivising of the CEO and top executives. To do so the system of performance 
based compensation (bonuses) is applied. This structure links rewards to corporate 
and individual performance. Such performance pay is often substantial when 
compared to the basic emoluments and is the subject of much public opinion. To 
establish the formula, firstly, and thereafter the actual calculation of such bonuses is 
a major task of the committee. This administers and also promotes profitability for 
the company. Thus, the remuneration committee should be able to account for the 
basis upon which their committee approved such pay for performance bonuses. This 
is central to accountability for public trust in the system say Spira and Bender (2004) 
and (Cad bury, 1992:58). It has become more acceptable to set out a formula at the 
beginning of a financial period to apply a target to the executive who then has to 
strive to attain such a target and consequently receives his bonus based on success 
of his efforts. Preparing such a target will be based on calculations finally submitted 
to the committee by the CEO and CFO. This matter is the subject of the asymmetry 
referred to herein. (Vide Paragraph 1.14). 
In the UK, a remuneration committee will be guided by the Principles and Guidelines 
on Executive Remuneration (2003) issued by The Association of British Insurers 
These principles require boards to demonstrate that performance-based 
remuneration arrangements are clearly aligned to business strategy and objectives, 
regularly reviewed and in line with current best practice. They point out that simple 
remuneration structures assist with motivation and enhance the prospects of 
successful communication with the employees involved and with shareholders. 
Further, performance conditions should be "relevant, stretching and designed to 











Other aspects of the actual executive compensation will be generally advised on by 
the independent specialists who make representations to the committee. (Vide 
Paragraph 3.9). 
3.13 Communications Reports to Shareholders 
In the USA and on the London Stock Exchange it is compulsory to issue annual 
remuneration reports to shareholders. This report forms part of the annual report and 
financial statements. The London Stock Exchange has set out regulations for their 
expectations. The UK Report is required to comply with the Directors' Remuneration 
Report Regulations (2002) of the London Stock Exchange and is subject to 
shareholder approval customarily at the Annual General Meeting. The content of 
reports by a remuneration committee can best be observed and understood by 
reference to Appendix 4 containing the 17 page UK report of Pearson pic, an 
international publishing group listed on the London Stock Exchange. This report was 
received from Ewald Muller of the Standards Department of the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants. He commented that this was one of the finest he 
has seen (an opinion that should be endorsed by many, as it is an interesting, 
comprehensive and readable report). He also confirmed that he knew of no 
regulations obligating a South African company to submit a remuneration report 
other than in the King Report (King Committee, 2002:28) and that there are certain 
disclosures required regarding remuneration. The importance of this report to the 
shareholder is that it furnishes an overall perspective of how well the company is 
administered as well as the standard of its corporate governance. Such reports 
imbue shareholders and investors with knowledge and confidence, which South 
African remuneration reports lack. 
Under the heading "Remuneration Policy in South Africa in clause 2.5.3 of the King 
Committee Report there is a clear guideline on the policy and objectives of the 
Remuneration Committee. 
"The chairperson of such committee should attend annual general meetings to 











3.14 Independence of the NED 
Should NEDs not display independence a perception of bias and wrong decisions 
would result The NED holds a position of high trust and accountability. The aspect of 
nepotism and cronyism as well as systems in use in the USA and UK regulations are 
dealt with in the literature review. 
Chapter 2 sets out Agency Theory Information and Chapter 3 sets out information on 
the remuneration committee in order to apprise the reader of the committee's 
workings. These should be a source of reference throughout this research. With 
these basic facts, this research now proceeds to examine in the next Chapter what 













4.1 Introduction and Philosophy 
Jensen (2000:1) states that his desire is to understand more thoroughly the forces 
pushing firms to operate efficiently and create value, thereby improving human living 
standards. Thus, each company will have its own strategy and from this philosophy 
of its compensation must flow the proper methods by which compensation is paid to 
all employees including executives. Moreover, from such philosophy and the strategy 
of the company the result, firstly, should show a positive effect upon employees then 
on shareholders, on growth of the firm, then on the economy; and lastly be able to 
meet ever-changing developments. 
The strategy and philosophy of the company is the background that a remuneration 
committee must apply in its deliberations. 
The magnitude of payments to CEOs is not only a matter for consideration at 
stakeholder level but features prominently in wage bargaining sessions with the 
details of the relative pay featured unsympathetically in the country's media. (Kantor, 
2006:2) 
In the foreword to the book Reward Management, (Armstrong & Merlis, (2004: viii), 
Duncan Brown refers to the discipline that has evolved from pay-focused 
administration to a strategically oriented and impacting total rewards management 
approach. He says: 
"To be effective a remuneration committee must take into account the strategy 
of the company and in so doing consider the policy and apply it in its 
deliberations about compensation. Remuneration decisions cannot be taken 











continues that the policy of the company itself must be applied initially to the 
specific employee being considered. " 
In the South African context, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu, 
2004) proposed that company law needs to take account of stakeholders such as the 
community in which the company operates, its customers, its employees, its 
suppliers and the environment in certain situations mandated by the Constitution and 
related legislation. Research today will show herein that it is fundamental to the 
amount of compensation that the total remuneration of the executive should not be 
based on the activities actually carried out but on what has been performed (results 
achieved). 
There is thus a serious and urgent need to view the present systems and ascertain 
how the problems occurred and whether they were they based on adequate and 
proper information or on information asymmetry. The sections below explore factors 
that show the background in addition to factors that a remuneration committee must 
consistently consider in its deliberations. Considering strategy in their deliberations 
indicates the importance of a remuneration committee member also being a member 
of the main board that ensures that he will be involved in and then know, as well as 
understand, such strategy and policy. 
4.2 Corporate Governance 
Remuneration committees were set up as part of the implementation of corporate 
governance policies intended to promote companies. 
"Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled". Cadbury, (1992:14) it is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. It has to 
align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society. 
Having a remuneration committee is an essential function. According to Cad bury, 











"That boards should appoint remuneration committees, consisting wholly or 
mainly of non-executive directors and chaired by a non-executive director, to 
recommend to the board the remuneration of the executive directors in all its 
forms, drawing on outside advice as necessary". 
There are vast benefits to companies that conform properly to corporate governance. 
Coombes & Watson (2000), conducted an investor opinion survey published by 
McKinsey & Co., Working with Institutional Investors Inc. they found, that more than 
84% of the more than 200 global institutional investors surveyed, together 
representing more than US$3 trillion in assets, indicated a willingness to pay a 
premium for the shares of a well-governed company over one considered poorly 
governed but with a comparable financial record. Three-quarters of these investors 
indicated that board practices were at least as important as financial performance, 
when evaluating companies for potential investment; and that the implications for 
companies are profound. Simply by developing good governance practices, 
managers can potentially add significant shareowner value. The creation of a good 
governance climate can make countries, especially in the emerging markets, a 
magnet for global capital. 
These empirical results of an opinion survey in conjunction with a firm of the standing 
of McKinsey set the mark of how important corporate governance is in capital 
markets. 
4.3 Quantum of Compensation 
How high can one pay compensation? What level of remuneration would be just? 
These are questions with vast consequences. Jensen (2002:1) asks whether current 
levels of CEO compensation are high enough to attract the best and brightest. Such 
reward and performance management is used, not just to align with business goals, 
but also in our more knowledge and service-based economy to involve and engage 
employees to voluntarily commit to achieving and exceeding those goals. In Talent 
Management, Zachary Weinberger (2007) believes that a remuneration philosophy 











his view more stringently when he claims that failing this disaster seems the path 
that will follow. The statement by Jensen and Murphy (1998:270) about paying the 
executive like a bureaucrat (supra) is well known and is quoted often but in the 
context of the philosophy of compensation, it is seen as vital to the enthusiasm that 
is injected into the whole company by motivating the CEO. If the CEO is enthused, 
incentivised and motivated by his compensation he will act and administer the 
company like an executive and not like an unenthused disinterested bureaucrat. 
Consequently, a remuneration committee will ensure that the company considers the 
advice of Jensen (2000) and will then be better able to meet its objectives and 
profitability. 
Even in the broader high-performance human resource management approach 
Pfeffer (1998) notes that the use of performance contingent pay is recognised as a 
key component. The shareholder (principal) is striving for the agent to become a 
"partner" in the businesses. The contingent pay is thus a share in the profits that the 
company strives to earn and improve 
Head-hunters cause a problem to employers because of their extensive activities but 
they do keep the market volatile. 
Whatever method is to be applied to incentivise the CEO the most successful 
method will be that in which a remuneration committee and the board cause him to 
voluntarily, willingly and enthusiastically administer the firm. Such policy and strategy 
is one in which the principal and agent should be operating in tandem. It is often 
applied by companies today being a method in which the NED can delegate 
particularly as the NED is not active in the operations of the company. In the 
process, the participation by the executive in the earnings has resulted in high 
earnings, to the benefit of him and the principal but this is also the cause of the 
problems by those who view the payments as too high. Such motivation is dealt with 
in (McConvill, 2004) where Pay for Performance is considered a flawed methodology 
and remuneration committees are recommended to considered other non-cash 











4.4 Remuneration Calculations and Performance 
This aspect of research writings shows another side where one sees factors other 
than direct money considerations come in to deliberations. 
Cash compensation of Korean Executives in Chaebols is significantly related to 
stock market performance of Chaebols. The magnitude of the responsiveness of pay 
to stock market performance is comparable to Japan (and the US in so far as cash 
compensation is concerned) (Kato, Kim and Lee, 2007:52). 
In their interviews of board committee members, Spira and Bender (2004) bring out 
clearly this source of tension, earlier identified by (Tricker, 1978) and by (Hilmer, 
1993), that exists within the remuneration committee between 'Performance' on the 
one hand (achieving an effective agency theory type pay mechanism, thereby 
strategically aligning incentives) conformance' on the other. With 'Conformance' the 
emphasis is very much on being able to demonstrate in an ex-post sense that pay 
awards conform with the various governance codes reviewed above, i.e., a 
monitoring function. In the pursuit of conformance, the remuneration committee is 
mainly concerned with probity, unrighteousness, moral integrity, honesty and 
legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Performance 
considerations, on the other hand, are more managerial entail the remuneration 
committee actively designing remuneration arrangements that both connect with the 
external reality of the executive labour market (in paying the going rate) and address 
the agency problem by aligning the interests of the executives with the achievement 
of the key success factors that underpin corporate strategy (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976:140). In terms of performance, the remuneration committee plays a key role in 
the strategic human resource management of the company by crafting remuneration 
arrangements that attempt to link the interests of the top management team with 
attainment of the key success factors for corporate strategic success (Stredwick, 
2000). Thus, there is obviously a clear tension between the performance role and the 
conformance role. This finding echoes that of Ogden and Watson (2004, 2006) who, 
in a series of interviews with remuneration committees of water companies, 











considerations. Such pressures are seen to result in (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 
isomorphism in organizational practice, whereby the desire to shape remuneration 
design in a similar manner to other comparable companies dominates detailed 
considerations of performance effects. 
4.5 Owner Shareholder CEOs 
Agency Theory thus implies that unless the holders of control exercise that control 
then inefficiencies could result which could lead to failure. A comparison is needed 
between owner CEOs and professional CEOs. This was carried out by (Barak et al 
2008). The significance of their positions is that where there is an owner CEO the 
control vests with him and a remuneration committee's decision can be turned down 
by his voting power. The results indicate that owner CEOs receive significantly 
higher pay than the professional CEO does. The authors conclude that owner CEOs 
extract additional private benefits from the firm. Barak, et al (2008) collected data on 
CEO pay in 122 closely held firms traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange during 
1995-2001. After estimating CEO pay performance sensitivity and CEO excess pay, 
they examined how these two pay attributes affect end of period (year 2001 ). 
Their main findings and conclusions are firstly that when the CEO is from the 
controlling stakeholders, the end of period is negatively correlated with excess pay 
CEOs, which appears like a form of private benefits. Then when a professional non-
owner CEO runs the firm, CEO pay performance sensitivity - incentives to 
professional CEOs, help promote firm value. This means that the shareholder 
(owner) is actually the decision maker in place of the independent board. These 
findings are consistent with the view that owner CEOs exploit the firm and extract 
private benefits in the form of inflated pay. In the paper by Barak et al (2008), 
cronyism appears to be a problem in either CEO or closely controlled companies. 
The situation is in contrast to Agency Theory where the executive controls the board 
without the existence of a strong controller. 
Another aspect of Barak et aI's paper (2008) is that of symbolism. Stakeholders see 











controlling chairman. This is similar to a reversion to the agency theory problems. 
Doubt is thus cast over their decisions. 
Barak, Cohen and Lauterbach, (2008) in a similar study found that CEOs who 
belong to the family or business group that owns most of the firm shares ("owner 
CEOs") receive significantly (about 50%) higher pay than professional CEOs who do 
not belong to the control group ("non-owner CEOs"). Owner CEOs' pay performance 
sensitivity is also (insignificantly) lower than that of non-owner CEOs. These findings 
are most consistent with the view that owner CEOs exploit the firm and extract 
private benefits in the form of inflated pay. Among owner CEOs, we do not find any 
significant differences in pay between CEOs in family firms and CEOs in firms 
controlled by business partners. Here again as in (Barak et ai, 2008) a remuneration 
committee's decision can be turned down by this voting power. 
4.6 Shareholder Power 
Bebchuk and Fried, (2004: Section 4) claim abuse by CEOs stems from their 
position. The solution is increased monitoring roles by directors and larger 
shareholders (institutional). They use stronger terms such as "defective board 
monitoring" recommending "shareholder power". The book is a critique of board 
management. The regulations being introduced for compensation committees are 
set out by them (and quoted in this review on the structure of remuneration 
committees.) There is very little approval by them of existing systems. On the 
contrary, when they write on "executive pay excesses" and "defective board 
monitoring" they recommend "the alternative managerial power modeL" The latter 
subject exposes the extent to which pay has not only become higher than what is 
optimum for shareholders but how it has been decoupled from performance. They 
then accuse directors of not following management when they not instinctively seek 
to maximise shareholder value. 
Directors' desires include re-election to the board, to placate CEOs given their power 
to benefit directors' natural tendencies to support awards that benefit their own 











CEO and senior executives. The effect of these cases is that a remuneration 
committee is not effective when its functions are subject to approval of controllers 
using their power for other intentions. 
The basis of their views is that shareholders would be better at controlling 
compensation than existing systems that they consider to be out of control. Whilst 
there may be merit in this argument in some companies views have been expressed 
that there are different methods for shareholders to express their views. 
4.7 Causes of the Technology Bubble 
Bolton et al (2007) lay the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals 
associated with CEO pay to the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. 
Whilst they do not reject the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive 
compensation, they believe that the recent evidence on executive pay can be 
reconciled with classical Agency Theory which begs the question as to what would 
have happened in those scandals had there been an effective remuneration 
committee as a watchdog. In a company, the shareholders bear the residual risk in 
what transpires in the firm. Jensen (2007:2) in his introduction makes it clear that 
such risk vests in them only saying that, accordingly, for control to vest in any other 
person who does not bear such risk would be the equivalent of "playing poker with 
someone else's money". The effect of what (Jensen 2007:2) is recommending is that 
whilst the agent may be given a cheque book he is not given a "blank cheque" and 
must account to the principals who should monitor. 
These research articles crystallize the questions by reviewing the direction of 
remuneration committees serving a purpose - whether they are eliminating the 
problem, or limiting it or whether they are of any effect at all. 
4.8 Operating on an ad-hoc basis 
Landsberg (2007:22) holds the view that remuneration committees tend to operate 











getting too high. This results in the creation of incentives that do not contribute to the 
overall health and well-being of the corporate enterprise. However, directors should 
know what their roles are and how to execute the written charter of the remuneration 
committee as set out by the main board. 
4.9 Greater Information and disclosure 
As more information on compensation of executives is made public, a better 
understanding of the mechanisms that determine executive compensation will 
develop (Laing & Weir, 1998:33), whose view is a continuation of how the 
remuneration committee system was developed out of greater information disclosure 
of compensation rather than under Agency Theory. 
Under corporate governance (above 4.2) Coombes and Watson, (2000) showed that 
substantial investigations indicated empirically how important it is to exhibit that 
corporate governance is being properly applied in a company, as remuneration is 
well related to human factor issues of performance of the business. Harrison, (1987) 
expressed the view that it is very much about how to get the link between the human 
beings that populate the business and the strategic plan laid down by the board. 
Comparisons of compensation costs should be made of the company's own costs 
with that of a properly chosen peer group according to Brain, Jackson, Pymm, and 
Wright,( 2008). Remuneration committees should set incentives and bonus targets in 
advance. Even then, the rewards should only be made for outstanding performance 
with a thorough assessment being made whether the targets have been met prior to 
making the awards. They stress that the company should not reward failure when 
directors leave early owing to poor performance. To strive for perfections may be the 
proper method but examination showed a gap in the UK disclosure rules which Ward 
(1998) questioned about a serious omission in disclosures. He felt that the aggregate 
remuneration earned by a CEO for outside directorships should be disclosed as well 
as the amount of time spent on such directorships, pointing out that remuneration 
committees should be made aware of such details when reviewing the CEO 
remuneration. When shareholders vote for the election of such CEO they may 











This may not actually be so if the CEO is also spending time on outside 
directorships. Ward (1998) called for UK policy on disclosure to be amended to 
embrace this disclosure with provisions for prior permission to be granted for outside 
directorships. 
Such research does indicate that remuneration committees are actively pursuing the 
most efficient, democratic and open approaches to compensation from many angles. 
The movement is in the opposite direction to agency theory. Operating in this 
manner does make the committee more effective. 
Brain et al (2007) detail some of the authorities under which the UK Combined Code 
requirements operate for listing on the London Stock Market including the obligation 
on a company to either comply with the code or explain why they are not so doing, -
the so-called 'comply-or-explain' approach. 
4.10 Regulatory Requirements 
It is seen from the above requirements in the UK, USA and South Africa that there 
are great responsibilities and thus expectations placed upon the remuneration 
committee. Many companies regard the committee as important enough to insist that 
one of the non-executive directors appointed to the remuneration committee is the 
chairman of the main board. These necessitate adequate allocation of time and 
resources plus self-awareness on the part of the committee of the inherent tendency 
to follow the norms, rules of thumb, and customary practice of others. (Brain et ai, 
2008). 
4.11 Institutional investors and monitoring 
Dedicated, as contrasted to transient, institutional investors can act as a monitoring 
or restraining factor on executive remuneration. The importance is that the investors 
must not be transient according to Dong and Ozkan (2008) who believe dedicated 
investors have a better discipline role to play. They found in their empirical research 











positive and significant influence on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity of option 
grants. Consequently, whilst a board may watch its largest (institutional) 
shareholders come and go, the board and the remuneration committee remain in a 
position where they must steadily continue to take their own decisions with little, if 
any, guidance from or consultation with the (institutional) owners, who are, in effect, 
their true principals. 
Throughout research it is seen that in the dedication of investors/stakeholders that 
the company is of primarily importance. The internal structure of the company must 
receive prime consideration, which places great stress on the importance of having a 
remuneration committee. In South Africa, it has been found that consulting 
institutional shareholders on the aspect of compensation does not take place other 
than in exceptional circumstances. 
4.12 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Coakley and lIiopoulou, (2006), found that less independent and larger boards award 
CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary following Merger and Acquisition 
("MA") completion both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub-samples. This 
is not to be unexpected as a merged firm is larger in terms of profits and turnover 
thus warranting greater responsibilities. Such a merger or acquisition would be 
attractive to an agent thus giving him the opportunity for larger compensation. UK 
CEOs and executives are rewarded more for the effort exerted in accomplishing 
intra-industry or large mergers than for diversifying or small mergers. 
4.13 The CEO as Board Chairman? 
Whether the CEO should be board chairman is considered all the more important to 
corporate governance as the chairman is the 'communication' between 
shareholders and the company overall. The chairman of the board is expected to be 
a non-executive independent director say Coakley and lIiopoulou (2006). Goobey 
(2005) found that the practice of the CEO also serving as the chairman is more 











on a survey by KPMG:Corporate - Governance in South Africa: Perceptions and 
Disclosure, which revealed that 47% of the top 40 companies believe that the 
chairperson is not independent. King Committee Report, (2002:23), "The chairperson 
should preferably be an independent non executive director". The draft of King 3 that 
has just been issued expresses this more directly leaving out the word "preferably". 
4.14 Pay and Performance 
Cash pay is unaffected by other measures of their managerial skill or performance. 
However, there is a caveat to the CEO that when a merger takes place his position 
will come up for review which can also have a downside or positive effect. In a robust 
empirical analysis of Dutch listed companies, Duffhues and Kabir (2008) failed to 
detect a positive pay-performance relationship, thus questioning the conventional 
wisdom that executive pay based on performance helps to align shareholder 
interests with those of executives. Included in their examination was a multivariate 
regression table presenting results for cash compensation. The results of these 
regressions showed them that executive pay is significantly negatively related to 
return on assets, returns on sales and stock. It is consistent with the view that 
powerful managers can influence their own pay despite remuneration committees. 
The results of the study suggest that other means of resolving agency problems and 
novel explanations of executive compensation may provide useful insights. Well -
known firms like Royal Dutch Shell, Heinekens, Reed-Elsevier, Ahold and Unilever 
were subject to strong criticisms on total compensation of top executives. In 2003-
2004 and 2004-2005, some top companies were given huge increases and generous 
remuneration irrespective of their meagre performance in those years. In criticising 
Dutch listed firms for their ingenious use of several anti-takeover defences, resulting 
in a bad international reputation, they point out that shareholders have no say in 
executive compensation with the non-executive directors. They then refer to 
instances in which dominant shareholders are alleged to collude with the 
management and influence decisions for their own benefits. What is highlighted is 
that controls do not always operate successfully and that even shareholders do not 
voice dissent where they should have. This leaves the thought about what effect a 











"Although the CEOs compensation is at very high level, it represents a fractional part 
of a company's expenses. Yet the positive impact that a great CEO can have on the 
company's success is huge; but the CEO is costing them pennies a share" say 
(Hsieh & Kleiner, 2003:77) thus putting compensation in another context. Although 
said in 2003 this is not an outdated view. 
Similar findings that executive pay is not linked to performance were made by (Ueng, 
Wells & Lilly, (2000:4) who confirm that the principal agent model of executive 
compensation suggests that by tying pay to performance shareholders ensure that 
corporate managers attempt to maximise shareholder wealth. This is the model of 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976). Ueng et ai, (2000:4) explain that when the interests of 
the principal and agent are not congruent then agency costs arise. Extensive 
research writings have endeavoured to find the optimal contract between principal 
and agent. They investigate the aspect that some boards are less independent with 
executive compensation being linked to CEO influence over the board but from the 
two different points of view - that of small and large firms. Their findings show that 
size is the most significant determinant in firms of asset size less than the $US 250 
million but that CEO influence or pressure is not a determinant. 
4.15 Criticism of NEDs 
In principle, the system of independent non-executive directors in a properly advised 
remuneration committee should be an objective approach to accurately establishing 
executive compensation says Ozkan, (2007:350-351). She suggests that non-
executive directors are not more efficient than executive directors in monitoring 
executive compensation are. Their function is more an advisory one thus she does 
not favour the remuneration committee system. Her research proved that a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors of larger boards pay their CEO higher 
compensation and finally that CEO compensation is lower when director ownership 
is higher. 
Ozkan, (2007:350-351) continues that this is the main point of agency theory in 











strong CEO. Looking at the functions of a remuneration committee it will be seen that 
a properly constituted remuneration committee will have a sound bank of 
professional advisors. 
Main et al (2007) using evidence collected from interviews conducted in late 2006, 
questions the adequacy of the agency approach in representing how remuneration 
committees design executive pay arrangements. Without being critical of other 
research the empirical extent of the investigations conducted by Brain et al (2008) is 
noteworthy, with 22 directors who, among them, serve on the remuneration 
committees of 35 UK companies. "Consideration should be given to criteria which 
reflect the company's performance relative to a group of comparator companies in 
some key variables such as total shareholder return (TSR)" This research further 
found that concerns with legitimacy push remuneration committees towards an 
institutional isomorphism in processes and practice. The shift in what is expected 
from remuneration committees has not been fully reflected in committee practice, 
owing to an overriding desire to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the shareholders and 
shareholder representative bodies. 
4.16 Incentivisation Policy 
An important shift has taken place, Brain et al (2008:233. Remuneration committees 
are now seen as key agents in the strategic human resource management process 
of choosing a remuneration package and arranging that it be calibrated in a way that 
ensures that it incentivises the executive towards those decisions and actions 
necessary to best deliver the company's chosen strategy (Baron & Kreps, 1999). 
They were once seen merely as an arms-length administrative device to ensure an 
acceptable degree of probity in the setting of executive reward, by Core et ai, (2003) 
deals with the basics saying that the higher the CEO power over the board the 
higher the executive compensation (a reference to Agency Theory). The 
remuneration committee thus finds itself tasked with a prime responsibility of 
remedying or ameliorating the principal agent problem of incentive alignment for 
members of the top management team (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The effects of 











subject (not for elaboration here) which is dealt with extensively by (Larcker, 
1989:320-321 ). 
Main and Johnston (1993) found that some 30 percent indeed had a remuneration 
committee and that they were often not composed solely of non-executives. This 
was contained in a study conducted of 22 large UK companies in 1990 to obtain 
evidence of a remuneration committee. The companies paid the highest directors' 
compensation where the companies did have remuneration committees. Although 
this is but one study and was conducted in 1993 (as noted by Main et ai, 2007) it 
does suggest that having a remuneration committee is not an indication of improved 
corporate governance. These findings could be interpreted that a remuneration 
committee is associated with higher levels of pay and made no positive impact on 
the incentive structure of pay that was also found by Conyon and Peck, (1998). They 
also reported that higher levels of executive pay were associated with a greater 
proportion of independent directors on the remuneration committee. Therefore, 
independence of the remuneration committee may not provide adequate controls 
over the levels of pay. Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand and Dalton, (1998) found no 
evidence that a remuneration committee with affiliate directors paid the executives 
higher than independent committees. 
4.17 Collusion and Bidding Up 
A 'cosy collusion' exists between executive directors and non-executive directors 
who happen to sit on each other's boards or remuneration committees and thus are 
able to bid up each other's earnings according to Ezzamel and Watson 1998:221). 
This asymmetric pay adjustment process produced clear evidence of a lack of board 
independence and is highly contentious. 
If this is the case then the concept of a remuneration committee is failing and they 
are not tough enough says Brett, (2003). In the UK, nearly half of company 
chairpersons surveyed in the wake of the Hampel, (1998) Report thought that 
bidding up of pay occurred, but as a consequence of increased disclosure rather 
than the presence of remuneration committees (Clarke, Conyon, and Peck, 1998). 











problem is so vital that it should be subjected to much scrutiny in our research. In the 
UK, the London Stock Exchange issued a 76-page brochure on "Corporate 
Governance - A Practical Guide July 2004" which added much guidance to 
companies in their corporate governance and particularly on subjects like the 
qualifications of NEDs and their independence. 
4.18 Monitoring Role and Further Criticism 
Fernandes (2008:30) conducted research of Portuguese companies. After recent 
corporate scandals and central roles that top executives played in them, the 
Portuguese stock market regulator recommended in 2001 that listed companies 
must disclose in their annual reports payments to top executives. The Corporate 
Governance recommendation of 2005 introduced corporate governance 
recommendations that included the obligation to disclose payment to top executives, 
obliging payments to board members to be structured to permit their interests to be 
in line with those of the company. The extensive research by Fernandes, (2008:30) 
embraced 51 companies listed on Euronext Lisbon from which he hand-collected 
data on compensation for all directors from 2002- 2004, categorising companies into 
large, medium and small based on market capitalisation. In his sample, one third of 
the companies do not have any executive members with the maximum number of 
non - executives being 80 per cent. The source of their information is Worldscope, 
Datastream, Euronext, and Lisbon. He finds that executive compensation increases 
when boards have more non-executive directors, attempting to align the interests of 
the directors and shareholders. Stock options granted were not included. The results 
show that the overall level of pay of executive members is in line with pay levels in 
the U.S. or U.K. The conclusion is not a favourable one for non- Executive Board 
members stating that they do not have a strong monitoring role (Fernandes, 
2008:30). The belief is that they are affected by the high pay they themselves 
receive for low effort having little incentive to act as honest guardians for 
shareholders interests. The further conclusion is that wages are higher when 
companies have more non- executive board members and companies with no non-
executive members have better alignment between managers and shareholders 











remuneration committees, which have been promoted as one of the solutions to 
powerful CEOs, who rule boards Fernandes, (2008:30) accentuate the doubts 
expressed in many circles on the independence of outside directors. His data 
suggests the NEDs are not really performing their stipulated roles; and certainly not 
their watchdog role, there being few incentives for them. They suffer more criticism 
with (Fernandes, 2008:30) finding "that there are high wages paid and that the 
relatively low effort required by these non-executive based board directorships can 
be highly attractive positions." 
Notable in Fernandes, (2008:30) research are firstly, the fact that he is a non-UK or 
USA researcher, secondly, his article is current - 2007 - and lastly, it contained 
impressive extensive research. If remuneration committees are not effective then he 
views the costs of compensation to be too high and corporate governance will also 
suffer. The only doubt is whether Portugal is so different from the UK or USA that the 
results may not be comparable but there has not been any cause for this doubt. 
Finally, his findings are most pointed and direct. 
The results of the research by Fernandes,(2008) are against remuneration 
committees. 
4.19 Institutional Investors: dedicated (long horizons) and 
transitional 
Dedicated institutional investors with long investment horizons can playa positive 
role according to their trading characteristics Dong and Ozkan, (2008). They were 
able to provide evidence suggesting that dedicated institutional ownership as 
elaborated on earlier not only restrains the director pay level, but also strengthens 
pay-performance relationship in firms where they have significant stakes. 
Dong and Ozkan, (2008) examined empirically the determinants of director pay for a 
sample of listed non-financial firms in the UK. They focused on the effects of 
institutional ownership in the UK on both director pay and pay-performance 











make no appreciable difference in the determination of director pay level and pay-
performance relationship. After they divide institutions into "dedicated" and 
"transient" groups, they show that dedicated institutions restrain the level of director 
pay and strengthen pay-performance link. This is consistent with their expectation 
that dedicated (long-horizon) institutions are more involved in corporate governance 
and serve a better monitoring and disciplining role than other short-horizon 
institutions. Their paper investigated the role of institutional investors in determining 
director pay in publicly listed non-financial UK companies. The focus has been on 
the distinction between institutional shareholders regarding their investment 
horizons. They investigated whether institutional investors, in particular dedicated 
ones, impact the level of director pay and influence pay-performance relations taken 
by remuneration committees. This becomes significant when considering whether 
such investors should be consulted concerning remuneration or even other corporate 
governance matters. 
4.20 Long Term Incentives (L TI), Total Shareholder Return (TSR) 
and Substance and Symbolism 
This section examines the attitude of a remuneration committee to the long-term 
future of the company as, contrasted to immediate returns, as well as the importance 
of the depth of the policy application, when compared to showing a "good story". 
In their interviews, Brain et al (2008:230) found that evidence of a similar desire to 
conform also emerged when remuneration committee members attempted to explain 
the relative prevalence of growth in earnings per share and total shareholder return 
(TSR) (vide paragraph 4.14) as performance metrics in long-term incentive (LTI) 
awards to the executive. (Bruce Buck & Main, 2005:1500) The requirement to satisfy 
outside commentators rather than to display any linkage to corporate strategy was 
usually proffered as a justification. The performance metrics utilised in the 
companies where the interviewees sit on the remuneration committee reveal a much 
richer range in short term incentives and (annual bonus) than in long term incentives 
(share options and performance shares). Westphal and Zajac (1994) also dealt with 











CEO contracts. They examined the political and institutional determinants thereof. 
Their research extended to 570 of the largest USA companies over two decades. 
Their findings showed that a substantial number of firms are likely to adopt, but not 
actually use, or only use to a limited extent, long-term incentive plans that they say 
suggests a potential separation of substance and symbolism in CEO compensation 
contracts. What is even more significant is that their analyses suggest that this 
decoupling of L TIP adoption and use is particularly prevalent with firms with powerful 
CEOs and firms with poor prior performance. Then they conducted further analyses, 
which showed that early adopters are more likely to pursue alignment between CEO 
and shareholders interests substantively, although later adopters then may pursue 
legitimacy by only symbolically controlling agency costs. How does this leave the 
shareholder? The principal sees one thing but what is it that he should see and to 
what extent is his investment to suffer from agency costs unknown to him. To put it 
succinctly - the principal will believe he is invested in a company with a secure 
management tied to a long-term incentive plan, which should show good returns, but 
in fact, this is not the case. This leaves him concerned as to what the future holds for 
his investment. 
4.21 South African Research 
There is a dearth of research articles on the remuneration committee system in 
South Africa. The book "Executive Pay in South Africa" is a key piece of literature on 
executive compensation and one of the few dedicated to the subject in South Africa 
by the authors who write extensively for the daily press in South Africa. Crotty and 
Bonorchis (2006:118) relate that on a few occasions local board members were 
called on to justify executive remuneration packages. Generally flimsy replies deny 
any impression of a vigorous arms length negotiation process or that those directors 
are concerned about their reputations. Therefore, they say that what is needed is for 
shareholders to pursue these issues. At general meetings of shareholders they have 
the opportunity to question the actions of the remuneration committee. 
The mere perception of the introduction of a remuneration committee was a welcome 











look into whether there are independent checks on executive compensation. 
However, they raise the question of how strong remuneration committees are in 
negotiating compensation packages and how effective they are generally (supra). 
The test is only likely to be shown where shareholders raise the issue. In South 
Africa, shareholders will unfortunately generally not have before them an annual 
remuneration report as extensive as is seen in the example in Appendix 4 
(Pearson pic, 2006) in the UK. With such information before them they will be able to 
make the enquiries which will ascertain whether it is only symbolism that is being put 
before them or whether there is something of substance which will give them 
confidence in their company, both present, future short term and long term. 
Thus the importance is that companies shape economies, and there needs to be 
broader accountability structures to ensure sustainability" 
4.22 A South African Critical view of the Remuneration Committee 
and its Members 
The published South African research has been by Tshepo Mongalo whose 
extensive article on remuneration committees in South Africa refers to their failure. 
He is now situated at the Law Faculty of the University of Cape Town and confirmed 
to this writer telephonically in late 2008 that as far as he is aware this is the only 
published research dedicated to remuneration committees in South Africa. Activism 
in some large UK companies highlights his view that investors want executive 
awards tied to their real contribution to value creation. Ten years after the 
introduction of the Cad bury Report (Cadbury, 1992) executives still did not suffer the 
consequences of their poor performance and were thus not aligned with 
shareholders. A further illustration is the golden handshake which Mongalo (2003) 
quotes as rewarding failure even after and probably because of poor performance, 
(Supra). He criticises share options that lack the link between pay and performance 
because they are one sided - the executive can only gain and not lose. Cosatu 











saying that 'we live in a grotesquely unequal society' and that such disparity will have 
an adverse impact on employee productivity. 
Mongalo (2003) complains about remuneration committees as fundamentally made 
up of members who may have a good knowledge of the company but no interest 
therein. This aspect can also be considered in the light of what has been written 
earlier in this chapter on whether the holdings of institutions are dedicated or 
transient. In the UK when remuneration committees were, established executive 
compensation grew dramatically. "He knows no evidence that companies with 
committees pay their executives lesser remuneration" (Mongalo, 2003:761). Some 
reasons for their ineffectiveness is access to information about other companies that 
is used as a basis for compensation decisions that should rather be based on merit. 
Interestingly, he comments that disclosure, which was so badly desired in the past, 
has actually caused remuneration to increase due to other higher payments by 
companies being viewed. Whilst expert advisors are promoted as essential to 
remuneration committees particularly due to the lack of expertise by board members, 
Mongalo (2003) questions their objectivity. It is risky for them to recommend austere 
or frugal packages as other consultants would then be preferred by the company in 
future. Should the consultants wish to ensure their own futures then recommending 
packages in the cases that mediocre results do not warrant them can only promote 
them. NEDs sitting on other boards tend to set a higher upper benchmark of pay 
within companies than is warranted. To him they have lost objectivity. Then comes 
back- scratching. Mongalo (2003:763) says that this applies particularly where the 
executive has outside directorships and then continues to recommend that: 
"It is clear that remuneration committees are not well positioned to tackle 
concerns regarding executive remuneration packages. In the UK they have 
not been positive in ensuring that at least pay is linked to performance." 
(Mongalo, 2003:763). It is clear that disclosure as a mechanism to bring pay 
in line with performance has failed dramatically" 
Mongalo,(2003:766), referring to the GSK vote (51 % of GSK shareholders voted 











seriously considered in South Africa. The payment of $US 35 million had been 
recommended in a report from the GSK remuneration committee. This illustrates 
effective shareholder power at general meetings of a company. 
Mongalo (2003) titled his paper "Shareholder Activism in the United Kingdom 
Highlights the Failure of Remuneration Committees: Lessons for South Africa" and 
proceeds to show that the significance is that there is a lesson South Africa can 
learn from the UK. It is of importance that the article is neither South African nor is 
the date 2003 too long ago as the content empirically evidences this. What we do not 
have is evidence of empirical South African research. How active are shareholders in 
South Africa and where are the leading shareholders? Although the press are active 
critics of companies, there is an opportunity for them to provide a welcome lead to 
the direction where shareholders should go. Mongalo, (2003) is of the view that 
remuneration committees are not successful and criticism by the press, although 
mainly dedicated to the quantum of compensation, is equally critical, as 
remuneration committees would not, in their view, pay such compensation. 
Mongalo (2003) has raised many issues that need to be looked at for a remuneration 
committee to be more effective. 
4.23 Independence of the NED 
Should NEDs not display independence a perception of bias and wrong decisions on 
compensation and other matters within the bent of the remuneration committee 
would result The NED holds a position of high trust and accountability. In the USA, 
the SEC set out requirements on NED independence. Wood (2004) explained Rule 
16b-3, IRC Section 162(m), and the NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements as 
creating a number of specific requirements for determining compensation committee 
independence. These requirements, as detailed as they may be, cannot, however, 
be relied upon as the exclusive test of independence. Wood (2004) believes that, in 
assessing a director's independence for state law purposes, a board should take 
account of personal friendships, prior business relationships, and even ties created 











explains a background of case law on this aspect of independence. He concludes 
that such connections might interfere with, or be perceived as interfering with, the 
board member's objectivity in evaluating executive pay. The USA regulations 
(quoted by (Wood, 2004)) are of more extensive detail than exists in South Africa. 
The rules are not only issued by the SEC but also by the Internal Revenue code, the 
New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. The implementation of these stringent 
requirements may not be easily implemented but they are not merely symbolic. 
When called upon to qualify as a NED the applicant should be put to a subjective 
test that would not be merely symbolic. The implementation of such a test would 
certainly inspire stakeholders. 
Having seen that the NED is fundamental to the activities and effectiveness of the 
remuneration committee his qualifications are then viewed from two aspects. Firstly, 
from the requirements of what one would expect of a director with a particular bent 
towards the remuneration committee and secondly, there are the recommendations 
(regulations) of bodies like the (Cadbury, 1992) and Greenbury reports (UK) and the 
SEC in the USA. It has thus been seen quite clearly that the independence of the 
NED is a sine qua non. As with qualifications, this is seen in recommendations 
(regulations) and in addition in the person himself. 
The importance of the independence of directors is stressed in the King Report at 
2.4.3 on page 24 which states these as: 
"Independent director - is a non-executive director who: 
(i) is not a representative of a shareowner who has the 
ability to control or significantly influence 
management; 
(ii) has not been employed by the company or the 
group of which it currently forms part, in any 
executive capacity for the preceding three financial 
years; 
(iii) is not a member of the immediate family of an 
individual who is, or has been in any of the past 
three financial years, employed by the company or 
the group in an executive capacity; 
(iv) is not a professional advisor to the company or the 
group, other than in a director capacity; 
(v) is not a significant supplier to, or customer of the 
company or group; 











company or group; and 
(vii) is free from any business or other relationship which 
could be seen to materially interfere with the 
individual's capacity to act in an independent 
manner." 
This is a matter for consideration, certainly from the aspect of substance and 
symbolism and to avoid criticism of cronyism. Research has shown that the 
independence of the NED is actively desired. It is a vital aspect of corporate 
governance. 
This chapter has shown research on the problems expressed in Agency Theory and 
views of a remuneration committee. There have been varied opinions on whether the 
remuneration committee system is working, whether it is applicable or whether 
shareholders should exercise more power. The importance of the NED has been 
seen from many points of view. Remuneration is a major task of the committee and 
many aspects have been seen particularly for the benefit of the company by 
incentivising the executive. Throughout, the importance and application of corporate 
governance has been paramount. 
4.24 Motivation 
When commenting on the Quantum of Compensation in paragraph 4.3, above 
reference was made to (McConvill , 2004) whose view is that pay for performance is 
a flawed methodology. His writings of are of great importance and should be noted 
by remuneration committees. Unfortunately, this is not a discourse on psychology 
but his writing are worth noting well. He draws on an extensive range of literature in 
psychology, management and workplace relations, behavioural law and economics, 
sociology, philosophy and law. 
4.25 Authors Quoted 
This literature review has benefited from the writings of top academics locally and 











governance in South Africa and Cadbury (1992) reported in the UK. No literature on 
the topic of remuneration committees and executives could exclude Jensen and the 
various academics who wrote jointly with him. Sanchez in Spain has vast literature 
on his website. Numerous UK writers are quoted. The contrary views on 
remuneration committees are expressed succinctly by (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004) in 
their book. One might call Crotty and Bonarchis (2006) ubiquitous, reading their 
articles almost every day in Business Report (Independent Newspapers); and lastly 
one is rather proud of the direct expressions of the views of UCT's own Mongalo. 
Because the results of the McKinsey research are so vital to corporate governance, 
enquiries were made to qualify them. The essence of the response received was 
"McKinsey is the creme de la creme of strategic and financial consultancies. It has 
huge and immense credibility." 
Such literature is the starting point after which this thesis will proceed to conduct its 













5.1 Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research now continues and forms a backdrop to enquiries conducted in a 
qualitative approach in the form of personal interviews. The quantitative research 
was conducted in the form of a survey despatched electronically in order to enrich, 
complement and enhance the qualitative results. In such quantitative research, the 
results of the survey conducted are analysed. 
Of these two main methods, it is necessary to ascertain whether quantitative 
research will be appropriate and to ascertain whether the information furnished can 
be applied in comparison with the results of interviews and the literature survey on 
the administration of executive compensation by a remuneration committee With this 
in mind, the questions in the electronic survey have been designed appropriately. 
5.2 The Interviews 
The qualitative research interviews were undertaken to obtain practical empirical 
information at high level. A spectrum of views was sought to ascertain what 
procedures and policies are applied in practice in remuneration committees. The six 
persons interviewed were the chairman of a listed company, the managing director 
of a formerly listed company, the recently retired CEO of a listed company, the CEO 
of a listed company, the chair of remuneration committees of unlisted sUbstantial 
companies and an analyst. Each of these persons is involved in remuneration 
committees and they hold positions in companies where such committees are a vital 
link. The variety of persons interviewed afforded a spread that afforded a balance of 
views. Although only six persons were interviewed, no matter how balanced, this low 
number was supplemented by the electronic survey that brought in the views of thirty 
one persons. After canvassing a variety of views of academics in the Faculty of 











survey responses should not stand on their own but need to be supplemented by 
the views obtained in interviews and in the literature review. This is discussed further 
in 5.4 below. 
The writer considers himself highly fortunate in succeeding in obtaining the co-
operation of the interviewees. The outcome brought a balance of views. There are 
numerous companies in which the top executives could most likely have a wealth of 
experience. To request an interview "out of the blue" would not have much chance of 
success and then when conducted the respondent would start from a fundamental, 
understandable basis of not knowing whether to trust the writer. The interviews were 
highly stimulating. Something, which flowed during the interviews, was an attitude by 
those running companies that they would observe in the breach many norms but on 
a legal and moral basis would act in the interests of their companies. This was 
illustrated by an attitude that where profit targets were not achieved they still paid 
executives bonuses for plain hard work in exasperating economic climates and the 
chairmen would then be prepared to take the criticism from investors particularly as 
they know how hard it is to obtain and retain top executives. They were prepared to 
make such disclosures to the writer because of the confidentiality undertaking. 
5.3 The Survey 
The quantitative research follows the qualitative research. The survey was 
conducted through a questionnaire on various aspects of remuneration committees 
(Appendix 2). A robust research solicitation of views was conducted in order that a 
comparison can be made of a research survey against interviews in order to 
ascertain what knowledge can be added and in order to enrich the information from 
the interviews. 
The basis of choosing the questions flows from the personal interviews conducted as 
well as the matters dealt with in the Literature Review Chapter. Matters raised in the 
research and reported on in the literature review are thus canvassed from a wider 











Prior to dispatching the questionnaire, a draft was tested against a variety of persons 
for their reactions and criticisms. Without listing all persons a sample would be a 
former Cape Town Stock broker who is now a leading investment advisor in London, 
the Managing Director of the Finance Section of one of the top international 
investment banks situated in Hong Kong, a business woman in Cape Town, and it 
goes without saying that this author received valuable guidance from his supervisor. 
Some of their comments are of interest. One said that he had never served on a 
remuneration committee; that the answers called for should stress more the 
"agree/disagree" format; the invitation to the respondent to telephone was 
considered important. A few important calls were received. There was some criticism 
of the great stress placed on the "jobs for pals" tone of some of the questions. The 
response thereto dealt with the importance of the NEDs in the remuneration 
committee being so fundamental that if there were not completely independent 
members then the investing public would reconsider the corporate governance 
aspect of any company's remuneration committee. A few of the persons tested 
asked for nepotism or cronyism to be explained; consequently, definitions were 
inserted in to the questionnaire. Inserting a background explanation to the complete 
questionnaire was considered but as brevity is of the essence in obtaining responses 
this was not proceeded with. It was decided however to explain briefly the functions 
of a remuneration committee in a question. This may be seemingly basic, but it is 
vital. In framing the questions, brevity was of importance as the recipients are top 
executives and analysts in South Africa who are cognisant of time constraints; if the 
survey is too long, they will merely ignore it. It is well recognised that there are a vast 
number of surveys being sent out but the electronic method was on balance 
considered by far to be the best one. 
A general impression received from these discussions is that knowledge on the basic 
requirements and the workings of a remuneration committee is thin. It is thus 
considered important that the chapter herein headed "Remuneration Committee" 
furnishes the reader with a description of the background and workings of the 











Sending the survey via hard copy correspondence was rejected as being too tedious 
to the recipient, too costly and not more effective than electronic communication that 
is considered more acceptable today than hard copy. It is also easier for the recipient 
to reply electronically. The electronic survey method that was decided upon was that 
provided by the University of Cape Town known as "Select Survey" which is one not 
often used by individuals. The facilities on this system allow questions to be asked in 
a variety of formats with multiple-choice answers, the main one being the 'agree, 
disagree' method. Thus, the decision was made that the best system is for the 
questions to be framed mainly to allow for the "agree/disagree" format. This allowed 
for a more positive and decisive response. The questions were so worded that direct 
and dedicated answers were required without any long deviations. Care was taken to 
ensure that opinions were not being expressed or suggested in framing the 
questions. The email letters were personalised by being addressed to individuals, by 
name, position and their company and more information where considered 
necessary, considering that they are persons of influence and experience. The same 
letter was thus sent individually to many individuals. 
5.4 The Recipients of the Survey 
These are persons chosen for their influence and knowledge. The survey was sent 
to the CEO and CFO of almost all listed companies on the JSE - a total of 243 
emails were dispatched .. In other cases, the survey was addressed to the chairman 
or managing director or similar senior positions for reasons applicable to the 
individual companies. The analysts or investment officers of institutions were also 
addressed. It is of importance to ensure that the list of companies is comprehensive. 
Thus, the names and addresses of such recipients were obtained from Macgregor's 
"Who Owns Whom" (2008) book which lists 349 companies plus others on the 
development board of the Alternative Exchange which companies were not included 
in the survey Whilst the purpose is to include all companies listed on the JSE, those 
owning properties reflected in the Property Unit Trusts and Loan Stock companies 
were in some instances excluded where they employ very few, if any, staff, rather 
using property administration companies. A problem is that new companies are 











history. A comprehensive list was therefore used. Considerable efforts were made to 
obtain email addresses of their companies. Telephonic enquiries were mainly 
successful although changes did occur and email reports on non-deliveries did not 
facilitate delivery despite follow up calls. The covering letter was worded as to appeal 
to the responsibility toward corporate governance. In interviews and general 
enquiries it was ascertained that every executive is personally, interested in earnings 
thus the introductory caption to the covering letter read "Executive Remuneration". 
Although an email list of all companies listed on the JSE was made available this 
was not used for the reason that results on an ad hoc basis were not required. The 
responses are from persons whose views should be respected. 
In 5.2 references is made to the receipt of 31 responses to the survey out of 243 
requests. Despite that view, the quality of the responses received from some of the 
most senior executives and the size and stature of their companies make up for 
quality over the quantity of the views expressed. The responses are thus 
academically considered both acceptable and defendable. Anderson, Sweeney and 
Williams (1990:247) confirm this saying that: 
if. ••• The sample size of 30 is the rule of thumb that allows us to assume that 
the large sample conditions of the central limit theorem have been satisfied. 
This research now proceeds to consider the results of the qualitative and quantitative 
research and the literature research, organising the various views together in order 












RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Having completed the literature review, conducted the interviews and the survey, it 
follows to examine the results of these aspects referred to in the research 
methodology. 
6.1 Corporate Governance 
Each person interviewed accepted that corporate governance of the highest 
standard is the norm, with the King Reports setting the basis in South Africa. No 
direct reference in the survey was made thereto but it had high standards as the 
basis. The literature review reflects an attitude that all of the research strives for the 
highest and the best standards for investors, the executives, the company, and its 
staff, that corporate governance will produce. A remuneration committee is an 
essential function of the prerequisites of corporate governance. 
In the literature review it was shown that the vast benefits to companies which 
conform properly to corporate governance were noted by Coombes and Watson 
(2000), published in the in the McKinsey and Co. report. They found that a huge 
number of global institutional investors indicated a willingness to pay a premium for 
the shares of a well-governed company over one considered poorly governed but 
with a comparable financial record. Three-quarters of these investors indicated that 
board practices were at least as important as financial performance, when evaluating 
companies for potential investment simultaneously adding significant shareowner 
value, which can also make countries, especially in the emerging markets, a magnet 
for global capital. 
Corporate governance is at the core of all aspects of the motivation, results and 
activities involved in this research. None of those interviewed and surveyed had 
anything adverse to say about corporate governance nor was there anything adverse 











6.2 Support for the Remuneration Committee System over Agency 
Theory 
At interviews, there was acceptance almost throughout in favour of the remuneration 
committee system except from the analyst who favoured to empower shareholders. 
The survey supported the views of those interviewed by voting 78, 57% against 
shareholders having more say or 71,42% against applying alternative methods to the 
remuneration committee system. The system is not left alone in an oligarchic manner 
but in the survey, there was a 92,74% vote for spelling out their policies to 
shareholders in the annual report submitted to the Annual General Meeting of 
Shareholders. One respondent commented: "Shareholders should have the authority 
to vote on broad remuneration principles via a remuneration report and vote annually 
- they should vote on principles". Another respondent put it differently 
"It is impractical to let shareholders decide on operational issues like 
remuneration. The chairman of a remuneration committee is to answer 
questions on his area of responsibility at a shareholders meeting. They are 
entitled to voice concerns or refuse to reappoint directors or ask for 
remuneration details at shareholder meetings". 
However, this may not always be the case in practice. Crotty and Bonarchis 
(2006: 118) relate that when board members were called on to justify packages there 
were flimsy replies which denied any impression that a vigorous arms length 
negotiation process had been carried out or that directors are concerned about their 
reputations. They say that what is needed is for shareholders to pursue these issues 
at general meetings of shareholders when they have the opportun ity to question the 
actions of the remuneration committee. 
A conclusive opinion in the survey summed up the matter when a respondent said: 
"If shareholders do not agree with the remuneration of executives, they should 
voice their opinion to the board. They should, however, not be in a position to 











Committee system should remain as the method authorising executive 
remuneration". 
Other points of view appear in the literature review. South African research was 
against many aspects of the operations of a remuneration committee. These will be 
seen in various aspects of the research outlined in this chapter. Overseas research 
expressed many opinions against the remuneration committee system. (Fernandes, 
2008:30) conducted extensive empirical research that concluded that NEDs do not 
have a strong monitoring role and that executive emoluments are higher when 
companies have more NEDs. He criticised NEDs as being influenced by their own 
high pay. 
Reviewing the analysis of the views expressed one sees that there is much support 
for the remuneration committee system in contrast to empowering shareholders but 
dissatisfaction with the way the committees are conducted. In the UK, USA and 
South Africa remuneration committees were formally introduced approximately a 
decade ago. They can thus still be considered young but what should be noted is 
that they are progressing away from the Agency Theory methods. This is progress 
although they do have room for further improvement. 
6.3 Shareholders vs. Remuneration Committees for Executive 
Compensation 
The debate is whether executive compensation should be decided upon directly by 
shareholder involvement rather than delegating this power to a remuneration 
committee. In the literature review, there were powerful writings against a 
remuneration committee that supported the view that the decisions on remuneration 
should vest in shareholders. Bolton et ai, (2007), however, claimed that the bursting 
of the technology bubble was attributed to the lack of the proper control by 
shareholders whereas a properly set up remuneration committee might have 
assisted in preventing some of the root causes. 











78,57% voted against placing more power in the hands of shareholders authorising 
executive remuneration, with almost the same number (71 42%) not accepting that 
there are better alternative methods than the remuneration committee. What was 
considered more practical is to limit institutional shareholders to be more effective in 
expressing their views to the board on how it decided on executive compensation. In 
the section provided in the survey for comments, views expressed were "Why have 
any board then? - no points in having a remuneration committee", "why weaken the 
board's rights, shareholders should vote on broad principles". One respondent in 
viewing shareholder involvement as impractical points out that those large blocks of 
shareholders could then express their interest in board remuneration. Other 
comments are that decisions in the domain of shareholders destroy wealth and are 
impractical. The remuneration of executives goes to the core of a company's longer 
term performance through its influence on the calibre and depth of leadership - thus 
they say it is "madness to hand this to a distant and possibly disinterested 
shareholder body"; "shareholders would not have access to the necessary specialist 
and informed decisions and would have very little knowledge of appropriate 
remuneration". One 'anti' view said that shareholder activism is critical on 
remuneration related issues. By this, one interprets that shareholders would not see 
a balanced view on the importance of compensation particularly the importance of 
obtaining and retaining executives and not merely being critical about the 
remuneration without being constructive by looking at the overall strategy of the 
company. In the interviews, the objection against shareholder involvement was 
strong, adding that shareholders also did not have the qualifications to be directors. 
Barak et al (2008) as well as Cohen and Lauterbach (2007) showed that shareholder 
power could negate a remuneration committee decision indicating that the 
independence of a remuneration committee must not be interfered with by a powerful 
shareholder. 
Bebchuk and Fried, (2004:195-200) were critical of board monitoring and 
recommended increased shareholder power by larger institutions. They disapproved 











"abuse by CEOs" and "executive pay excesses" and submitted a "recommended 
alternative managerial power model". 
Jensen, (2007:2) warns against giving the agent a "blank cheque" saying he must 
account to the principals who should monitor. 
The above views indicate much support for the remuneration committee system from 
the survey respondents as well as at the interviews. Opposition was shown to 
remuneration committees in the literature research with corresponding support from 
them for shareholder involvement. 
It is prevalent today for companies to seek approval for payment of the fees payable 
to NEDs (only) at shareholder meetings. 
6.4 Outside Remuneration Consultants 
At interviews, most companies supported the use of remuneration consultants. One 
company appointed a life and pensions consultant, who is not a director of the 
company, as a member of the remuneration committee. In the research literature 
there is a strong adverse view on bias shown by such consultants who would affect 
their own popularity if they do not present remuneration statistics favourable to the 
executives. Mongalo (2003) questions their objectivity saying that it is risky for them 
to personally recommend austere or frugal packages as other consultants would 
then be preferred by the company in future. Should the consultants wish to secure 
their own futures then they should realise that in the event of them recommending 
compensation packages that reflect mediocre emoluments they then take the risk of 
not being re-appointed 
In one interview, the company restricted the use of such consultants to a minimum. 
Only on an occasional basis were consultants used. Their committee preferred to 
follow the market itself by keeping abreast of trends in the press and by inserting 
advertisements themselves as well as generally maintaining communications 











In the survey 89,19 % considered it essential for external and lor internal 
remuneration consultants to advise the remuneration committee in deciding on 
compensation. Whatever the correct view is, the committee must be guided by 
proper research into the quantum of compensation paid in the market place and 
employments packages and conditions as NEDs cannot themselves be regarded to 
be specialists in executive packages. 
The analysis stresses the importance of consulting experts on the matter of 
executive compensation that is regarded as not being within the knowledge of the 
average director. Whilst all were in favour of consulting them, in the literature review 
there was a strong warning to be sceptical of the motives of the consultants. From 
this, one is left with the thought that the consultants should be put to direct tests as 
to their methods; alternatively, two separate firms of consultants could be used 
independently either on the same issue or on different divisions of a company. The 
one could be played off against the other. 
6.5 The CEO 
At each interview, the problem of a sudden unexpected replacement of a CEO was 
considered to be a major source of concern. One interviewee had been a director of 
a company that had suffered such a problem. No definitive solution to the problem 
was offered although many alternatives were considered, the easiest being found in 
a group of companies consisting of many divisions to have within such divisions 
executives capable of such promotion. The working life of a CEO is considered a 
maximum of ten to fifteen years with age being a factor to take in to account, 
particularly in the fashion industry. 
In a unitary board, the CEO is the executive director whilst the majority of the board 
are NEDs. At interviews, no need was seen to increase the number of executives 
although some companies do also appoint the CFO and Managing Director to the 
board. In the survey 62,06% voted to increase the number of executives who are 
members of the main board but still ensuring that NEDs remained in the majority. 











of the main board having no involvement at all in the executive function of the 
company. This matter was not a contentious one. An important aspect emerging 
from the interviews is the importance of ensuring that there is depth to management 
that would avoid the major problem of an unexpected loss of a CEO. 
"Given the strategic operational role of the chief executive officer, this function 
should be separate from that of the chairperson" (King Committee, 2002:23). 
6.6 Qualifications Appointment and Independence of NEDs 
In the literature review Clarke et ai, (1998) pointed out that a remuneration 
committee is only as good as its members. A guide as to the qualifications has been 
issued by the London Stock Exchange as part of their 76-page brochure on 
corporate governance. The qualifications could not be discussed at interviews, as 
the interviewees were themselves NEDs. 
In the literature review, Mongalo (2003) complains about remuneration committees 
being fundamentally made up of members who may have a good knowledge of the 
company but no interest therein. In the interviews, the support was for the unitary 
board system with no problem being expressed about the selection process. In the 
survey 100% voted that remuneration committee members should have various 
specific attributes and not to generally be persons with business experience. 
These attributes which respondents to the survey listed commenced with a sound 
knowledge of remuneration, then followed numerous other attributes such as broad 
skills, general commercial and business knowledge of the ins and outs of package 
restructuring, employee benefit funds and of tax, to be economically astute, and 
have a reputation for being fair with integrity, experience on similar boards (being 
wary of conflicts at the same time), experience in human resources, a holistic picture 
of best practice in other organisations, independence, common sense and a sense 
of reality, having held previous senior managerial positions, industry experience, 












67,64% felt that at least two members of the committee should not be directors of the 
company and should rather be nominated from a pool of outside persons appointed 
for 3 years in order to maintain their independence from the main board. Following 
on this 62,85% wanted greater institutional involvement by forming a pool from which 
members would be available with impeccable qualifications. Whilst 80% are satisfied 
that remuneration committees are generally made up of independent members, 
65,71 % felt that the committees too often consist of friends and associates of the 
board and are thus not entirely independent(vide paragraph 6.7, below). However, 
59,38% were against accusing the committee of being part of a "club". Then 90% 
called for the nomination committee to play a more active part in forming the 
membership of the remuneration committee. 
The extent of the answers furnished is a strong indication of the importance which 
senior executives, who are the main respondents of the survey, place upon the 
qualifications, appointment and independence of members of the remuneration 
committee and the vital part such committee plays in the welfare and progress of the 
company. 
Thus, one sees that the importance to the company and its owners of the high 
standards required from the NEDs equates to that required of the main board 
directors. 
6.7 Cronyism, Nepotism and the "Club" 
These are problematical questions which themselves invite debate. The answers 
furnished reflect appropriately. Whilst it is not considered good balance to frame 
survey questions to suggest an answer this question was initially very carefully 
looked at. Despite one sharp criticism from a survey respondent that the questions 
are not appropriate to a Masters thesis - this may well be - there are aspects of the 
answer that have been difficult to avoid. The choice of the appointment of additional 
directors must almost always express a board's wish to be responsible towards 
appointing a person whose qualifications are well known to them - and should refer 











directors to join the board, the board will be most conservative in their approach as a 
reversal of their decision can be unpleasant and reflect poorly on them. Accordingly, 
the choice would veer toward someone known to them. How well known of course is 
the difference between cronyism and independent judgement. 
In the literature review Ezzamel and Watson (1998) suggested that a 'cosy collusion' 
exists between executive directors and non-executive directors who happen to sit on 
each other's boards or remuneration committees and thus are able to bid up each 
other's earnings. If this is the case then the concept of a remuneration committee is 
failing and they are not tough enough to make independent unbiased decisions. 
Mongalo (2003) criticises back scratching particularly where the NEDs have outside 
directorships in which they can recommend the appointment of each other. He 
continues to say that this does not allow remuneration committees to tackle concerns 
regarding executive remuneration packages. Another form of cronyism was seen in 
the research undertaken by (Barak et ai, 2008) where owner CEOs exploit the 
company and extract private benefits in the form of inflated pay. Research in the UK 
found in a survey that nearly half of company chairmen thought that bidding up of 
pay occurred. 
Despite these problems, it was thus encouraging to see that the responses to the 
survey showed that some two thirds voted in support of the accusation that boards 
did not make appointments based on accusations of cronyism and nepotism. Eighty 
per cent of the responses confirmed that the independence of persons appointed 
should be known to respondents. The result of the vote on whether new 
appointments have to be members of a "Club" was 60% saying this was not so and 
that appointees were independent of friendship obligations. Some comments are that 
remuneration cannot be administered by outsiders, that the remuneration committee 
must stand on its own two feet "and if not it is completely useless". The concerns are 
valid but not pervasive as shareholders meetings can take up the issue and 
shareholders do have the ability to nominate and appoint NEDs. Some strong 
opinions were voiced - an example was that there is a high incidence of cronyism 











criticism is that companies appoint NEDs who are likely to agree with their views and 
once appointed they reciprocate favours for the opportunity offered to them. The 
comments and the votes are rather mixed and leave one without positive direction. 
The following are some direct quotes from respondents to the survey: 
"I believe there is a high incidence of cronyism; 
Should not happen but I have no knowledge of whether it actually does; 
In our experience non-executive directors take their responsibilities very 
seriously and make decisions on external information such as remuneration 
benchmark reviews; 
Companies in most cases appoint non - executives who are likely to agree 
with their views. Once appointed these people reciprocate favours for the 
opportunity offered to them; 
There will always be a degree of cronyism in the appointment of non 
executive directors to a remuneration committee." 
It would have been considered aggressive to ask the persons interviewed whether 
the appointments they themselves had made were based on matters other than their 
best judgement of the suitability of the appointee. 
In paragraph 6.5, the importance of the qualifications of the members of a 
remuneration committee was stressed. Thus, the instance of any cronyism or 
nepotism becomes a startling and major issue should it exist. Shareholder 
involvement in the activities of the remuneration committee met with general 
disapproval, the appointment of the members of such committee is one that should 
be subject to great interest at shareholder meetings. This need not only takes place 
when a new appointment is made but when the remuneration committee reports are 
submitted for approval at the annual general meetings. At that meeting, the 
opportunity should be availed of by shareholders to evaluate each of the members of 
the remuneration committee. NEDs should then respond to investor examination. 
The recently passed Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008, which will only come into 
effect in 2010, provides that the sister committee - the audit committee - " ... shall be 
appointed at each annual general meeting and shall comprise of at least 3 











remuneration committee but this is a matter for future consideration that would stress 
the importance of a remuneration committee. 
6.8 Compensation 
The literature review, contained many requirements that the compensation 
committees should follow the philosophy and strategy of the company. The 
committee should be aligned to the company's overall vision, its mission and style 
(Weinberger, 2007). At the interviews, the respondents all felt that compensation in 
general is market related. Where criticism was levelled against the amount of 
remuneration, it had been found that, when subject to enquiry as to replacement 
cost, the latter was found to be higher. The margin of any possible overpayment was 
very often considered to make very little difference to the overall profits of the 
company but created excellent inducement to the executive. In literature Hsieh and 
Kleiner (2003:77) stress that "the positive impact that a great CEO can have is 
enormous and companies cannot afford to lose it." On the other hand, a robust 
empirical analysis of Dutch listed companies failed to detect a positive pay 
performance relationship (Duffhues & Kabir, 2008) 
Ward (1998) felt the need for a remuneration committee to control outside 
appointments by the CEO from the aspect of time taken and his earnings. In 
addition, his research indicated that remuneration committees actively pursued the 
most efficient, democratic and open approaches to compensation from many angles 
that caused him to support the committees as opposed to Agency Theory. 
Compensation being the main function of a remuneration committee is the subject of 
much research on whether various actions by the committee cause compensation to 
be higher or lower. The quantum of compensation is a vast subject not elaborated on 
herein, specifically due to this research being mainly on the effectiveness of the 
remuneration committee. The incentive aspect is considered a major function that 












In the literature review, Jensen and Murphy, (1998:270) ask whether current levels of 
CEO compensation are high enough to attract the best and brightest. He is against 
paying the executive like a bureaucrat because that is how he will then work. All 
persons interviewed agreed that one of the main financial ways to incentivise the 
CEO is by participation in the results of operations. 95,24% of those surveyed 
agreed that it is accepted today that incentive schemes are important to the 
employment of executives. The only dissenting view was expressed by the analyst 
who felt that the whole package needed prior approval of shareholders. This was 
supplemented in one case where executives participated in the results of nodes only 
which were not related to the bottom line. These nodes applied to specific tasks 
delegated to these executives. The most prevalent method is where targets are set 
at the commencement of a cost period, the formula providing for the executive to 
participate in a share of successfully reaching a target agreed upon in advance. 
Westphal and Zajac (1994) expressed concern about information asymmetry where 
substance and symbolism differed and a problem arose with verifying the targets 
submitted by the executive for purposes of calculating incentive payments. 
Landsberg (2007:22) warned against remuneration committees acting on an ad hoc 
basis saying that incentives should be carefully thought out and structured. 
In the literature review Pfeffer (1998), stressed that even in the broader high-
performance human resource management approach the application of pay 
contingent upon performance is recognised as a key component of compensation 
packages. The principal is striving for the agent to become a 'partner in the 
businesses. The contingent pay is thus equivalent to a share in the profits. To quote 
one interview 
"The difference between a good company and an excellent company is your 
top executives who make the company work. You must look after them". 
Whatever method is to be applied to incentivise the CEO the most successful 











voluntarily, willingly and enthusiastically administer the firm. It was also noted that 
the CEO compensation endures for a relatively short period of time during which the 
CEO has to provide for his own subsequent future. 
It was however, agreed that the payment of bonuses based thereon are not "cast in 
stone". At one interview, the current economic downturn was considered in this light. 
The remuneration committee had to consider not paying bonuses when the 
executives completed a gruelling year in difficult economic circumstances. The head-
hunters arrived with attractive signing on bonuses. A redeeming feature in these 
circumstances is the employment contract to which the executive was bound by a 
restraint of trade payment. So the remuneration committee was left with the problem 
of how to incentivise major efforts other than in "terms of the rules" especially when 
the results achieved are due to external economic factors. They broke the rules and 
paid bonuses in these circumstances. 
The remuneration committee is guided by a CEO who shows his appreciation and 
leadership of the executives. All accept adherence to corporate governance. 
Important research writing is the comment by (Jensen and Murphy, 1998:270) that 
executives must be incentivised failing, which they will perform like bureaucrats to 
the detriment of the company. 
In the survey 63,04% disagreed with the concept of shareholders approving the 
salary of the executive whilst 61,36% disagreed with the concept of shareholder 
approval of executive bonuses. 
The views expressed were sharply in favour of the financial aspect taking steps to 
incentivise executives by participation in results achieved. Remuneration committees 
must however be cautious in merely accepting figures placed before them, whether 
such details relate to forecasts as to the future or of historical amounts. The 
mechanism of participatory incentivisation is regarded in the interviews as being of 
great importance to the success of the organisation. The public perception of high 
total emoluments of executives stems not so much from their basic salaries but from 











6.10 Shareholders - Board Representation 
Because shareholders are more involved and have an investment to consider, the 
question was included which asked whether institutions - generally referred to 
because they hold the largest shareholdings - should take up positions on the board. 
65,51 % supported this view yet, at interviews, the views were that they did not 
usually have the expertise or the commitment to the company, whether they have 
long or short-term horizons. The institutions themselves were reluctant to accept 
board positions and preferred having regular informal financial reviews with their 
analysts and executives of the company. One of the institution's main considerations 
is that if they have board representation and then bought and sold the shares they 
might be accused of insider trading. This exhibits an interesting aspect of the logic 
behind their investing in listed companies. It does not evidence an intention to be a 
long-term holder. 
In the literature review we read that dedicated, as contrasted to transient, institutional 
investors can act as a monitoring or restraining factor on executive remuneration. 
The importance is that the investors must not be transient according to (Dong & 
Ozkan, 2008:351) who believe dedicated investors have a better discipline role to 
play. Dong and Ozkan, (2008:350) found that this is extended to institutional 
ownership having a positive and significant influence on CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of option grants. Consequently, whilst a board may watch its largest 
(institutional) shareholders buy and sell their shares, the board and the remuneration 
committee remain in a position where they must steadily continue to take their own 
decisions with little if any guidance from or consultation with the (institutional) 
owners. 
Other than the analyst interviewed; there is little support for shareholder involvement 
in the form of direct board representation - not even through the remuneration 
committee. In theory, the board should represent the major shareholders who are the 
true beneficiaries of the organisation's results. They should be "there to look after 
their money". This is not the situation due, firstly, to institutions not employing 











themselves the right to be able to trade in the company's shares. This latter logic 
would render them subject to the penalties of insider trading as well as not being 
dedicated long-term holders - thus defeating the purpose of board representation. 
6.11 An independent (NED) non- executive director as chairman of 
the board 
This question is close to the cronyism. In corporate governance, it is accepted and 
considered by the King Report, (King Committee, 2002:23) that "the chairperson 
should preferably be an independent non-executive director". Thus, one quarter of 
the votes in the survey against an independent NED chairman is significant but in the 
end not surprising due to the approach of many executives who are large 
shareholders who wish to have stronger control. 
In the UK, there was a sharp adverse reaction when household name company 
Marks and Spencer appointed its CEO to be the board chairman. The chairman of 
the board is expected to be a NED having no management ties (Coakley & lIiopoulou 
2006). Studies found that less independent and larger boards award CEOs 
significantly higher bonuses and salary. 
"Companies should be headed by an effective board that can both lead and control 
the company. The board should comprise a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors, preferably with a majority of non-executive directors, of whom sufficient 
should be independent of management so that shareowner interests (including 
minority interests) can be protected".(King Committee, 2002:22). Today more 
companies are moving towards appointing an Independent NED as chairman. 
6.12 The Press 
"The media also have a part to play in drawing attention to governance 
issues of public or shareholder concern. It is vital to seize the opportunity 











Criticism of the press because they look for sensationalism was felt strongly by (96, 
67%) of respondents to the survey. The suggestion was that the press should turn 
their attention to investigate fully how compensation is calculated (96,67%) as well 
as how such calculations are comprised (91, 66%). The consequences were not as 
strongly felt when 66,67% of respondents said that this could affect the quality of 
investors and investment. None of the respondents proffered commentary on 
whether there are any positive aspects of the functions served by the press. 
No research was found on the effect of the press on remuneration committees nor 
were they discussed at interviews. The attitude of the press should be reviewed in an 
objective long-term context. Until disclosure became obligatory, investors were ill 
informed. Once King and other overseas bodies brought in disclosure requirements it 
was the press who then highlighted the extent of executive payments as disclosed in 
annual and other reports. These writings could be applied to more constructive 
comments on other aspects of listed companies' compensation policies. 
Announcements by companies of results are part of press briefings at which 
journalists have the opportunity to make balanced enquiries on the operations of 
remuneration committees Thus they could then report in even greater depth on the 
emoluments that they consider being so vast. 
A gap exists for the press to be informative on the workings of a remuneration 
committee as well as the infrastructure of executive employment. Such information 
would add strength to the information customarily provided by them and 
simultaneously promote investor confidence. 
The views of those interviewed, the results of the electronic survey and research 













To establish remuneration committees has been a corrective process. The King 
Commission in South Africa and the Cadbury Commission in the UK successfully 
introduced remuneration committees. The initial problem was the escalating losses 
suffered under Agency Theory. Investments in companies suffered Rents and 
Outrage costs, the consequential mistrust, losses of confidence and weak corporate 
governance. Remuneration committees were thus, introduced as the solution to the 
Agency Theory problem. In that they have succeeded. 
The importance, whether they are effective is seen in the strategic effect that 
remuneration committees have on the results and operations of listed companies. A 
divergence of views expressed no confidence in the remuneration committee 
system, supported in the literature review by many authors although persons 
interviewed did not express any adverse views against the system, nor did the 
electronic survey elicit strong views against the system. There was some support for 
shareholders to be more empowered, albeit without direct involvement. The strong 
call has been for shareholders to be more outspoken in their contacts with boards 
whether at shareholder meetings or by indirect approaches. With such a hiatus of 
opinions, are they effective? Firstly, the committees are young, having only been 
established in the 1990s. Then, there is not much research of a current and topical 
nature to establish in some detail whether their operations have actually been 
successful. This is one of the matters for future research. 
Whether remuneration committees are effective enough has been shown to be 
debatable, but they are "the best we have". Nevertheless, they can be improved 
upon. Whilst many faults have been shown in this research, remuneration 
committees, although effective, have need for much improvement. 
Symbolism may give the impression to outsiders that all is well whereas substance 
may well be lacking. Doubts exist whether the committees are substantially carrying 











consultants or whether the right persons are appointed to the committees or whether 
NEDs are merely friends of the board appointed "crony like." 
There is now full disclosure of the emoluments of the executives and their incentive 
bonuses are properly shown. Nevertheless, it has not been established whether the 
committees apply their minds fully to the calculations placed before them on how 
participation in profit sharing schemes is calculated. Information furnished on such 
procedures would instil confidence in investors 
King and Cadbury supported the use of outside advisers. The committees are thus 
not left to select emoluments based on their own non-professional experience. 
Nevertheless, investors should be advised of this in the annual remuneration report 
together with information showing that the committee has chosen such consultants 
wisely. Doubt has been expressed whether the consultants apply themselves fully in 
the interests of the company in a professional manner. The committee should also 
be a direct party to the engagement of remuneration consultants and not leave it to 
executives to engage them. Enquiries should also be instituted directly by the NEDs 
as to compensation in comparable businesses. 
King and Cad bury called for the unitary board system comprised of the appropriate 
number of NEDs that is now extensively applied by listed companies. The question is 
left open as to who appoints the NEDs. Logic would expect those who own the 
companies to be represented on the board. Such owners (the institutions) are 
avoiding this and leaving it to professional management. They should be more 
involved and take such interest as would be expected of one who values full 
protection of his assets. Institutions are mainly investing on behalf of client investors 
who would expect them to be more involved in the underlying companies in which 
their savings are invested. The holder of a life policy with (say) Old Mutual, San lam 
or Liberty will want to know that his savings are invested in Companies where the 
insurance company takes proper and full board representation where they hold large 











Many points of view have been expressed for and against the effectiveness of the 
remuneration committee system for listed companies in South Africa. However, the 
structure of the committee omits what is truly left outstanding, that is whether a 
committee made up of transient members can finally be effective. Greater openness 
in the appointments of NEDs would be one step in improving this perception with 
more involvement from larger shareholders on boards that would instil greater 
confidence. Strong views were expressed on whether the NEDs were appointed 
consequent upon cronyism or nepotism - serious matters which affect their 
independence and which cast doubt on whether they were chosen on merit. There is 
a need for the regulations defining independence to be more rigorously applied. 
The problem is whether their appointments are merely an assignment to them with 
no permanence. The introduction to this study related the problems in the Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank. It has still to be seen whether remuneration 
committees are strong enough to prevent recurrences. One doubts whether transient 
NEDs with short-term engagements have the commitment to become sufficiently 
involved. 
Remuneration committees serve an important function in promoting corporate 
governance. Their existence adds to investor confidence that corporate governance 
is in place. The McKinsey quarterly showed us of what tremendous importance 
corporate governance is to the capital structure of a company and empirically 
illustrated the quantitative effect on company values when corporate governance is, 
or is not, properly in place. More visibility is needed in appointments of NEDs. 
The conclusion drawn from the research conducted in its various forms is that 
remuneration committees are effective with the qualification that much progress still 
needs to be made. Thus, there is scope for improvement and further research will 
promote this. 
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Appendix 1: Further Research to be Undertaken 
It would be beneficial to conduct research into the following aspects of remuneration 
committees: 
What is the reason that shareholders do not attend company meetings and what can 
be done either to encourage them or to facilitate their attendance? Some 
suggestions have been for video screening between main centres or holding 
additional informative meetings at various centres (This was successfully carried out 
by the ApexHi Ltd (now Redefine Group). 
Should remuneration committees be appointed by shareholders and not by boards? 
Should appointments of committee members comprise an equal number of outside 
members as NEDs to remuneration committees? Such outside persons would not be 
directors with the result that openness would be applied in their appointments, 
particularly by shareholders at meetings. 
Is it beneficial for institutions to become more involved in directorships and to hold 
longer-term horizons in the companies in which they invest, being substantial 
investors in most companies on the JSE? This matter has wider implications and 
does not only apply to listed companies. 
Greater independent scrutiny of whether corporate governance by companies is 
implemented in substance or form. Possibly an inspectorate like that of the JSE 
could establish whether the corporate governance of individual companies has 
actually been successful Reference to the research reported on by Mongalo will 











Appendix 2: The Survey Questionnaire 
I . II"., It.,· • .., . .. to" •• " A,h. ""'-,,,'n"" " ..... " .. OJ;.~.H . , ... ,,",' •• ," j,., " ..... ~ .. ~~ . 
",1\ ., " iM 'h ............ ~":" '~ •• <10'"'''' h •• ., :"11'" •• ,I ... . ..,,~. It~. oi " .... ,. ... "" 
r :,,:~)'. ~ ... f ' 1'" r u" ... 1 r o."J '" r ~'""' ~ '~" 'j'" 
"."n: 140<. 01 J" 
.pp" .. ' .... E .",~. ' 
0,,,,,,,,5 .1.-, 
! ... ";':(Joo-,,,-u,, 
1I~ .... tt".£ .",tr.' {," :1,'" r ,rf:,,"w:o 
t , '.' 
!~I"'" 1Jtr. ",u. 
11~ ,.>., ... r •• " 
£ "., •• 0·"",,, 
! .1 ... 
n . '. 01 ..  ,. .. ·" C,,, "' .. r .. .,,0, , -, i' • 
., "'I . ... 'IP"""tn\ 
.n '~~" .r"l ",I" ... ".", 10,,,.,,.,,. 
, ,",,·'.(D 
>0:0'" 
c , c 




!, ra n,l. 
0'10,'" 
c 
l . ~ .<In 1/1"· ,,, .o..r,. '" I- "t< d, \ t'tI>~;,., d ,,,~I. " t'" If"" , ... , • ..,""" '" "" C, """,tt .. , """. Ii 
., 111"~'" j' . ", •.• f..,. "'" ItJ '" 
r r ~ .. ~ !'''''1, ....... -1f" n ... .,..1 [> .. ; .tt !"<'·~ ' O.'1f" 
~. Th. ,~".!> .. h ,. 'j b .o~t: h • • ,ft. ,~~~ ..... ,~""" ". ".....,.-." .'.M""" "".,,, I : ... . 
~ •• ,,_ f 
, . 1 hOt • • " ,I", 00"., rH-t"j, of ''''' ~l • n [ """, 0" rr"or,"," ,·,f",' 0'" 'i' i """,. ~,n Comm,"" or 
I" I""'~"" ,,,or, '0 .cp ro, .~, ""'".,,. ". 
r 51""~. "l'" r' '1'" ( 'luhl r {\Inl'" r !,"''' ". .O'"I .... 
t. i.",,".,~~ " •• ll:Il .. ,.~ ,...JI , "',.., ,ft,a,., ,-.• r-"'" I,h.., . , •• 1, ,", £< .. l'(('If''' ''''' 
o ""~ .' .... wo .. .. oco " 











1. H:lui< ,~ •• ~ • .•• , , •• on fit"" .• ""'HO' ."1_ i""~"",., .k"'" -V'" 'h" J ":$ '~, .I~, ,~'" ''''" l 
oJ' ." ·U'trt", , .... , '"~~'''. j to I~.,,~,r It" "'" "'''1' 1,1, ~,' 'f;" ,I,; >"""" .. ~,m" 'r! "", .... ,, .1 
J"."." • 
I, I , •• ;1"", ,r,r" ' ... n,n,,,,·, n C, mrr 'II .. ,~: ,Ij i. ,~.II. i "'" :".,1 ,";" "p'" " ,fo .. , "I J", 
"111111",,, '" 'G fl" 
-."" 
, 
~. Ii" J.,to h-I no," , "y! ..• j,,, :,'" ;, ":, '1'.1 • /.",,, 1 ,," ",J;. ,; "." """". '" ,'W' "",~, / '" 
, I" m, ." ~,.I,I, ,,,,.,. ". roM '" t", "",,,,,,, .. " I,.il. , I" "ro" "H' Ie. oboc. " "., ,. ~" ",,0, .~ , .• 
• 1,,: •. ," m •• ""' " ""I, 
I I 
10, G" on ""~. "'" , "" ,J 1:,": m, " " r" ,. ~ I. ,. ~ ••• ),'J), 1 ••• 1 ,r ,"J . ~ ":I.,, • .r.,,":" • """" 
;,11:<:11 ,ho "'.f on r" """'''''1" :.m'"",u" ". '"~ ",.n "" ",",," tol M 
II. 'J I. "" '. r t""*" d~, I ....... ",·'" , .. .,~ "It ,.,.If." to J •• :1,,' oi,~ . " ... : ,., "j 1~,"l j 
,~.,. ;'" to n, ~" ." J;" '"' I ~;: I.; '"" it' I h!'. ".,,". 0:; , ... " J b • ""'"0'''' ' ,~" . ,tIl' ill .d" 




'''''ll, 'lru ' '" .. 
I" ,'" ~d'"'' 
, i,,,,.,'. ~,,." .. 
, r II.w.' ."11,,,, ''',n,I,[,,,,,,, 
11. I. "'un""". " ....... from .,"d •• "n i","" '"!OJ I'" , I (or t" ""''''''''. I' '''''1 '" w,,~ Ir, III. n 
t ' ~ r 











14. (o~ ,·C. ;lIl tht tl". '1"I:.~r.:tJ":t :1 ,,"'Mrs ef ih rt .... r .... :~< ::nhtIU II M(lt 'M~' rv. rt· ( lull; .t 
+·, ~.f". Ibtl:",' 
Ste:r.l, I;r<l .II., .. r.t.hl 0,";,,, ~ t':r;11 
C"lIi'" 
'1-. COM:.!.!>:' d 
Pt .... r.nbC~ 
C:" ... ntll ,1 1:e 
:fl tn~':I .,,:1 r ( Io.r:, "1'( ~,,:: . In 
:Itt. f :1': If: t: 
Ih.1 Itrl II r:t 
t r-llrtlr ,,:,~, :1'1 
~,. , : • .,t"i,.:tI-.oI 
~ , .... r4I1(1:' 
:,,, .... ,tt .. ! I" , r r r , 
; ••• 1111 "'I:I.~ :1 ,,,.,,,:,,1 ,.,,,,~,,,, 
15. ~f. r~M · '.oI,:r eeMM'U~ !~:.I : ~ II', • ":'. ):t" t .111" r,,,,r-.; ~\-. "'" .... ,,\-.p d If, FtM.tt'1~:r 
::"'M'~U 
16. F,~".r."t"r :; "r ' ~ .. ; I" r~~ "I"~ .~ •. :I,. . o."".tf .. " ror' .H:,"~ ,· . 0,,1<1: .. or. prt ,I I •• ,Lb :' I'. ~""! . 
, 
C' ",:Ci ; ~Ir:r:h' C>""" 
17. :. ~.I: ye. I~ • I:. ;<t!l ) :.r: > ,,: r :r I ". ~< ,,:,1 :c"b:" I~'..t th I,~:ir tr"rl :1 r:r ~ t:.b,. 
:~~"I tI;.N~, t. :1.11 d "" ..... '1I I: ;.1 ''1:I')'&n ( ~4ff't~ " or d: ~ .. rt,·", .. " .... ~I":-·' ;, "~;I'I'" 
(6+1" .. : 11\,.1' : ,. fll1:f1;' I~:"'I C.·r ,.!ot-:rf' 
-
la :'1M'!';'II~C.I: ;ft.~I~;ltI""'lr; I; In i ~ d ~r:"; r(r' "".t, < ;" 0<1'<1 1-: tl • ,, ·,~,,;,,~ I. 
:.1' f,,,t.,,,,, ",Iotlt 10 bt ,;nI' lit.: cr tI-. I t..' I!II: ~:Ir:1 11" 11 '. ·:.1: 1\:1.:< ml!:1 '" " ,i:. " :'j 














10. ;,"'ht "'.,rl.,r'" • " •. ;nl :1" ;0 .... "·-1 r;r .• ,,, .. tt« e,,,:tT< th f.d Hno ... ,.b ., ,': ,I: it 
'"I"I'''II,:r t' , ..... 'r k.,! b-, ":,, lh' ... 11 t-, CEO. CF: m: :~~"'D 
, 
C·, .. " .. ' Ht:~::I. o.'OO'H 
1I. l'llot.t>:r •. Ir' L~:''' tJ,J. ~ CF :ZO"S ~"'" or :ti,.I1," t: " .... ,rolH .... ,' .. ; .• ""~" ." II. ~"'" 
!h:.I, tt>.o ""'I.I':r rot ~.;. 1:,,,..t" 1 " .. ~«: " .~ t..... .t,.': & .• r ,.., •. ' . ... , ., h;!; •• ,. ~<. t~" 
H. :''''I~" ""t.,.~:rl t. ,L:'."" i~'''- ',or ~ CF :zcr.5 11-1 / oI-.<: ... k: (t..", •• 1 •• ,/ ."' "1 "'." ,' .... '<1,,, •. I I 0 ;,:...~~. ":"H'''!'' t'. ~,.r: , 
»). r ",. t.:, 1I ~",,,~.:i lOf y<. t: ror:ffor or', "",.",11 '. <c ,of I: rut , " or , of '''' I", 1 •. 1'1 ...... IJI 
"",,., .. 11 .If "': II II:: ,,. 
)0&. &."I."Io,y d"," , .. <..I, ... :' ro, I:" I: .. r , :r F ",.. .. ,,1'" C: ,,,.,t'tt , 
D: \:. t/-,rL thot ti".". 
" . '''''I'l';':;',u, "".t.., :.,.:\, .. 
I.""tl, ;" 
0.1'< """""" t: be,,,, 
(0, ;:"'n"" n," 
,,,: •• to ,fi:1t I ; 
';r. .rtt.,Jy ",c· . 
• 0:.1 ... ~ ... :<!', t: 





n . t.," . I ,':.1, t ~"t:t'" !, c~1 "",' • '"~ tf < c~, "'''''' <cbd,r.; 11-.-, .: d ..... ~~r ".,. ., • :t:. ;b:c 
h, ... &.0 , ,'!:..... °t" no"" tI" :01:: bo ,,,.r f. o1f .. "",, .... ,,' t . tto' '",,~, ,/ fI' .... " 












17. "" .• 1:1' , ..... :I': ':tl I', 1 .• ,I".:r ,. ,~£ ~:':!.i 
!~ .. ,. " " ",, "1 
..... ·.1, If; .... :1 
........... "";. t-: 
.... . 1: I'!CI t. ;11'10: 
""'11 1;,..,: 
• '-:". i~'FE 
:'':';~L$ t: I ".~ • 
c"'tct:,, t",., ........ 
.... ;.,,, .; ~,. ,,.. 
Ihn'~ I" \",", 1 :~1 
' II" t: I,~"'~I",, 
HII'I:::!',.. .. It!.'" 
>"",\0",,1: .. 
• rrr: . 1:, 
,,:~""I"\":lt'~' :f I'. 
,."'_"""'" c,,.,,,,mt, 
Tr.t:111 :f ~" " 
Of~:" ,,~. ! ... : 
, ;t" ~', :T ,r .. .. 
aN11 
or. \:,,1 of n .. ,. 
:r~:"lf:.I: ,.:t 
•... ;t.:. !', ,j "". 
m<tll 
n-. I:UI ~I $h,. 
o~". "" •• !: rol 
•• , .. : 1(.', d !h" 
:I:"II! 
........ ' .... ,., Ht'. 
'It , .. " •• :f "T ,.. 
: '1"-" "'" 1-.=1 : 
,f,.I: ':1 1 tU: p, 
:lffl" : .:·ul 
71-01"" \ r .,.:1 
" .. " Or"'" ,f(.I: 
II • I ".""tj., 
~:"lll~' :." 1'\ 




















lS. _rol_, ~"" ~I""~"i . .. ,.I.lI.,ct", I" '''''''<; It-. ""'~' i ,,!ok' V,., .. I .~ ,"tN f,Uc. '"i .... 1" ... 
:.1: t .... ,'~ .r~"".tl; Ttl ., ,,1,1. "c:nror"lI,r CI,lT,· 
"ho .'01' ." ...... ·,11., 
bo," , ;" 
u·.ub:r'P'I'" 
-/"4 ~ .. " ,t-:.Ic: 
::·-.... o'ln, .. " ~. 
"""Ir.·"~" .j 
~"oJ ,~. : 
-<t~I" ""I: 
" .It .•• t .... ". t-: 
;olf:,...,,:. 
" .... f"or .. I'" " 
<.b.lOlO: 
If Iro .,.n '.r:".: 
"",ro :t.o;t. ,I-. :r 
"nr<.nt,,, v, 






19.1fv."'~.r: 1,1. 1: ,,:t . • t~. , .. .Ito cI ,."" 'If-" 'ro"'o' n.l,,, "h '/C. , . .... : te" l,t:l.,. "",t IC .. ' 
""" ~ ,::,," r.1 ,. =",1, Y'"" ....... ( I'.of "",lltl l,. .. d_-tl". "'" 1'\1, ,I" .:: "'" , .. :n,I,;' .f 












Appendix 3: Electronic survey 
THE RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY QUESTIONS ARE ANALYSED HERE. 
Most answers are in the groups AGREE or STRONGLY AGREE on the one hand 
and DISAGREE or STRONGLY DISAGREE on the other hand with provision for 
neutral. In order to crystallise the respondents views it is desired to categorise them 
into percentages for and against. The formula for so doing is to allocate two points 
for a "strongly" and one point for a "not strongly" vote. The reason for the gaps in 
the sequence of the numbers below is that the questions requesting comments are 
reflected in the detailed responses received. 
No. QUESTION IN SURVEY 
Percentage Percentage 
FOR AGAINST 
It is essential for members of the 
remuneration committee (especially being a 
1 
board sub committee who must oversee 
100.00% 
remuneration of the top executives) to have 
a sound working knowledge of 
remuneration. 
Prior Shareholder approval should be 
2 required BEFORE the board may pay of any 
of the following emoluments: 
2.1 




Shareholders must approve the Executive 
38.64% 61.36% 
Director's Performance bonus 
2.3 
Shareholders must approve the Non 
78.57% 21.43% 
Executive Director's Salary. 
The Remuneration Committee may make an 
2.4 urgent appointment on approximately the 70.21% 29.79% 
same terms in the event of a CEO vacancy. 
Placing more power in the hands of 
4 
shareholders is better than the 
21.43% 78.57% 
Remuneration Committee system of 











There are alternative methods of deciding 
5 
on Executive Remuneration other than the 
28.51% 71.42% 
Remuneration Committee or shareholders 
voting to approve Remuneration 
Institutional shareholders should be more 
6 
effective in expressing their views to the 
79.41 % 20.59% 
Board of Directors on executive 
remuneration 
Because they have no say on Executive 
compensation, institutions should express 
7 
their disapproval by then voting against 
39.02% 60.98% 
different items submitted to shareholders 
meetings like disapproval of annual reports 
or appointments of directors. 
The policies of the Remuneration 
8 
Committee should be spelled out in detail in 
92.74% 4.26% 
their report to shareholders submitted to the 
AGM. 
At least two members of the Remuneration 
committee should not be directors of the 
company and should therefore be 
11 nominated from a pool of outside available 67.64% 32.36% 
persons appointed for a minimum of three 
years in order to retain their independence 
of the main board. 
It is essential for external and/or internal 
12.1 remuneration consultants to advise the 89.19% 10.81% 
Remuneration committee 
Remuneration surveys from outside expert 
12.1 firms are essential for the committee to 
decide on compensation 
The constitution of Remuneration 
14.1 
Committees is too often made up of friends 
65.71% 34.28% 
and associates of the Board and to this 











Are you satisfied that Remuneration 
14.2 Committees are generally made up of 80.00% 20.00% 
independent members 
The nomination committee should playa 
15 more active part in forming the membership 90.00% 10.00% 
of the Remuneration committee 
Remuneration committees are not entirely 
16 effective because their non - executive 40.62% 59.38% 
directors are part of the "club" of the board 
Institutions should group together and form 
a pool of proposed non - executive directors 
18 
who have impeccable qualifications, 
62.85% 37.15% 
available to be nominated on their behalf to 
boards. (This would exclude staff of the 
institutions) 
19 
The chairman of the board should always be 
74.28% 25.72% 
independent non - executive directors. 
Whilst maintaining a majority of independent 
non - executive directors the full time 
20 executives should be represented on the 62.06% 37.94% 
main board by more than just the CEO, 
CFO and the MD 
Whether institutions have LONG or SHORT 
21.2 
TERM HORIZONS they should (because 
65.51% 34.49% 
they are the larger shareholders) as a group 
be represented on the board. 
24 
Availability of non executive directors to 
serve on Remuneration Committees 
Do you think that there is a shortage of non 
24.1 - executive directors available for 89.28% 10.72% 
appointment to boards? 
Do companies make adequate effort to 












Non - executive directors do not receive any 
tax concessions entitling them to claim 
25 expenditure as a deduction from their 68.00% 32.00% 
income. This matter should be given further 
consideration by the Minister of Finance. 
It is accepted today that incentive schemes 
26 are important to the employment of 95.24% 4.76% 
executives 
Are the Press performing a useful function 
in guiding the investing public? Your views 
28 on the following questions would be much 
appreciated. They relate to compensation 
ONLY 
28.1 




The press should comment more on how 
96.67% 3.33% 
compensation is calculated. 
28.3 
The press should investigate more how 
91.66% 8.33% 
performance compensation is calculated. 
If the press reported more objectively on 
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rfil~'lent ,,-nh iI, pohy, the committee ph"" 
cO<l>;Jerabk "",ph",i, OIl the ptTlo"mncdinkd 
d,'<I1.nl< i .• , em'lual in.:<'11ti"" boon", ,h,n. mal,ching 
,,]j(llO!ll{-letm inc,"I,ti "C>. lla,,-,d on 11", d""il, ",t Nil 
in ,hi, rc1'm, our poli<v i, thot the M"~" impon;mce 
u[ [L,,-,J e",J perfc<T!,,. n,,,-rd.ilt,] reillunel'aliotJ fct 
,,,,d1 of th< di,~ct"" ,!xmld b..~, IntI"",,' 
,t.1 , 
. ~ ...... '-lc-u., .... o ~_,_ 
K ,.".-..c ....... .w "- ,~. ,",-,,_. 
"-'M"~~~.,~~ 
The commEIlL< w'lI "",Iic_"" lo re"je,.,- Ih,' mix "f ,,,,,'<I 
",,1 perforo1O"ce-li"W reLllUnerJ1joll on on .,,,"ual 
ba",. con;i;ic'nt ',ilh i« o"erall plHlosuphy. 
L"'", I'd;",' ;. 11>" Ihe n'lllWl,ralion ol the ,,,-,-,,uu\'e 
dirc'CIo,-, Jl()uld I>e mnlpetiliw with ,h",. ot' di1',,,,of< 
,m1 ,,,,,,,u,i,,,, in ,iJll>I", I"l<ition' ill n'l111"r.N" 
mnl)\ln""- We U," a ronge 01 rK C",,,,,,,,ie, Ul 
,1ill,'tI.'n' "-,,toes including 'he "",-1", ",,1m, Sonl~ arc 
ct-, ,irnd"" ,~ !o I'c.u"",n, ",hi!< oIh<t~ ""c largeT-
Ixlt the n,.,thod "hod> tbe ,:ommitt""\ ,n<l<pe"d,,,t 
",I"i",'," ill< to mlk' n'''pori>on' ('l! rc;nlffieraUOn 
ta,,, !hi, into "",,count. In aJdit;"". alll",,~ ''Of' 
''')Nd)1[i,,1 eN,,"" "l''''''t;''''', W" "Iso ",,.,, ,,-'kq,,<1 
mcdi. mmp"lll<S in North Am",ic,. 
\,'L "'-'<' tl,,>< corn)",,;..., ","com", the,. "'l'r"'.:1" th< 
""(\<" de<utive tdl,,,! pool from "t.i.:h ,,~ might 
"'peel to rem.rit ex!<m:illy ,rxl !Il< PJ:}' nl:J.Lhrt La 
""i(h "" m;gilt be ''U)rl<'I".~le it' m,. rOl11un"""i"" "-,,, 
l!0'. compe\1\iye_ 
[j""" "a)",y 
01" ""h:y i,; !o ''''i'''' ,.ill,i", ane;).lIiy, ("",>dft;'l8 
!<vol, of p,w Jll<l ~"')' incr~,"" ,h;-O,-,gh"'L! !he 
mmr01Tj 
The camr.lil!<c ha. r("vim'-'<i ""<ocuti,,,, director>' ho",,, 
",!mi,:,< :or 2[(1'1 .consistent with thi, policy_ Full <it1ai l, 
"ill b< ",101'1 in th" ['<port on ,1;','<'lO<; ,emunc"ti"" 
!U, 200{,. 
01 her ''<llol'~-'lCI''_' 
II js lhe ""'''p.",,''' ,UK), 'h" it' b,,"dil ,"ogr"JllLl-"" 
,I",~kl 1M: coml""iri,'e in th,' conl<Xl of th< locall,):.mr 
lllJr!:,ot, but "JLl ill1"iLl"lioll.ll compal'j' 1>'. r"'lui" 
""",uti"", lo o~":rn~ ,,,,-,rldw.Jc .mJ rt'Cq;n i'" tha, 
"",ujlm.lll ,)", o)"-,,,!.,; "-,,.-Idwidc. 
""1\U,) in"-"li,,, 
Th< cool1niltc" ",,,Hi,h<" the ,mnw) in(mtiY<' ptm' 
!", the 6ffuti"" dir,x!oN and the eh ",f <=(1,"'"'' 
o[ l)", <omp"',)", I'rilKipdl "I'<~ .. \ing ,'o<npani<;, 
including p<TIormJllCC m,."ur", arxl wlg"'-'_ 
'[h, ""'lllllil1e.' .ho om.blist,,,, 11K' u'g,t OJ"I 
=imum lc"c" of ;nJi,,;du,1 m'-"",," 0pl"'1'luni,;' 
1>;,,,-'<1 00 ,n , ..... ",'m,'ll i>r thecoHlIll;n,',,", 
imlep.,nd<TlL .,h'i'"-'" of m",hi P<"':~'" [0' 
COIllp"rJble comp,nje, ,nJ joN-. 
ll1e )"'lfomlJncr m .. ",,-s ,cleM '0 the co<npmy', 
moil! dm," ofbu>.,O" f'-'fl(,mldlloe "llx~h 'h< 
corp"",!e .nd .""""ting ClJI1l)l.ny h,l. rerf",')l"'!lCe 
i, Jll""'Uf<'<I "-1'JMdy 10, =h i1<1", r u, ,';)(1, 
p<r[ocrrkmcc m.,,,,re. the .,,,,-,milk< "":mliili,-~ 
thre.'llo!d~ Utgets "nd nw.irnd to;: difte'~nt I,",'d. 0( 
p,;uu1. Wnh lhc c-,<'~ption of ,),., COO, 10% o[th< 
to(J.; .1\1" ",,) inc""';",, ~l'po!llHlit)' tor th" ","oco'i,'£ 
dtreclOf> arxl olh." :l",nbc" oj tho Pea""" 
M.n'gen",n! CNlllllnt£o ~ k=l ()t1 ['<1t,,,",OI'O< 
Jgains( p.-rwn.1) ooj..'(ti,.,;. 
h)f 2006. the fm:modl 1"-"I!o"',"""e ll",,,u,,., fO': 
P"aJ>on pic ~lT _'*~ ~ro"1h in u"derlyin~ aJp-",C'J 
,'",ni"£'< pu ,I",,~ 10, continuing op"r «Iiun' :<1 
con<lo'" ",chol!g< r;'h, a"'''ge \\urkm~ carila) "-' , 
"li0 '0 ~11e< 8",1 "l"->t',,':ng ",,, tJu,.,', for ,"bscq"'tlt 
;-=', th" ITl<';,;)re, ",ill b.. ,.·t " ih< lun-.:. 
J'heTe hay< 1>.,,," no chaTl!')-" to 'he necuti'T di1'<o'",,' 
i",jiyj,lll.ll ,,=tj¥. opport""i!i",. r'Or tile CEO, 
the ~~1'g.' annu,l incenti,-" oprmllnity i, 11:fJ% 
ofb,,,, '"""Y Jlxl th~ nl,x;mtlm i, 150"(" ror the 
olher necu!;,,, ,li,eoto1" and other 11"'Illhrn; of the 
!,<",Ofl \1Jmg."'~nt Collllllln,"", the 1.-,rg<1 ;, uJ' 
to" ",-",imum d 75% of ,..J"ry and 'h<' rtillimum 
i, n.1<O IOrge!_ 
The committee may '''':11'd :"di, ',fu,1 discr",,,,,,,<"}' 
po.vmeTlK 
f)"Ji~ of ",n",1 IX'YOU1; fo, :-1005 ." I<'t 01'\ ill ,.1>1. , 
;1I1d the 'lOt", on ]'<'ge 29 o[ Ihi:, "-1'<""" 











TIl< wmm'"'' "",11 wmill"" t~ ,,,,i<,,- !1l< ann",,1 
I1>Xntn'< ria", ~"n ~""" ",IlJ 1,. ""'i ... · the ?Orion,,.,,,,, 
n"-"",-,,,,, 'UVl. md in.ii"iJwl inL<n,jn 
orr<"TJn~ic:< ill light ~f du..-,,,, (~1,,1it"'''' 
.I.!mu," ino.'Iltile J",'m",,[, Ju no4 [0"" J'M! ~[ 
p<m,,'n1b1o c.uningo. 
IJ.oMLl> J",r. tn.ndring 
The mOl!",r))' <'n<<>U '''tI'' """'''' iw di ''''''0'' , ",1 oth<r 
'<tIj,x ="Uli,'", '" J<4wn' .rI,,lllold f><",>ort <lure" 
rhe onnu..J bc>ma ,0"", m.tc~in~ plan p,:rmi" 
necuri", dire" .. " md seni", ""'cWi, ...... wu,ld 
,[,e <'''''p.'',!, to i",,,;( up t~:<JliJ uf .. w Jf!«-w. 
,nnwJ l"nu, in r.ar",n >hm~. For J""rJ, to 1", 
nude i" 1(0; .,,.,1 !h",,,,It,,r, if the..., .... .,,, 'f<' f>t41 
,Il!d tho: c~rnf'ln\', .Jiun--J <1'~' 1'" iharc inCT'''' 
ill ,,,,Ito,-,,,,,h\ ,t leN.\% pa In .. u,,, .:(Impound n"" 
• Ii,c-)"" l"rioJ, III< wmp>r1)' '" Lil mOl.1t them on • 
g"'" ~ .. ~ .• of on. >har< lOr" '-')' 0,.., lodel, H.tf tI", 
m'l..I~"!\ ,h." .. ",iU \,,,,1 if th< ",mpN1\', ,>.liu,!cxi 
<arnm~' 1"" "'= in.:r""-,,, in ,d t<m" bl'.t b,. 3% 
I",r '''''Ull] <Otnl'OUnd u\'er !hr first li1."& ,,, .... , 
R,,~ groMh i; ""'"0,,,,1 "gd'nst the UK G""-''''·ll.m'; 
!ndcr uf I<ct.:llI !'r"'-~ (All [tclm). \\', cht:oru<' '0 ""It our 
""mill!" I'" sh3'" gruMh 'Vin>! UK in~,<:",n """r 
Ihree mJ li,~ Y""'" tu ,',,'asUr~ ih<: (o)ml''''''''' IUlO"",.J 
pcng"" "''Or Ih.' p<riod to which ,I>,. . nrilicmen! 'u 
n"t, Ilin~ ,I,,,,,, td.k>. 
,,,.,", iL> inll,'lllldll'll, [ho:", haw tot",n f(JUr 
tuli Ii,,,, )""r 0-.1<> olthi, rl"'. Fa- th. t 'i9X • .,..rd, 
tho: first oIlC-fm-t"'~ In.t,1l. ", .. ,\1, t..~ nut ~I< [ull 
"",-~fur-~"". f .. r wlh Ih< 1999 M.d 2000 .".-ard, 
botb m",d"" 1.1r-i, Fur the ,001 .",-.rd, th.: tun 
OIl<,flJl"lXte "",ten 1""''<1 ... ,,-1 out in tho n"'c~ '" 
",hi< 1 on I"I!< 3J .. f !hi, "f'('rt. 
LOLlg-"..-m in.:o."ti,~, 
\\"< at"< ~in5 'h<orcilOkltt' by "1"lJle ,,,,,<uti,,,, te. 
.ppro", tho: re,,<, • .-<II of the Ion~ '<I'm in.:<nti,,< pan 
"rot inn-.-tu,ed in 1001, 
II", <n,nmi_ "", fC, i,,,--oJ th< t>;".,."ti.rm ,o[!hi> 
~'" in the l'llhl o[ th< wrn;>lnY', ,tr1,<Sic ~, 
""J '''mlci<J...-J Ih.n il i> ('I'<1'drin~ uti,fut .. rilj' .. "1<1 
.>.:h.i'''-;Mg 't, o(,;'<>i"-,,. W, .", tkeel(>", ..,d'ing 
"'pl"ov,1 ~f ii, '<"<" ,I un b'~..:IIr ,I, "n~irr.1 "'mb, 
Su~io<' '0 <.h."fx-Idor,,' ~I'r, .. d, """"ut;"" di"c'or" 
"""or .,."-,,"t;",,, .00 01"". Il,.""scr, ",ill t><' diyN ... 
t~ prni<:ip"< in tl>< rim whi<h c.n J.I"'<f f<,rrict<d 
"(I(~ ,ml.'N ,ted ort"'n~ nle ,in, OS hd"", is to gil'< 
the rummm ... r.l1l!o}' of ""'" ",ith ",hich w unk 
""lX" ,\1" p<'rfo, 'n."<~ \0 ""'fIaSOOlnel1!'s Ion~-\Cfln 
!<w.rdiu. Ibihk WJ\'. 
R<<lri<tffl >10.:1 wan""! t .. """"i,,,, <firKlo" "'ill ,-.,," 
~nJ)' when ,tMdltng 'o'f""t. ptrio"",n(e "rget' 
"',or . 'p<'c-if",d r<nrxllu,,, b,,-.:n "",c Awanb will 
, ... t ~n , ,Iiding """ t» .... 1 on p<,fu,n~""-~ O"ol' tho 
period. TlI<r< ~ ,Ilk n,) ''C1"",ng, Tile (H,,,,,i11<'< 
will ,kl<rmi= th.: ~orm:a",,' m<.""",.rnJ ""1"" 
[K''''''"Iling an ,l",ro of rNri<r,-J 'I"'"i., prior '0 ~ranl. 
The ,'condit'"," Ih>: wiU ,ppl. [or tilt: .i0Cl6 ."e,1I'<1 a",J 
;.ub"-~I'l,'nrly for ;t.. <',"'u!~" dirrct .. " will b< fOCll",d 
~n ,k~l"\eling ,\lid irnr""'~'l> ,ell"," to lhiluhol<kr>. 
j M I,.,tf~"""oce m<,"lH~1 will h< rd,;iv< ,,,,,,1 
r.hMcll<.4,\or retrn <l. ",rum on ~\\~",'<i "I~:.! ond 
e.'rnin~, ",,1' .~larc !U"','rh. 
11" mnunittL< cho", ",,,,1 ,Jurcho\Jc,- r<tun '''.>tiv< 
t~ the ,,,n<titu,,,,,, nf :11, FTSE \\Nld .\l<di.1 index 
be<,.,,,,-,, in line WIth mOJ1,' ,0( om ;hordl"lde", il [dl 
rl,-,' p.rt <>i ,,,,,",un\",, di,-ecw,,' ,,,ward, shnAl h, 
re\.te,J to I'O'f"11n'Ih'~ rd,,,,,, lu the C<J1l'FJny', p'cr~ 
\\" d"-",, ",""m Ull ;n,,"-'St«! (OpilJ!, willen is 
J.:rin<d "-' op.,-,tin~ ponti' n<t of 1<;0", ca.~ll"-'. 
dj, ided br nC[ operJting 0"""< piLl> g."» f,,,,,>Jwill 
(pre =>onju'ion), b€'c,u>c, 0"" th" [,>-,t f", "M< , 
me n.m,!nrmJtio" ofP".,r><:,r, I"" ~g"itic~ml) 
inCIT>-><''<i th< npUl in",,,,«:d in tl>< bu,,,,,,,,, 
: m,,,rly ill th. tmm ,.1' ~1"'ill .r.ssoJ<',"led "i!h 
'<4-'i.lih<'n.<) ,\lid '"'l"ll"cd ,ub>l.mli,J CJ;h 
i"'<>tmrntlrl i"'<gr'!' tfr<>", oc'l"i«'ions. 
Earning> 1"" <har< gm..-th ""'-' ,,,,,,,-,, tot"'''s< strong 
bo11o",-lirr~ growlll ;, impe,"li,~ if we "'" lo iml'lTI'\" 
um total ,h"",hoLJ<, r<turn "",1 OUf 'obm on 
in,,">teJ "I~\"L 
P"''''''n w"" .. 10 m,""Ur:I!(C <x<<uri,'" .mJ ffi.nag'" 
:0 buil.! up a iung_, .. m "",ling ~f ,h."c'S '"' as t,. 
demon'lfdle!heir wn1;nilm<nl 10 ,he wmram. 
10 >chic,'< ,hi;, [,'" ''''aId, oj rc=irtcJ "lock th.t "'0 
.Ub;«-1 lo p<-rt(Xlnooce mrxlition, "w, , ;h'''_y<ar 
r<riool. 75'" of the ,w"d "Lil,">! " Ih' 000 elf 'he 
th!tt-W:1r p<n,'ll. Ih "-"L~a;<lin~ 25% .. f til< ~w,m! 
will ~nly ,"<>1 if th< pmicipan, retain, the ,11"'-1;». 
numL><, of ,h"rc'> that vest" ,.,," mltt f,., J f",tile'!' 
twu ),e"", 










ikwi.kJ ,\oJ: ill"" b< ~lL',j ,.,iLhc~ll r<,{UfI1",nCe 
"",Jiti(l)u ", .. tio./t n'CIUlm><,." .,\<l momio:l 
"bo..~h\',,,, 1(..~lfKl<'Il '""'~ _"d. tha, or< n('t ,ui'l)<."<1 
to ]><rforrnJ.ncc .:<>nJition< ,,'iU "'" t... ~',",ltJ h' ',m 
(1(' tho (lI',..,,1 ."" .... Jtiw Jir«IOC'I, 
It is not II", ,,,mJl~n,,,·. in",.,';"'" Lo ",onl ,"""k 
,-,\~iom in 2[()(,. %uId t~ COI11111iftf't" <Il,,~i< t., Y']]' 
1hem ul fulu,o. 0]'100' g",nl,,j 1.U ,· ... :culi, ... di,,'CtUn 
",uuld ",m< with. ",ia;mwll ,llorN_ve.,- , . ..,.;,'11 
re' iod .nJ "uul,] "l"J1 (Ij, • s1iJi~ ,.:ok h....",J on 
,lrctchi,,« pcrfocm>n<c ~ m. mr"'\'eor r rri,,; ,,;th 
no r .... "ng 
n-.." ",mmin,,,', irxk,,,",,,J"!J! .«h .... ~, cakuLto the 
cx,""",,-J ,-we of h<,.h rr'''''''led '''''~ ,"d s1<xk 
~ption. i.e, ,t..; r ne' I"e;tf\! ,~h", ,~,.,- ''''i''~ ""0 
"m~m .Ill Lh. «(lnJiuwu and. in ~";ClIbr, tho 
pnJI"'hOlitv ,~.! 'c.,' f'<''''''~'c(O ",nditioru ~'ill 
"'-
T.w.nS ;nl(l 'CcoJ.nt Ih"", .. ..Ill<> mcl ","""<ll><"nts 11)' 
<he mmmi"""" i""'-'P'"d..,t oJ\;<Of' .X "",,,-.I 
I" "t;':o tOr eu'''I",r.L-Io <oml""';", ihc committ« 
<-Iwhl,,),,:, ~uiJ"'r>« ead1 -=r I"r tho "\',;.im"m 
'''T",,,,.d ".'llu. ~f i"dLvidu';! ..... ""is. Sin,,· 2,\)1, 
we h""c' .hlul'kcl ,hi, llldrk! -h,.,·d "Pl",,,,ch ,,'hi(h 
N,hli,;h.-d maxim"m '''Mel ",,,,I, of .'W", of <.>LuI' 
<>-1-.qt,xl >.1,,0[01 the ClO ,,:J ~O:t% of ,..)ary 
""1"-~kJ ,'.I~~ fo, Lh,' c'lh,,- ,,,",CLlIi,,. d,,~.:t(l", 
In prolCice, 'irx:e 2002, .cnwl ,\~ ,td. h..,., ,lh'ay< 
b<en bc"""",th= 'lL,l<imum b'd •. Th,'<xp<ct<cl 
due or ,w,,,b tOr the ""OQui", dir"'t~(' in 2tOi ." " 
pt!COnt"S. of hi"" >.Hul'".l1 k illlir-.t·" ith the duo 
of "~'.ud> ~r.m,-J in 100-1 .. lIJ =. Ai the cOO6 ""',!rel 
,,;11 ",,\ he m ... t" untJ lot'" ill !he ~'"or. full J":,,,b ,.LlI 
be ><.1 OUt ill [he "'1"''' (In di''''''''''' ,.mun."..lio" 
fm 2r.l(; 
In est:lNilhj',lg Ih"'" guiddmc,. [Of the maximum 
e"'I"-~Le;J d"" cf inJi"il~ .".,(]<., tlte """min.., 
ai<L, ha., ''1,rd '(I tho i",.., v"k", of II>< "",.,d; "..J their 
""kn~al \'.uu,· ,hould tilt· p<rinrm,nr:e 13'lJO" b. I)~, 
In '"'I' roUinS lO-w'" p<riod, "" 111",< ,11,,, 1% (II 
!brson .quit), will be i". ... ". c'[ he C>J"-hk 0; il<ing 
rSi"'-'<l, unJ...,-.u P"ar'<Jn', "'>I< pl.!M and "" ""''' 
than :>0/, of r<ar«Jll "Gurry ",11 he :""'00, '" be "'I''"-~O 
(Ii t><ing """.-d, "",-lei' """,'uliw Or ,Ii.",dimurv plon~ 
D.·,"ik of Ih. ,cru41 ''''''L\1s, pet1;"""0c< I""' iod~ 
rn"'-'u,,~ ""J 1"'¥"U [Cof ~I< 2'1Q, r.~ >tOe. 
......... J, are"" 0111 in Wk 4 .,'" :he " ...... "" l"'lt' 
3110 )..j (If 1]6 "I"'''. 
Al 3! L"",.'mho.'f !l\l,> ",d. "",,,,,J,; gr~nt<d in the 
""" ID "'." ~n..ter thi' and .11 ~t"'" '"'pOor'" ,n.1l~ 
p/."" l~ be "nhfi..<.i ~' ",,,"'-i<;LK' ,,,,,it),. :IIt!OU.~lc-J 
tt, 3,(,"1, ,,,f tl>c .:om]"m's i~,lI<d ""~re '~rit.1 oM 
"'ttl<:- Ill;' ,ncl om", e-x.."L~i'~~, Ji',:re'ion",;-
plaL~< om"",,!.'" IrJ 2.-,,,,,-
Ali-,'mpx"',,, '/'oJe plUl' 
F",cu:iv< dil a:tur; "" digiL'-k I" ,·.m"i~,,!c in tlk' 
<()m~<lll\"; all "mMu 'II1..-c pl.m; Oll tho ... m" 
'"rem", "'hor emph"...,., Th .... ri"'" 0''"'1'1'1'" ,"'t~ 
"'1Ldl"," s;<,'ulg'I''''''YlI\'''''', in :)". l't-.: and tf.: lS 
'lhc"'l'lan; "1""'''< within 'f'«i~< 1.1, l<p,l.non 
{indudms a r<quir<ment W ~ru".(~ .cqt,i,itlun of 
.br<" ""jug 111< Vnx."rJ:, ,,[ J.l"onthlv SJ.vinp 
amtr""t) ancl til.: aC'l"i,it:~Jl (If ""res ""d", thc"", 
l'ltm is m>l ,~b1<'(IIO II", ... ti<i>tt"-'ll u< ~ l'<rfi>rm.1IlL< 
lar~,~, 
SIWch(l]Jil,g poIic~' 
AI. T"'''i(lll.<lj· Mt.d, in lin. with ,he poll,!, of 
""'c()\"'±Sin~ ",it1.~l'rc·.J "mp"",'," ",.-""",hip, til.: 
""lllIUll)' ""wumS'" ",=u,i'e dir.x:t~r,' W t->uild up 
a <ub''''''1ia) >h>reI:1,,"dillg in II,. wmpLmy, 
Giwn the .ho'e r<tell1ioo f~at~'" (If the "',1"1.1] horm, 
.J1.lIT m.J!<hins "ad hmg.l<rm in«nri,·o pi""' .111J 
tho whtM)" of Iho 'IOXIo. mar""~ "'0 ,L nol 'hini i, 
i, 'l'l't~'ri'k hl ",,,-,,tr,. a ]urlhilir Tdat;on,hip (It 
,h~"'hoIJin~ hl ilia"" llu .. "",.,-, ,," "'-'>fTibe "'I"'.lldy 
he"," bxh lhi: "<m>I,,,,' of <11"", thot t~. ««LLlm 
dir.-cw" holJ ."d the ,'a)"e "'rrO\;.,,,1 _, , I'-'f(enl:tgc 
"(N .. ,,,I,,),. 
Th" t'urrcW • .J!"" of holJjn~s of til< conrinuiL1g 
nem,iv< Jim-r(l" ~ "1l1h~ mi<klk rna';"t v..Juo 
(It' Pe'aNCll' ,Ik"'-~ ufiGS.5p "" 2. fd,r"rv 2(rOIi 
.lg>in<l ,ho ~ ",bTl( ><I ,,," ;\1 th .. "-"\'-'rt is"" iollo,.,." 
,\j,'rio<i< ",,,,-dino 
D,,,',,llkll 
R"". r .... l.".,j 
i<lrul.\l>kl",,", 
" " '" \',".",,, 















Sc,,'icc .~,:"m,_ .. " b 
...., ~ ",,, '" tt.r .rnnuol .<'J'<'Il ro..!l»I. I'o1.<f 
k>I·anuo. .. h ll00.J •••• m .. > Ji ........ " f .... "omp.>nY 
n,.... ~'>.:c 4l'''<T1C<11< p""'~I. tll<t tl>r ,on>pny 
..... ,,"""',.,.. tlo:>c 1Cf'~-n1i by t,·;,,~ 12 "",mb,' 
nol·ia,.nJ ....... ~·""'m~ ~~v 
...... y of liqw,\.,...J dl;j""~ III ,·:""'ll, ... n,,, ",-I' e",,!be ~,.. h.:o.Ion ,.,...,.,,,'" I I ,.~ ... '" N«(I. b..o T<rn;ji"..;J 
""titl..! '" 'UlM . ..,,,", >bun- ....... l<q;-l<m\ di .. 14 'j· C~"'I''''r l<rmin>tn .... "II'.""tnU -"'llt not".~. 
>n<I <~h<r hrMito. n..... "'''''I'''''''''''''~ ,et 00' ;1\ 
,., ".,....", .. ,,\ ,4~1 2g );0"",,,' ;:ooS, 
C.HR, \\'~ f .. 1 d"'l dl, ..... /lOt"" ,,"no..!; .,-,J rn~·i;x"" 
krr )iqWdotoJ o.bm~ ... ,' .cltq~ • • .:<>ml""""'~'" f0l-
D'!l!H' St.....,..,n rc1i...J .. ,w;,-, .... , ;Il, J "'''-''''''' 
un I L'\.'oiJ,...,. .:005. ( ~l":1 M,,",,,,, W>I 'I'P'~""" 
cn.,jn""n and J i~", nn I ( kI0b<-r :l'IJ~ . 
k»> of "IT;', and jn I;n. "'III .... "'>fl<-!. 
Tn '-';((1m"" .. wIth k"'g nI.>IlI"1><d ....,0..)-.• ..n 
eun lin'J.l:nll 0'''''''';'''" dirl.-ct,," ~.'" roII'n~ «-'!Vi.:<: 
.'g'''"'''nt, un,v,. "hi<~. oth« 11>0" by lormiJ»\too 
UJ a<tC!<Wn<c .,.,.jlb. lb.c L.TIm '" w~ "ICTI.-..mc'flt>, 
=p«'Y'n<nl cootinu,~ ,..,til r<6.-me-",. a~ •• 
W .. ,umn",,'" Iix- "'" O:t "P""mertt. ,,~,\ 'rr-bc>J 
,\u,i~ )'J(), (0< in II\.: ", ... ,' d I''''~ f,,,.,,,,,)\.j,j, .",1 
D •• m;' '~"e\",n tru. W i..:1 '" J I I,""",!, l\JO; 
,n,1 I c..Jot.... COO:; "">,,,-\;,,'dy1 on" \h" m~'''uc 
\cI"I'I' lv fr,.- 2()J6 '" l(~ 
. ....... _-------",=._..,.-, 
. ---~'"c·,.,<,.,.~oC'".~--"== "Ox, f" '= ' 
L' .\~.r lJ-,l, ' h ~,(",ti" ,;,,,,, ll~ <ii,,;',,;; 
:r", ,,~,~,. '0 I Jl rnGnttc, fN'" th< "'''>P'-'')' 
1 n:tu(><, lCO'; 1 
'N lul\' :-0, , 12 ",m'h> ,'rom <))(, ,~,,,,"'or: 
(>or ,.",->Or fi·('I.~' 1, n~mLI ~ '''''TI LI", "''''F.''') 
r~,,, .. . ~ ~. 
,"""""",,, "" ",,..,. 
~'_'''''' ' O''''N 
I !k')':i ,.r ", '"'' ," ,he dOl, 
of ter," i ,,,1,,,, 
lQ/.S of ' llnu,,] ",~ ', 'oc """ 
,.f L<r' nin-:., >Orr 
.--.;~..:,?-. 21."~:;:= : --======,----------CC, ""'."'"' .. ," __ . __ . ,~ .. ,' " ,'. "' "',_,.,,.,, Si,~""I"(~m" "',di,,,'or: ~ ,.,,,_, '"" ""_. u ~ ~~ 
~O"ob..·rXOX1 
ikr. ,"'r."" ,,, 
jl k,nu"'""i ",-,-,,:, 
1, ""nt I ,., (,o." ,I >< ''''''~" n)' "j' "7'" im';"";, 1:': ,n",-wI 
Six llli~lt],. from ,b. ,L ""-" ," 
l J ",",'" 1roJ~ ti" ,,",UI"""-
" ,, ' ." F"n".m '''4 .• 11 o'l ,~ 
oc,><fit> "l<i 5<AO of Fct<J"iJ.I 
,''''''''] "",~'ivc 
](ky.;" , """",1 ... ~')''' ll1< del(' 
oit"m;,,,,~,.,,,, :1 .. ", ,, ",,,1 
, O>t of P"""'" . ,,>1 ,ll oti" , 
l,,,,,.,r,., ",,1."1'); 0' I"'"""] 
","ud [",. otM 
", "".,,1, ro·.,.",,, •••.• ,n •• ,., •••••. -=.,."~,.,., •• ,"= •• ".,.,'":C":v,, tl>< dc . ., 
1: mont!>. from til< ")~''''''\' oi ",,,"i",,",o, "(' ""''''] 
",., <i pet""", "d "II ,,".~ 
Imp!<~ll,",J" """ I" ,,,,,,in,,'~1 
",. <il:-.o, I'lrty" ony ti","" 
,"1'1" L ,,, d,,,,,, "","I~' ,,,,~., 
from 'k Ji,,,,,,,, in ~'" ,~'" "I 
",,] ""'''''. ""¥r>-1t>on 
Si, ",,,,,h, 1o," Ll" "i .. c,,~; 
I: nx""", Im~' tI>t <O!TIjhl"\' 
ocn<fit; .,-,.j :;( ~;, ,--{ potentilJ 
,.nm~1 io<:,'",~" 
~«~i> of ,'Ill''''] "1:",, 
'" d '-"b'" """ ", I i " ' '',,' i,~ 
'(oJli, of ,"",">1 clary" ti>< d,,,,, 
""""i""i.m. ,I., ,mn"J 
""",- of r'm~'" ",d ,.I ,~her 
t. l",r" "" I .i'-:')(, "I I'; "nl,,1 
<'.,nud jJ"",b~ 












We d,'O(ribo !he rtlirl'1tl"'lL 1..',,-"1:1. fo< ,'<dI of th" 
<x.:cul;"'" di,em)", 0.: .. , .. d di",:",,,' """,,;inn 
an'ng<''''''~u oro "" out in tal>k 2 "(I 1"'<'" ,1(1 oj 
th" '<'pV:t. 
Ex.:c";,~, dirC"<:lOt'!l I'm",i!"le ~~ tl>..: "'I'",\UI,'<n"Ol' 
arr''''lr"",nlS "', up Ie.- f'ci,,,,,,, <mpk'r"'" M.r~'!;' 
<;C-",di",~ JoI1n M..xin>on, Rum 1"',;';',.." .00 p<,,,," 
]"'''»(Njc~ wia JM ,,,,c',.., l><ndi,' ULl<i<1' uL"'rrmV«i 
am1fli!'ID<"l> l"..:.ILL><' of 'he mp Or. I"" amOl"" ,,[ 
hend1t< ,h,t can I,. pr",';dod !Tom ,hi.: 'pr,w..J 
''''''g,,,, .. ms in the' US ",,11k l'K. 
11Ie p'-",ion .rrang,<m,'nb tor "I] the <'"cuti\'e 
dir.ct"" incluJ.. lifo imur"nc. ,'('f','" ..... hi< in 
~ml'l(>."",,,,, ,ull .",it;'mc,n to. I"'Jl';OO in the t\~rJl 
of ili,l><..Jth 0' dJ"h.ity. A p"n""n l(lT I ... " 'f'OlL'-" 
,",11,"' dop<Ild,nt< i, "I", ",'oil,tv OJ' .l<oth 
Ia If-.< US, \!'e 'PI'M ,d ddiMd bt-ntt'tt "'"ng<'T\l<''' 
"the Ih,<on 1",-l'c""o" fha. '[hi.; rl.m pmyid,~.1 
lump """ (00",'-'-;1* to a r<'n~"" "n ,...t'"mml. Th. 
bmp ;eLfH J{cnL"l .l6% "r c">,p"l o--,"npoem"lio" 
until .1 I Il<c,mb.:r 1(1)) ",,11,'n iurrh'7 "",nctit .mu.l, 
"",""" l\"orm,1 "ti,oLllon';, .<g. 65 alth"",oh "rly 
«1iI'm,,'''' is P'-'>"bk' ,ubje-ct to ~ T<'<llloCt"," h· t'.,I~ 
p,),m.nt, l\"~ '"(lNI<" 'r<' guaron .. «J f,,' r<";i~'" 
in paym,'nl l'h"tc lS;> sP"Usc', I"-n.."''''' ('1' <ka,l-. in 
'<'n-;':~ .",({ th.: "ptio" to prmidc •• 1,.111: in "<Iir,mont 
i"rlSio" bor' jcdlu:in~ lh. m::rnocr\ JXll~'Il. 
I ht '1'1'",,,,,\ ,[.,:{m.:d wnlnbution ,uTOIIg<m':J,t 
m 'he US ;, " ,WI (kl pm, . A, ","r.m'n~ rl,.. acWll"t 
b.,lanc", will l>o ,,,,,,1 10 proviJo b"n<ti"" In the ""nl 0' <ka~, befun: fc111Clll<11l, the "':oW'., 00I.&n",:, will 
be ,L«<! to prmi<!< t.:l,<iit< fnr ,1..,.....1,"" 
Tn the l:K. th, apl'rC>wd plall j-; tbt Ib'5<111 (;",up 
[\,,,,,ion PIon lind ,.,,,,un,,," Jim:l",; porti,ipalc in tl>< 
Final~' '<'''ion. "'orm.,1 rt'Iimll<',,' "!l' i:s 62 ~ut, 
,,-rbj'cr 10 tOmpJ.ll~ Wll'c'-", rt\itl"',,"1 ;,. p"--""bk ..s,,,. 
,"" .'il. n", a<:m,.ci p.:n';on i, .-...:Iu""t ~n fflire"l'nt 
pnor W ,!:' 6{),I',,,,iorn ia I""'m",' ore g""mntcc,j to 
;na"",e """ \~"'r " .,% 0' rho i",,,.,,, in tl>< Ill(l.-. ~f 
Kct.ill"rj"", if!~, I\'u"iorn [0' A mmlbc~', >JX1'U><', 
.k'poe,,,lctl 1 (hildT<'f1 lin J' (Of n,,,,,illAIC'J tin >nci al 
J"p"D<.hlfll"'~ f'l),,,ble;,, th, ""'C,!,,t of <I'".1,h. 
In «:'P<""': '0 'he I ·K Gowm"f)e"t'. ph", fo, 
r<,,~on' ,implirotiOll mJ <o-dleJ I\-D.\' <ffw,," 
troll1 AI"il cD,-\«. UK C"~'llli~. dirL'dOT> ",,1 olh"r 
m,m\l<:T'l of the r ... """ \~'~Lll' Pm.;;"" rl-.~ '~-tlO an; 
0' I>ro:Jmc, m"'t"J hr lh,' lif.lim. "nuwall'" .,ill 1..' 
,>lre"f'" • ".J, ""t"ri"'''''' a. .,., <Ii1,'flU';-"< 10 funn.'T 
.,,,,, .. 1 ~f rtll,i"" t><n.rn. ~n a ~",j, tha, ~ ~,oodl)' 
to,,[ n'~llnl ~) the ,'om!",a)", FurLh..:, J.-w.u, ,.ill he >d 
~ut ;n the r'PO't ~" dirtaors' "'InUll" <I\;on 'or 20110. 
M~fj"'ic 5<""1;",, 
;"brjorie Sca!-dino T='icip,,,,-~ in Ill< I'"",-",n In.:. 
p.,n,i<m Plm ,,)(1 tho aprroy ... 1 ¥l1 ikl p4n. 
AJJiLion.i l"'''''''' bmofLG will be pru ... ,kJ through 
all uiliundc'd ~l1apl'rO"l'.d <I'~Llod mntrihu~o" 
pion ",,,1. htr)(lrd ,i<ofiJlM ,c<lll'ibuti,," pbn 
appro>'<\1 by t L\! I<JcY':Llue.mJ C",;tomo ... " 
(orr<\l'o"diJl~ jl,m to '''pi"" 1''''1 of ·,Il. UnflLl\dcl 
rim. rh<, AccOmll b.:-.L1IloC': of th" U llli.lL,.j cd 
LlJ"'Pl',m-..1 <i<fuo.1 colltribulioll pi,n i:s ,itter:n'n,rl 
br rd",<'f"-" to the ,,,I,,,, of ~ notion:i! ,,,,h ;o<\:uunl 
:h.l1 ;nc"a"" >l,"u>II,. ~y • '1'<"<"",<1 llotioll>.J "'t<]·"t 
,,''''. '1'1-.i, pkn pro,·>'b Ihe "rPu.-lunjl~· 'co t"""'" 
, P"'P""~)J1 nt ,hi, l1o'ioml Collh .""",nt in'o " 
noti",.t ~ ... " ';':,Olt'" r<'I]"'ting rllC "ok" ,-,F " 
awnoc, of Pca,,.,n urJinary .I-Nt.", 'tbe mlTT1b,~ '" 
,h.,r", in tl>< Mti<ll1,1 ,h..,.. ac"""lt i,.< de'(O'o,illrd by 
r<f."""", W th~ m.n1-.ct value ofP"",,!; ,b.".".1 Ilk 
J.,,,, 01 wllvmio" 
J).,yid &'/1 
DJ\'id l>ell " • " .. ml...". of the ;'<'<\'lOn Group P""io" 
I'Lm. H" i, d'~iN" for" pm''''" ~f .,m·tni,<I, of ni, 
fm;>] has< ".1,,:-' at age 62 ,hL~ 10 his I":lg sen'Lt' bul 
eMir ,cUr.-mt'Ilt ",jth ~ ,tJuc.:d )'<'11>"'" bri,,,, that 
dal' i, I""ssible, ,uhi«.t 10 comp'"), (oo""l1l 
R,~UI Fnir" .... .! 
Rona hU""-'1d is A Inl'nlh<, "r ~'" l'c.Irwn Croup 
1\.11<iOll Plm, H,', 1'<"""'" '"nul ral. i, 1/:10th of 
l"'mionohl, "bry pt, """Urn, tl~lt':tL',1 LO tnc 
,,,,mag.' GIl' introduced ~. th~ Fin"". Act 19M. 
1'1", '~mpa"y .Iw t""lri"',"" ,,, A Fu",hl 
Uru\I~n~"J R.:riTl'fTlt'm B<Tl<.'liG '<:h,m.: {FURBSJ 
G" h<,. beL1If, In lhe ,wlll of dttrth bel",,-' 'culC"Il,enl, 
th. p"x",xl; ol,h. Fl'-RRS O(co~nt "ill he u.<Cd to 
p'~"id< ixnefit> ioo, j-o" &pet,.j"m~ 
hl"·/".·.",,,,;,.!, 
p('"'' I"..an<",;ch "A n"-"',b..:, of tb< Pe",><m Inc 
I\""i"" Plan OILd ti-.c appro\'"J ·!OI (ki plm. Ho .l,o 
patri(;p"" ;ll an ""runded, unarv:o-wJ s.,P""''''llt,,1 
E,.tttuli,'e Rotit."",n ll'l"" (SLlU-') thAl pro, ':k, .." 
I!Illllci .cCTu,,1 of 2% 0; n"<Ii ""(""!'" ''arnjn~~ It" 










US So.:i.ll ><-'CUri,,·. He IT"-,,,d Lo "uild up furlh<r 
l>ct"fits ~, !ht ~UU-' .K .II I"~ ... "bo:, l<,1Q!. Addilion.!! 
d<!il,,-d co"lrillUtion f>rn<lic. ... PIo';J;,d througlt 
" fund.d, un"l'S'TOV«l .j()1 :~) ""' .... p"n .nJ Ai' 
""f""""d, LLn"rrroO't-J "rr_ns=><nL In ~>.: <I"m of 
Je,th whil< ill t~.ir< 01 di~-iliillt!-l>tn<fu~ the .u:cou"t 
bolall,,", in Ih" detillctl cc~ I I ,-i>u1.iolt '-',; Ilji,<." .dllS \'I ill 
I", u.d t() prori<il: b.no/it; f()T ocprnJ.1l1", 1I-.. S~RI' 
Jrr,"'gemt"D1. pro, iJ., • 'I'ou",', p<nI,on ('" Jt",:h 
"'filk in "''''irl of ct...,h!!i(,. b."..,f", <md lh< ur<ion 
"f" <k~Th Ull<1ironll'nt pen"(I" b-. ledO(in£ tJ-.l' 
ruCTIl1><r', P"[\w(>[\. 
}o:", .I'j",b",m 
John ~ b.in«l" i, , m"m~' oj to< l'oo"'<}]l C"'L4' 
POI""]' Pwn unu~r ,,"h~h hi, j.><n,ioo"ble ,..,]4Ij' i, 
r.,.ridro '0 th"""'in~<car- Tn. <omp""), "",>Cd 
(0"tl)l",lioo, on :11 Ikv.'lllhc, :001 lu I,,, rUIUb 
.UT"'!>",,""'L llw-i"lI20011t s« up.n l'nl'"mkd 
Urupp"" .. ed Retirement Ikllefit; "I',me (t lJRBS) 
foc him. '!l\e UUI.8S lup' up lh< P'-""i<J", 1'1;,,1:>1, 
tmm the re"...,n GTOUf' remi(l" P"," ",.i the do,ed 
) l 'RIl~ to '"'gel" 1"""i011 uf (\,'lHhirtb t,r a ",\'.lluN 
D." <aiM)' on ""ir<lllmt at "g< 61. Th< r.'".>lued b",-", 
",em' i, Jefined " (4;0,000 etl«tiw 0 t 1 I",,,, cOO:'. 
mG •• l.":u 0\ I l",m.lT}, ",eh )''''' h,' "-fere,,,",< to th" 
in",.,,,, in the lOok< 01 Ret,il hi,"", 1 nth. "en! 0fh;,; 
d,\uh a l",,,,jnn fwm tho Pe.lT>on Ctonp 1'0",ion 11m. 
th. I'L:RUS ,,,J tho Ul'RRS ,.ill he )'ai..t to hi, <f'(l"-" 
c>r num'n,"",Ili.J,.]~'i.1 &pcnUJ!lt, ~.u-Iy ",I,,,,,,,,,U i. 
f"">iUe fwm ..go 50, "i,h conlf"ny am«nL 
Jh p<ruion i, m:lu.cro to tdI~, 'ho sh~lt'" ~vi". 
""d l"'OlC age 60, f"'lher ",du'-'.-J fOT cMI}' 1''';TIIcnL 
FX<'"",jYe dj",.(o,' ""n-e"'""'''ti". d'T« 10l"\hip, 
U,,! polic)' is (h,,( ,",,<cunY< dir<-'Clor.; may, !-or 
"!If<<n,,,,,, \d~. th" t>o.1L"J, ."'1W"' nnn-.',,,."~'" 
,,[ othl'! «(I,npJn,,-~ <!!>.l ret";l\ ""y h', !-"v.ble fOT 
th.;, ",n'i, ... 
(1,,,i'm.,,,', r<rnu""''''tion 
0;" poi,,;- is th,lt 1Ioe ,1"irl""'I; V,"" ,hOlUd I", ,d ,,( 
.r I",,, that i> U""p<titil" with tf""", of clui",,,,, m 
,imibr PO<i''''fl' in ""ml'.",hl., O"~'''Il",', I Ie ~ 
liN ,'nl,thl ((I olLI' ann'."J "T Ion~-!"lll i,k'C1lU"-', 
,di,.Olllem 0' other he,,,,fit~ 
I'h< ,'"",min",", "i"'" i, ~\a" wling into ,coount Lhe 
rcmuno'onon of ch,,,,r=n m wmr",,,hk l"',iti(ln<. 
,h.,rPTOp"'''' t"",1 P'l' ic,." j. f. 1.'_'.000 1"" }"". 
N, 'n _''''':ll I i,'< di. ,,:t(lT> 
F,,,, IOC non--t'"'-"'uu,'c ui",:t.o" "'" tklcrmin,-J u; 
tht fuji f.o:=d "",ins T'l>",,-d tv m.>.rk<! "",ti, •• nd 
within tl>< rNr;'t;"11; (ool.ill<ll 11 ,h. wttll''-'')'' 
.,-li,h ,>( """"ution. Non-c"-,,,,!;"'c din:do" r<c\'~'" 
"0 ot~,.,.-I''''· 01 btndit, t "' ..... t"~n ~ml>ur"'\lI<!lt 
Yr' ""P""'" "" .UR,j ir, ,'o<,,,,,-"l.,,, ",i,h !he" 
dir<cto.-<hir of tho mmpany) ~l1d 00 []('Ot ",rti.:ip'" 
"' t1 'C wn!p'lll'\ "'-l,ull ,L •. t>aI in«"li,. puns. 
p", coo5, lk ch";mw." omJ lhc c-,c,,\lt,,"< JiTOc\O" 
01 the b(l.lrd r~ .. i,,,"ed ,he kwl ..... 1 stn":rure 0' 
Itoo-t""lll\'e ui"'t\(''', Ie"" ",fath h,d 1\(~ bee11 
rn"'*,cd ,ioc£ Luxury !(OJ. AftIT rni..--..,-ing ",,-rem,lI 
bro<iUHrt,ks, the) "I'-'<'N an UKR"""-"n Ill<' bJ, .. ' h· 
to i-15.00lJ. on U"',,,,,,,, in ~'" itt tOr the mmT.1itt« 
cl:.tinn<n to £ I!l,(l)(\, tl>< intro<\u.;ti(lfl of "'I'M'I< 
f<,~ of [0,000 rn.- comm.i!!"" IDt"fIlber.,hip "nJ of 
LI 0..000 ror thto ><"11i", iLlJep.:nd.:n! diT<-ctOT ""J the 
ttpl,,,,n-..nl of til< tee f", ,wn-UK lxlw uiT":!or, 
with. fcc of fl.'.OO lor mcc'""» lDLrting:>. 
"-".' 
Ot:,iTm'"~l!p or ouJ:t "",I 
I'''''' '' d ""wll ;1l"", 
,k,",,,,,J,il' ,,f ,,00;, ,,>OJ 
1'C""-"lTId rurnm it"'-" 
; 10ill) 
S.-nioT ",4.--pm.l<n """,,,,', k< 
'''>c, third c-f t~,- boo,,, lu. (ll"' tht entire tee in (ho "I", 
nll\ana "J'iwru-. i. I",iu ll1 P'"drlOll >I"",~ !hal lh" 
nOll'n<:cntiy< ,~r<:cto" h~\'. rommill<J tn r.,,-.1ill for 
th< !'<'I'ioo '" (oor di"'-:tor,bj[". 
~111lc "'''' of P.""d:. Ce·;,:JlL. Iu, fee "''''' p.>id 0"''' to 
h" employer, 
N:m_,,=miv< JirectOl"' "''' .. Ptar50l1 ur.Jer k1lc" 
"I 'PI>oUll.nk'nl omJ do ,~" hot .. "",vi..::< contr",:t •. 
Th<l"e ;. "" .rniti<rrw:nt t., compe""'t;.on (In the 
t ""nin'l!o" uf 11w:u dir<cw"h,1'" 












'1>I.>Ir ', ~ .... ut""'<im:1uI'I F-h " ._ 1.. IO pcaIliMMdo.'"-*' ...... ~ilft(lulill ...... ·l.~·~iIIlNI_ .-
"-"---. ......... " .. "'''''' ........ --.,.-,,,,,,,,,",,, _>-4_'" r-->, "" ,. ~ ""'- ,k , .... ·"x ,,',_ ,  ""'·,~h , __ ~,,_ .. _ "" """._. 
.. _"""'''''''''' ..... ''''''''' ..... , ......... -......... b 
' ..... 4' ......... _'~ .... _-.-..... "' .. , .. _~ - .. -.. , .... '"-..-- .. ~~ 
... _ ... _ ..... ~ __ -_._,_ ... ,L" ........ --"'" ..... , ... -'.--..., ..... -, ..... ,,~ .. ___ ... ~ .. 4 i,~ ......... «_.,,"""' .. 
..... _-- ... ...-__ ... -"." .... ) ,.-"-"'---..-.,..-.... ~- ................ ~ .... "' ,,----.-......... , .. ~ _ ........... -
_.o;o~ .... _ ...... ,...,.. ......... ,... ... ~ 
""-""""",.. ----........... "" .... _ ......... -'_ ........ _ .. ,,,  , -""_ .......... --.... ' ... "'_ .. , "." ....... ""'" ----... _ ... --_ ....... ......... --_ .............. --
-,;:: I 
















" " '.~' ·F 
'" '" -" .l' - -,.,., 0.1," 'i,i.' ----- -
2,~7'I _'I: ... ~ 
"' ... , ,_ .. -.-.CO> ~~ __ .~ -J .................. 
"' .... _of "..;. .......... ' . .......... '"',''' ,. "'.". ~-'"-""" .... "..,. ,.,---- ,,"'-", ...... ,..,., .. ...,.;.." 
:'''::'''7~='::;''::=."Zo:.:';:'~100 ""-,._---_ . ....., ..... _ .. _.-..,-"."",--.. ~~-- .... --,..-,,,,_.""""" .. _;. ..... _" _ ... ...---...""" ___ ._ ... _ ..... _'r.t_"'.~ .,,,,-,... 
_'''''_.".~,~ •••• ''''J.o • ....,. ... __ _, ..... ..., ... ,.,'J'_ ... _""' .......... _ -....... ----.. ---,-.~~~." _...,_ ..... __ .~ __ 1_(..,. •• ~ 
_t", __ ....... "'-'--'_"~ _J _ <,.." 
n."''''I;·llncC,_", _,~-',."_ ......... " .... ",..,,.. ... 
_I~_ .... ""'~_I' _ • __ .(_ 


















, . ..." n."""',"","" ..... ~,, , ......... "'.< ,,,', ..... , ~"'" .... _ 
_ r_~-.lR"_ ... .-.. _ ... _w~"L_ 
=!. P,.,... .. ,,-u"',' ","", ,..., ~ .......... _""l~~"' 
""""""' ... w .................... .., .......... ..,_o- .... 
,,, .... "" p"" ""-..... ' .... ., .... -- """ .. "" ....... "", n <u>."'" ____ ~. "",,", ", .. , ....... ~~ ... 
C',,"'" "" I '._--1" \.'_'",,' I .... ..,..... 
""'" "" n~ __ r.h, ~ _" L"-"', "''' ~ ..... ',.,,,,J ........... 
""'_'" oa> .. --.,,"" .... 0."" ,"", ~ "'" _I "'>-, 
,~"", ........ _ ......... "" ... ,:> """. """'" ,., .... ~~ 
•. "-..... ~ '-." """". " .... ~ .. "'- '-"' ~~,,­




,.~",~" , l' ,,~"'" .' , ... ' , '. , 
I, 1:) • 
""", roo "" ""''''' ;~~ ...... __ ........... _ ,,, K,,",. " .. LI"'~"".~"""" ... .... __ 
-~ ... ,....-''''''''' .. ---.. ,--
~--;<-
.... 17\., .... __ ... """',." ..... ,,_ ....... 
'"",,, .... """ ,-~,,.,.. 














_ .. 11 1 __ ... _ .... '-_ .. _ 
"-(; 










Toble' t: \\twn","U "' di, ... -r",..' ~ in fC"Olr;'I<'J ,1\,,, ... 
~ .... In ~IN -= • .&1.",,\1 """'" ..... tmo.:!li,,!( plo.n, b ~. t~" U>::..'<ll;'" pWl; .\IId • ,,11< ... 
'~..lfi~ .oil ' l"".mbn :!005 ....., ,..-.I ..... "'" "',ll po.'l\JiIlj; ......... 
" .... , .... ,~ ..... ,.~-.. , ."",, 
'. "I 
~.:.~ ><~ .... ,~" .~ .... ,,'.~,,' , I"" " .. " .. , ",' _. ,., '- , ,,'--' ~ -,"-' ,'~,-. 
u.,,"~ ""'",.",., .' "'p' 0 311101 IO,ID) ! -, • 
j(" ,,);) til '. 'r ,;5/0: 
1<>r.1l .1O.fK\J I _10,(0) , 
\!.triori< ~ .. "m",..' , - .. , " 111~,'Ol ",1 ~; • 1<, ,,\] I.jJ-'_lp 11'-,/01> 
" ~/".'~ 1 . 19,0:<7 r • ':'l!!l I 
9,7/.1 I_~~~J"" "·,·m 1/3,m /.II.:" , ;(,1l1M2 ,\6;',(>Ifl 1 ffl,l1(1 ,\nl,/((' MS.,,!' 'i,.'~,-oj "~.' ,,'iJ_, O-;{;,Op 
I, ,0/9:0_' '''',2-I<J I 
T 
I-I-I_!~~ '<13-'1' 26.'J.f.» I , '_~IIl'l\t+--- _-Ilfi_._l-,?_ ' ------ i ---::~:: .u.~ ,!112-'0, I, ,J,'iJO,'Jj ( lnOOJ o",Or I!/'I.'O' +----------,,,,,1 g7j,6-1~ I 1'o.OO'J 19,(·) , 1 .. ",6,01:, 
D.,tJ Ildl .' lI.'~Ml (,J.' 1 oJ! I H.l3.'-.p II,' '-KI<\ .' I,/i.''') .l,n'2 )Nl i~ 1."1' 171-1,1)<, , 1','(110) ,'N,; -+- 'T' JiJ).1 '~I.0l' 17.'_H'l' 
1(,'4,-'()l 4.'"'3 
, I .1,~.' ''',-0,' ;(J4:U' I 
" W,,\JI 1 ~ ..l69 I ; I ,12, ,l,14! linn" 
q',/W liJIO> HI • ~" 
I, lo!I~.'''l li9NS !(,.61' IJ',O.6 "Js.~1' :,,'o!{J, :6,7fiJo (,:6J~, 
I, ,';,'1N) 9R:&;;X~ 9S.8I'(J }g2_~ ,6,'9/(\_ 
0 nil:/l}! Hi\ Ot\:'_l. _ ___ I 16S,{0;3 oU,Or 1IlL~.-07 
" 
L','UIt.'U" J /(j,00'J J),I.QOO 6~l.r:\, :.IN,(J,< 
T"t.~ -I5~.9(,9 ' 170,00:1 f 3KHl + ,i),!:" 
R ...... F,;rh.",r 
.;" " , 1 ~ll"-O2 1M S9],\'r I~'-~.'O' +--- I , 1'I<.utl.' Wi I 167 ~~,'!.lr' 1"!<.'07 
l7, • .'Td 7"1" 
I I T 7.'01 i-Il.o,_ " I;.'~.'-"" , 171He' 7.1\; .; 1':.02 i~ 1.0,. n-li\l!l 
16.' .. ·'01 .<i ... ;' ,,1# ".-;,.O~ WI.W 
i i,;-i6--1-- ------------10."11(6 1~,7-16 6JIW 101.,,,,, 
-----" -
0 S/·L'(Jl \OO'J , ",M , ~1:'.Op 81mlH llWS (>-il,'r 
I, 16,'1l1t12 "g,671' 
, 
26,(,1.\ 1 Ji,0t\> ~!~.Ip c& __ o.'ll'i :ol.-'I'J5 (,7("C'r , 
I, ~"'9l{jJ 'll',l:8n --9~.iio t '!~.o" !"N-'ry, , 
I, ' I I, (>I 1 05 "'-' 1(6,01>3 GI,HOp O'1l,2,J,7 
b n [;,;-11 ~ lOOooO T-
, 
ZO\fU, '",J~, ,V''-(j$ 
lotal 119,1Ill1 ' ""-It :11,61-' (el!}."" 












r ....... : ~ ... .-..... 'r.Im"". in .... "",,11 ~ WIIliD.ro 
11M ;.--..:1 ....... __ ........ bolo •• ohaK _ .......... " ..". ....... '".:mM pbn; """ • wbm 
........ ,1 !'Mol""" XIld ..... -.:I1IId .wNldf"Cl'di"" ...... . 
, II!~"'I Y,".' , ----------. 
" 11' ..... ' I~IO~ , I I W: .' (',,0.' 
" ~'!'\i+ I~Y'; • , ..,'11,';\! ,\'I(,"IP.O 
l.l.9-J8 
.1<,-11<0 




{i, I GS 
.,-,;>0 
I.-'~ .. '" 




.-.... ..... '..... . .... 
~- .. , ...... 
1.'-





" "I!I;:'t).4 :6_;'(10; 
" H~"'" IIoIHW 
li!tol 51 Ll 3-1 13n,00J 
,~ 1.Yli.!·l.l Im'JJ% 
""" J .... ..-...--.. """'" .,,,,_,,.,~ """" .... ....,.". 
...." "'" -""", -,., --,-"""-, 
"'",' "" , ___ ." ... _ " ' __ -,,w. "' ...... _ ""'" ...... ,.,,,.>L 
""".0: ........ _ ..... '._ .... ,._ ..... ... _ ", __ • ___ .. '.-,...., ..... ~..i"'_ 
"''''~'''--''' ' .. · .... _ ... h. ___ ( ......... -.."',,_ 
_ ...... __ ..  ... _ ...... d •• ".-...  .. __ .. _, .. _-""",,, ........ ,, 






~_ ..... >w ~,"~_.~ w'> C' .,-.. .. " ,h..."'_ t\, 
"'"'""" .......... "", .. , .. ~""" ..... _, .. d"' .......... _,,",,,,. 
" '''" ~ "" ..... ,,~ .-..0,'" c .... , ............ ,bo, .... "" >f ... __ .... _ JOf-.l .. _ ...... , .. ,.. .• ,,_ ...... _t,,,. "'"' 
,~ , ,.t..-; .. ,.., l. ""-';. """ """"', ""-,,,, ........ 
\ .... ~~_ , "' ... "'-__ ' .... k .. _ ' ... .. 
" .... _ ... """ '._" __ .,w,,"," ~ ..... ... 
"-"-.~,> - ~" ... )) ""''''-
l .. _ ....... _; . ......... ~ ..... ....... n"""·~U" 
"' ................... ~ .. _, ......... _'" , L ,.,~ .. ' ''' 
~~ ".N"-_, <L ,'-"" .... ''''{'''' ''' _'"''''' ,,~,'_ 
Tho ........... _, , .......... a-o-.-.- ....... ~ "' .... ".", ..,.... ..... __ , ........ "'""_ ,. .. ", .. ,"* , •• ,;....-J .... -- ,.". .... ,.,.. ..... ----,.'" -' .._'"" 
~.O>"'_'1"''''_ 
,.."" .. _...-~..-_ ... N..."._""J""',_ 
"'" ..-." .. --... '" "'" ~'" _ ... """"'" '" , .. "' ..... "";..;._t..-4 .... _ . _ .... _,-. ,*"'-_ .... ""-. ';'-,,"--",,-," ............ .... ,-....... -..... -...-........ ""-~ - - ..... -........ , •.. ~-., . -.......... "'-.. ,.-"' .. -"""~- '''''''.''' __ ...... _,- - ,_ ... ..... """' .......................... _ ..... _" .... -
11 .... _'j .~ .... "".-.. 
..... _""'" ....... ""_"'" __ >W .. ", "'''' ... , ,."""", _ ...  ........... ,."' ..... _  ........ ... 
...... _ .... ''''',_ ..... ~.'''' ...... _,_._ n" 
,.,.... .. _ ..... _d ....... "" •• _,-, .... _~ .... " .1" 
"",~,-- ......... ;,. ..... ~ , ........ , ~"""'.,' 
w ....... , ........... "" ........... _ ..... .,-.. .. I; ''''_ 
,~"""'"'D.-.--o;d ... "" _  •• ,t1 __ ,_ ......... 
n" ... "' .............. '" '" '" """ . .... ,---,,,.' ~, _,:<2 "'" 
""''''" .. ~ ... '''',_ ...... _, ....... _ ... ~_=~'''''J 
•• • v-..l .. _ .............. _ ..... ~ " ..... "'''_ '.,."'-;.. _ .... , ......... ,'"" 1"'_""" , .... _",. u._ .. 
......................... -_ .... ""' ........ ,,""--"'" .. ....... -~ .. ~_ .... "'"i_""_·· .. .-·, ... 
.... n ... _ .. , ...... "" to_'" "",,,',"," _ ""'" 
""" "",,<, "." ....... ,'" ,-.. "'" ,. "" .... "",. .... " "'~. 
'" .... " '" ~ •• ,.. ~ ....... "' .... ' ci-o. _. ,_,' ~ "-.;..-~ ~'Q "' "''' 
~~., "'.-'.~ " ..... _. ~ ,~_, ,-\." ,., ... . . c' . . ...... -
• ....... ~ .. _,~ ".If<! "'" "'" _ _ .',.. _,,~ l.~ 
.r"' .... """ ... M .• '1"", " .... , .... ""_ " .... ' ._, ,,, .. "";"~, 
'""."...,... ....... , ..... , .. , Dd .... ~' '" ''-'' ., 1.-,'" ",,.., ;,,,,, ... , ",." 
""_" .... n •• ''''' .... ... 











,A ...... _(~_ ......... . "'--',._,.... 
-al~,.-. ....... ..... ..... , .............. ,,,,_. ,.,.,.. ..... . 
""'.i< ""_ '''''' '"", '- f _.c.!'e" ""a..~'" ..... .... _, .,,,,, ,,, .. _. "" -.. ......... ",,~, .... <0"" 
-''"'''' "''''''",,'' C.",,""""'"""_., __ ........ ,, __ ...... ,,~ 
~"" "''' "' .... --"''''', .... --~"' ........ , --,. .. '" 
"",...~ .. . ld.'" " .. r"""-
A.' ..... '..-.. ~ n. ""' .. , ..... ,...' ...... ...... ,. __ ~ .... ,. 
"_ .... oro, .... ~ .. .... ,~,, ..... · ~'" ;''''' ..-.. ~ ... ,'~'I".,., 
>'""'~!~"'''''' ... _-.t._ ... ~_)~:_'''' 
_~._ .. "'""~;;o<" n.~.11Ol "" _,...~ d >Lo""".",, "" 
" ~.,. ':0), ,o. """",, ", ka_-" ...... " ..... "' .... , 
~,"" """' •• , t,.-~ ... ''-'"''''_''' ~, __ , .. ,.,..,. 
""'" ~"'. 11. -'" ,,.;,;, ,,, .. Jw-.,~ ""' .... ,. '" _,,' .," 
"1" '1"" ,,~~ _ .... " ""' ...... " ,-,.-.,.i'M."'" ... """" ... "" """' ...... """ ..... """"'d"" ........ "'''''' ~ """ ...... -"'" .. ". '""' <, ~ ."..""", 
""'.", _·N.~ ~ '.I ,,_ "'" • '" "''''' ,,. ' '''~'' _'" 
'"""''''' ,"'''' """,.."",.,"", "'''''' .... ," '" ...... " ..... -' . 
~"'_" -", .... "" "",. ." ..... ,,..,.,.. H~.·,,~., '''p' "FJ,-
"""", .. ,,,,-.-.-~ 
'''' ..... ,",,''''''' ..... ~,~~,"~~.* ... """"'o,,; , .. 
'''_. d ... IT" """" , .... .... , .• ,'"" .... "' .... ",'.''', 
. ,' he "~,,~, _"" ..,._,.., "" .... '''''" "'" """',,' '"" 
""., ,,_,,-'" U ..... "",,,, .,,,. "' .... ' "",_"""".", ""''''"~ 
"'~'i """~i_'. "" .",', '''''''_'-'-.,,'''- '.r.,." '" ,I. 
~ __ ... ....-,~. ;....-,,~ ... ~ .. , .... """,,,"'" crt"" ., 
,....-.,,-"' ... --........ ~,"' ......... "-"" ......... .... " , .. of""' .... ·, .... "'-""' __ ow ...... ~ ... _ 
.. "..., '" _ ......... ~ ... ""~"",,, .. >-.'; ... , "'"d", 
_"" .•• ~, .... " ........... ron "' ___ , ".~ "" ,. ~--~ ... ~",~ __ ~ ........ _ ""' ..... .. ". • ,...-, M' ."" .. __ I ...... "'.I ..... _."'''M~ ........ ~~_r.. 
"'om "" _J """, oi ,_"". "" , ;n.L·',' -...J •• "" ., ...... _ 
',","4,~_' L.~~ '._ 
r" ... , ,,., ","'~ .. "', .............. ," • ...,~~ ... , ... ,_'"'" 
i<. "'" ,,,,-,,< .. ,h, ........... ~ .. ,""", <>8' "",-.. ~ LoA """' 
..., ''''. \"' ...... .u .... "~. ~ ,.w, "" ...... ~""'_" 
~""'"_ .... _ '"~ "'" l';" _ ..... ~.; >h.-.", 
1\d,"", " ..... "" ... ~ "" " _,,," t ..... 1<, .... ,~ ... ~~, • .., . .... ~ 
... ~"' .. '4"""""'t-"'"""-"'" L"" •• , ~" ".- •. , .. ,,......., ,''-
"'", ..... ~ ~.""."'" ~ to" 
"~ ,~,"., ~"oi,'~ '''~,,,. ,h. ""<,.-,,," , • .-,,,j ',~. ",~, 
'I '" ",""" ...... .- , • • _,,' • " "" ... 1", _. , 1"'''-,,_ ~ ~ , .. 
, ...... , ' r·""'~ ,(, .. ,>u.-., ,.,.,_ ' ....... '" -'~-",f,'" ",ue "'" 
''-''',"" tt<.....-, ""'_"-"""''' '" """' ... ,,", ~'r k"""" 
...... ~, """."" ..... '" "",'" _ ",,", ,." c,",._ "', "'" ~'" <'Ito' 
,""""""" , .. " ... .........." oi ." .,'"-, .. d,' c •• ,.~, •• ~,~, "'>.. , 
"~ .. _ ... ,,",, _ '" , •• "_, ., .~ .. ""' ''"''~~' ' ''-':ioNI;o ... 
"~'"'' \...,....",~,., ...... . ,." b ..... L,~ .... \j.,,;_,,'., ,.,,",-h,,-., 
~"" ,b . "",. ",. .• ,,'l>..~ ~~\.~. ,., ."" .. ,~ ... ~I '_<cl~" 
~ ,,",,' .,,""',' "' ... ~""" 
foblo: 3, M""",:wnl> in dir<llor;' im<","u ~, ,hare "I'U()Il' 
St.""" W1Jn' ,,!,lion:&IT ,hjll""ed as: ~ =x<><iv., b wffiJ",i,J., sa'" to(' ,h,l">;, l'rtmium rr"",d; dI..J 
d long !.:rm inw-ci\." and ' wh." "I";o,,,.r •• "''''ci~,Ne , 
I .. ,"", """',"',,, -~ i" 4iW i J,':'; 
Tot..: , ''-* ~ 
~ 10";"-"", s.:,,4ioo 
" W"''!~ 1:6,,0.; . 
" 1 ',-'9,"" :;,bW! 
c 151",-. 1,~39 
" 
~.I"/!l.\ l ,n" 
• 
, 
~-,'" .. ",) .'7,,'8) • 
"' 
. f.i" .. "fi .)7.~ ,l 
'" ~. 
~!6.''''' )),.'>-'\J i 
IISIOO >.9~) , 
_'"100 ,16,')8' 
.,' WllOi 4155() 
.,' 'l/il<Jl 41,S5() , 





.------::~ --. l,.;~ 
' II'" ,.-. '--""", C"' 
-170.;"" ');.\!p 
~ ... ~!"", ! __ I_~-U!'_. 




I N : .'y 
_3?,o~J II 1 ~2~:?r. .. 
:.;, 1b] • ';~.' ."¥ , :::::T' .l6,~_' _'m.l;> 
! ,'U~:, H",trp --_ .. , 
<l.S~:' 11) '-lip 





























"fji l I 
"I'illl 
"{I,II , 
9--''1 I I 
P ".,0, ,;, .,' , ,""" , ',n ,'",,, '" , __ ''''''', ~uO' 
,'·1 












'Lbit '" M .... (ft>.:"'" ... JOIn",.> in,.n",I> in ,n.u, ~rlion; contin<>.>! 
~=u unJ"y oro;.,., .'" ~N '"" • O!.",utin: b W{lrlJ!,.w .... W. "'""'" C ~\tt'"'''''' yr., • ..!; .nJ 
d Io,'t;"mn """"to,,...oJ .. "",-no "f'<""" .1f< ",,'ITi...i,\e 

















J' til "Ill 




















___________ , __________ ! __ 'M-.M 
, 
.l7J 
- " --~--------;'-' ... "---------------------------
HI 
UI! 
-lcHI' !,~ 1,'!'07 
~."r 1.'il07 Ii.!!'>! 
j(l7-'~ 
I J-,,-~,'lr 
1~,7o:'_.~M'-'1' 1l.'{,1ll ~",,.,,. 





lC-,:I:<] lL:l.~ 9.',,'0< ~,_,.'ll 
1;:;;~1 H~l.~ ~'-';i03 b'll 
16,5:<] I-Ul.~)' ~.'OIUj WOIll 




1.1!.'(IO 1/1 iii, 
'11 '0.1 1/" /I i 











__ •• ~~, •• ~.,·I,,,,,"u;~C_1 • 











-, .. - ..... -... - ...... -~ .. -_.
, ....... ~-"'" -.. . .. Il00 _______ .... _ -"'.' ..... '---""' .. _ ... -_. ..... .,-.... _ , ... .. _ .. _.. ' .-.... _' .. -.-. ,-...... ----.. --' .... ~ ...... -- .... ~.- .... .. ..-
_._~"M __ .. _""-"'~" _.-... '_DnoIo.t_ ...... _ ........ _' ...  ......  ........... -._ .... -........ , ..... --.. _ .. _ ..-... _ .. -...... __ ..... _...  .....,. 
-""-, ....... ...-, .............. _' ... _ .......... wo ___ .... '_"'_ ....... .. 
~, ........... , .... -~ ..... -.................... ... 
,_._."" .... ---...--_ ... _...... .. .. L~ ___ .. _L 
... ___ .... __ ........ H ... '_ 
.... _..-_ ...... ___ .. PfOo ___ ....... ... 
.... !~-"f'_ ... __ "' .... _ ..... _. -... --... ~", ... ---....... - ..... --.. -"U_ .  _~·w<"''''' __ ' ...... _ _.  .... __ ..... _ .. -
_,_'-looI __ ... _ ..... _ .... ..,.,.-.. ... _'-........ __ ....... _ ... _ .................... _-
4'~"' ___ .. _ .... _. ' • __ 
.... _ .., .......  .... , ....... _--" ... -,,-
, ..... " ... ..,.... , .... ~.- ......... _1. .. _Ih ..... ~ -,.--... -..... -."'-... "' .... ~ .... . -, .. ~ ... -... , ... ,. ...... 
'" -.. ... """'~""' ___ l""""",... _ ..................... ' ......... "",._--.............. ,"'-.......... , ...... _' ..... "' ..... _. __ .'''"_ .... "'" .'-'-",- .... -..... ,... .. ~. ,...," .... ~ ... '-.... --....... , .. _............. ,... ............. , .. 
Tcr'v !!<If"" [Ij,,"(fN" 
~~ F<bru"l';o,>o; 
,,,,,.,,, "~,, .X,. r"" .. " SHL"'" "" ' )7 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
